University of South Florida

Digital Commons @ University of South Florida
USF Tampa Graduate Theses and Dissertations

USF Graduate Theses and Dissertations

March 2021

The Domestic Reality of Foreign Policy: The 1994 Clinton
Administration Response to the Crises in Rwanda and Haiti
Camara Kemanini Silver
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the International Relations Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Silver, Camara Kemanini, "The Domestic Reality of Foreign Policy: The 1994 Clinton Administration
Response to the Crises in Rwanda and Haiti" (2021). USF Tampa Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/9611

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the USF Graduate Theses and Dissertations at
Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in USF Tampa Graduate Theses
and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

The Domestic Reality of Foreign Policy: The 1994 Clinton Administration Response
to the Crises in Rwanda and Haiti.

by

Camara Kemanini Silver

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
with a concentration in government
School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida
Major Professor: Earl Conteh-Morgan, Ph.D.
Peter Funke, Ph.D.
Lawrence Morehouse, Ph.D.
Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.
Date of Approval
March 29, 2021

Keywords: presidency, post-cold war, news media, interest groups, public opinion
Copyright © 2021, Camara Kemanini Silver

Dedication
I have to thank my husband, James Michael Howerton, who never gave up on
me, and is the source of inspiration.
When I was 13, my mom rented a movie called Hotel Rwanda. Yes, a film is a
reason why I wanted to learn more about the Rwandan genocide. Critically looking at
popular culture can light the flame for future research.
The most credit goes to my amazing mother, Veronica Bell, who rented the film
in 2004n on a Friday evening. There is no rule book for raising two sons; my mom has
always encouraged my intellectual curiosity. After watching the film, I couldn't help but
wonder how, in a post-Holocaust world, another genocide could occur. This question
has been the focus of my entire academic career.
This dissertation is for Shamari Silver, who had to endure my ramblings about
school for years, and for my Mom and Grandma-Joyce Spell always supported me and
sacrificed so much for my education. My uncle Roland Eugene Salter and Aunt Eulu
Salter helped raise me as a toddler, I am forever grateful for their act of love. Lastly, I
cannot forget my incredible parents in-law-Kathy Howerton and James "Jim" Dale
Howerton, who would drop me off and retrieve me from the airport for when I would
travel to conduct research interviews.
One close friend needs to be acknowledged in dedication to Gabriel Sanchez
Jr., a good friend since the tenth grade. We went to King High School together, we

worked our first job together, we went to Saint Leo together, and the list goes on and
on. We pushed each other to reach greatness.
I also dedicate my dissertation to the Upward Bound program, which helped pay
for my ACT/SAT registration and college applications. Upward Bound is a pre-college
program that supports first-generation and low-income students get into college. I would
never have learned about this program if it wasn't for my terrific guidance counselor,
Mrs. Holt-Smith, who recommended the program to me. Also, I would like to thank Mrs.
Simone Reddick, who, as my academic advisor, helped me navigate through the
uncertain terrain of the college application process. Thank you to the late Dr. Douglas
Astolfi of Saint Leo University, who saw potential in me by purchasing a suit for me and
inciting my curiosity by supervising my bachelor's thesis focused on the Rwanda
Genocide.
Lastly, this dissertation is dedicated to the future students of Upward Bound; I
hope this paper provides you with proof that you can indeed accomplish your dreams. I
always tell my Upward Bound students, "If you do not dream big, then who will do it for
you?"

For
My Mom (Veronica Bell), my Grandma (Joyce Spell), Upward Bound students, St
Leo University students, University of South Florida students, and for anyone with a
fluency disability like me because “your voice matters.”

Acknowledgments
Throughout my life, educators have played a pivotal role in cultivating my thirst
for knowledge. I would like to thank Marcia Austen, Kimberly Leach from Letchworth
Central School, who fostered an inclusive learning environment.
When I was a King High School student, even though academic success seemed
bleak for me, I had various teachers' support. Amanda Perez, Jennifer Soprano, Karly
Dell, Bijaya Bose, Brodrick Rivers, Benjamin Burnett, and David Edwards told me that
anything was possible as long as I had a thirst for learning.
Since 2013, I have been perhaps the longest-serving graduate assistant for USF
Upward Bound Program. If it were not for the dedication, mentorship, and help from
Raymond Cabrera, I would have given up a long time ago. I would also like to thank my
terrific colleagues -Lawanna Hair, Carrie Blaustein, Evelyn Keeton, and Morris Martin.
The Upward Bound staff cheered me on from completing my Master's in Africana
Studies to the defense of my doctoral dissertation.
I cannot forget to mention Saint Leo University, which allowed me to attend a
university. As stated in my dedication, this dissertation started as a bachelor's thesis
under Dr. Astolfi. If it were not for: Reggie Hill, Dr. Heather Parker, Dr. Tyson Anderson,
Dr. David Persky, Dr. Anthony Epositio, Dr. Jack McTague, I would not have never
gained the academic background that made completing a Ph.D. possible.
My graduate studies at the University of South Florida have helped me become a
more polished scholar. I am grateful for having the opportunity to have completed a

Master's of Africana Studies, where I learned valuable interdisciplinary research
methods that I have used to complete my dissertation. I took a class on Haiti with Dr.
Kersuze Simeon-Jones, who introduced me to Haiti, one of the cases my dissertation
focuses on concerning Rwanda. My Master's thesis, which was "The U.S. Response to
Genocide in Rwanda: A Reassessment," would become the blueprint for my
dissertation. Dr. Edward Kissi, who was my Master's thesis director, was a tremendous
help. Dr. Kissi is a kind scholar who helped me realize that I had an interest in
international relations.
Moreover, I would like to thank the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies
(SIGS), who allowed me to admit me as part of the 2015 cohort of students. Dr. Bernd
Reiter, who was then the graduate director, gave me a chance by accepting me, and I
truly grateful for that. Dr. Reiter referred me to the McKnight Fellowship, and I
appreciate what the Florida Education Fund has done to fund my graduate studies.
SIGS represents interdisciplinary studies, and my research is an embodiment of that. I
want to thank Dr. Steven Roach, who help refine and expand my knowledge on human
rights issues. I am thankful for everyone in the 2015 Ph.D. program student cohort, but I
want to spotlight Dragana Mvros, whom I took most of my doctoral classes; she has
been a trusted colleague and a great friend.
I would not have been able to complete this dissertation if it was not for Dr. Paul
Achelty. Dr. Fai Howard approved funding to visit the Clinton Archives in Little Rock,
Arkansas, to garner the primary research materials I needed to write my dissertation. I
would also like to thank Dr. Joseph Nye, who agreed to be interview in-person because
he served in the Clinton Administration. Also, a big thanks goes to Ambassador

Prudence Bushnell, who has not only agreed to an in-person interview but has been a
great ally, and her support does not go unnoticed.
Finally, I need to give a big thanks to my dissertation committee. I met Dr.
Conteh-Morgan back in 2013, and he has shaped me into the foreign policy scholar that
I am today. Dr. Conteh-Morgan's wealth of knowledge is priceless, and he has tirelessly
helped edit and refine my dissertation to what it is today. I want to thank Dr. Morehouse
and Dr. Funke, who has been incredibly supportive of my project and have helped craft
it into what it is today. Lastly, to my outside committee member, Dr. Marco Rimanelli,
whom I have known since 2010, he was the first person I saw as a college student and
will be one of the last people I see as a graduate student. From having Dr. Rimanelli as
a professor at Saint Leo, he was the one professor that kept challenging me, and it was
an honor to have him on my dissertation.

Table of Contents
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. iv
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... v
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... vi
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................... 1
Abstract ................................................................................................................ 1
Post-Cold War American Domestic Expansion: Substantive Focus ..................... 1
Political Development of Rwanda .............................................................. 3
Political Development of Haiti .................................................................... 5
Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................... 8
Foreign Policy Analysis .............................................................................. 9
Role Theory ............................................................................................. 11
Democratic Peace Theory ....................................................................... 15
The Clinton Doctrine as a Paradox in Post-Cold War Politics .................. 22
Research Questions and Unit of Analysis .......................................................... 26
Hypothesis .......................................................................................................... 27
Concepts and Definitions .................................................................................... 28
Public Opinion .......................................................................................... 28
News Media ............................................................................................. 28
Interest Groups ........................................................................................ 29
Constraints/Variables (Domestic) ............................................................ 30
Foreign Policy Decision Making Process ................................................. 30
Crisis ........................................................................................................ 31
International Community .......................................................................... 32
U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations PDD-25 ........... 33
The Contribution of this Dissertation................................................................... 33
Domestic Power ....................................................................................... 34
Chapter Summary .............................................................................................. 36
Chapter 2: The Case for Domestic Politics in American Foreign Policy ........................ 38
Abstract .............................................................................................................. 38
The Presidency, Foreign Policy, and Domestic Variables .................................. 42
President Roosevelt Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality. ............... 43
President Truman Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality. ................... 44
President Johnson Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality ................... 46
President Nixon Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality ....................... 50
President Carter Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality ...................... 50
President Reagan Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality .................... 53

i

President Bush Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality: Fog of a
post- Cold War America ..................................................................... 54
President Clinton Foreign Policy, and the Domestic Reality .................... 57
The Power of the Domestic Reality in Foreign Policy Decisions......................... 59
Domestic Reality: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy .............................. 59
Domestic Reality: News Media and Foreign Policy .................................. 60
Domestic Reality: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy ............................. 64
Case 1-Literature- Clinton Administration Response to Rwanda, 1994 .............. 67
Case Study 1-The Role of the News Media ............................................. 73
Case Study 1-The Role of Interest Groups .............................................. 80
Case Study 1-The Role of Public Opinion................................................ 83
Case 2-Literature- Clinton Administration Response to Haiti, 1994 .................... 85
Case Study 2-The Role of the News Media ............................................. 90
Case Study 2-The Role of Interest Groups .............................................. 91
Case Study 2-The Role of Public Opinion................................................ 94
Gaps in the Literature: The Domestic Puzzle ..................................................... 96
Chapter Summary ............................................................................................ 103
Chapter 3: Methodology .............................................................................................. 104
Abstract ............................................................................................................ 104
Introduction ....................................................................................................... 104
Philosophy of Research Design........................................................................ 105
Decoding Political Norms: An Interdisciplinary Endeavor ...................... 107
Case Study Approach and Case Selection: Methods ....................................... 109
News as Archives .................................................................................. 117
Measuring News Media ............................................................... 120
Measuring Public Opinion Polls................................................... 123
Measuring Interest Groups .......................................................... 126
Integrating Elite Interviews .......................................................... 127
Patterns and Frequencies ........................................................... 128
A Compass for Domestic Power: Expected Results ......................................... 128
Biases Subjectively, and Limitations ...................................................... 130
Query Searches and its limitations ........................................................ 131
Why Consider Public Opinion Data? ...................................................... 134
Chapter Summary ............................................................................................ 134
Chapter 4: The Clinton Administration 1994 Response to the Crisis in Rwanda ......... 136
Abstract: ........................................................................................................... 136
Introduction: American Political Culture at the Fog of Genocide in
Rwanda ....................................................................................................... 136
Rwanda: From the Shadow of Somalia to the Question of Rwanda ................. 141
Interest Groups ...................................................................................... 143
Congressional Black Caucus Plea .............................................. 144
Public Opinion ........................................................................................ 145
Biting the Bullet: Contextualizing Domestic Variables and Theoretical
Framework in the Aftermath of Rwanda ...................................................... 145

ii

Theories of the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy in Examining
the US Response to Rwanda ........................................................... 148
Perception of US Interest in Rwanda/ Policymakers Interview
Response ......................................................................................... 149
Chapter Summary ............................................................................................ 152
Chapter 5: The Clinton Administration 1994 Response to the Crisis in Haiti ............... 153
Abstract ............................................................................................................ 153
Clinton Administration and Haiti: From the Shadow of Somalia to Action......... 153
News Media ........................................................................................... 155
Interest Groups ...................................................................................... 156
Public Opinion ........................................................................................ 158
Perception of US Interest in Haiti ................................................ 159
Clinton Administration Reaction and Discussion on Haiti ................................. 159
Chapter Summary ............................................................................................ 163
Chapter 6: The Domestic Reality of Foreign Policy: .................................................... 165
Abstract ............................................................................................................ 165
Towards a New Framework? Analyzing the “Domestic Reality” ....................... 165
Why Not Rwanda?-President Clinton Speeches and actions ................ 170
Why Haiti? ............................................................................................. 171
Question of the Impact of Public Opinion ............................................... 172
Foreign Policy with A Domestic Reality: The Clinton Doctrine
Reassessment .................................................................................. 174
Future Research ............................................................................................... 175
Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 177
References .................................................................................................................. 180
Appendix A: IRB Protocol ............................................................................................ 218
Appendix B: Interview Invitation Email ........................................................................ 220
Appendix C: Contextual Quotes .................................................................................. 222

iii

List of Figures
Figure 1

Rwanda and Haiti coverage in the News Media .................................... 120

Figure 2

Domestic Power ..................................................................................... 129

Figure 3

1994 Print News Coverage of President Clinton via Source:
ProQuest................................................................................................ 142

Figure 4

News Coverage-Haiti sources via ProQuest & Vanderbilt News
Archives ................................................................................................. 156

Figure 5

Americans Perceptions .......................................................................... 166

Figure 6

1994 Rwanda and Haiti Media Coverage via source-ProQuest ............. 169

Figure 7

1994 Public Opinion Polls via iRoper ..................................................... 172

iv

List of Tables
Table 1

1994 Print News Coverage of Case Studies .......................................... 117

Table 2

Coverage of US Print News Mentioning "Rwanda" and "Haiti................ 118

Table 3

Number of Times Where Polls Dedicated Questions to Rwanda and
Haiti........................................................................................................ 123

Table 4

Interest groups and Haiti coverage of the Print News-1994 ................... 126

Table 5

1994 Coverage of Rwanda a “Civil War” via Vanderbilt News
Archives ................................................................................................. 142

Table 6

Haiti coverage (Interest Groups) via Source: ProQuest: ........................ 143

Table 7

1994 Public Opinion Polls Rwanda via iRoper Polls .............................. 145

Table 8

1994 Print News Coverage of Interest Groups Mentioning of Haiti ........ 157

Table 9

1994 Public Opinion Polls-Haiti via source-Roper iPoll .......................... 158

v

Abstract
Domestic politics steered The 1994 Clinton Administration's response to the
violence in Rwanda and Haiti. This dissertation takes a novel approach by employing a
case study method to gauge the political capital of domestic variables such as the news
media, interest groups, and public opinion. This dissertation argues that domestic
variables' presence and absence can explain foreign policy outcomes in a post-Cold
War era. The fear of another version of a "Black Hawk Down" forced the Clinton
Administration to streamlined its support in foreign policy decisions requiring domestic
input. The 1994 crises in Rwanda and Haiti offer two case studies where policymakers
can examine the power of the news media, interest groups, and public opinion to
influence foreign policy decisions. The narrative of the news coverage, interest groups,
and public opinion provided the Clinton Administration with the political support it
needed to use ground troops to restore "democracy" in Haiti. At the same time, the
Clinton Administration echoed the public reluctance to get involved in Rwanda. The
Clinton Administration's support of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 940
to provide troops to Haiti resulted in eliminating the military Junta. In contrast, the
Clinton Administration did not support American troops on the ground in Rwanda, and
the violence escalated into genocide

vi

Chapter 1: Introduction
Abstract
Chapter One introduces the need to include domestic variables in the foreign policy
decision-making process. Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy is a case study that
analyzes the Clinton Administration's decision-making calculus in its 1994
involvement in Rwanda and Haiti. I examine the role of three domestic variables: the
news media, interest groups, and public opinion to determine the power of domestic
politics in the foreign policy decision-making process. To make my case that
domestic politics are important in the foreign policy -decision-making process. I look
at the political climate of 1994. Still, I bring in -Democratic Peace Theory (DPT),
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and Role Theory to demonstrate that domestic voice
matters in foreign policy decisions in a post-Cold War.
Post-Cold War American Domestic Expansion: Substantive Focus
In 1994, the Clinton Administration made two significant contrasting decisions
regarding foreign humanitarian crises. One is the unwillingness to provide American
ground troops during the genocide in Rwanda. In comparison, the second decision is
advocating American armed Intervention to restore Jean Aristide as president of Haiti
following a violent military coup that removed him from power on September 30.
1991 (The New York Times 1991: hereafter NYT ). These two events defined
Clinton's foreign policy decisions. The conclusion supported a policy of "inaction"
1

regarding Rwanda and "action" regarding Haiti. The 1994 American domestic
political atmosphere influenced the Clinton Administration's decision-making process.
The power of three domestic factors of foreign policy directly impacted the Clinton
Administration's decision-making process:
1. News media
2. Public opinion
3. Interest groups
These domestic variables played a central role in the Clinton Administration's
supporting Intervention in Haiti and not in Rwanda. This dissertation uses Rwanda
and Haiti's events as case studies while also examining the three specific domestic
factors mentioned and shines a light on domestic politics' significance on foreign
policy decisions.
These two case studies, Rwanda and Haiti, demonstrate a relationship
between the American public and the Clinton Administration's foreign policy decisionmaking process involving humanitarian crises. The Clinton Administration's calculus
in determining whether to intervene with armed forces or not was a political reflection
on a disastrous peacekeeping effort in Mogadishu, Somalia (commonly known as the
Battle of Mogadishu). In October 1993, Somali rebel forces ambushed and killed 18
U.S. Army Rangers as part of a US-led armed assault named Operation Gothic
Serpent (Armstrong, 2009). During the mission, the loss of American life ignited
outrage among the American public, which restrained the Clinton Administration's
commitment to providing military support to U.N. missions that were not in the U.S.'s
political interest.

2

In this dissertation, I critically analyze why the Clinton Administration in 1994
did not intervene in Rwanda during an ongoing humanitarian crisis that resulted in
genocide but sent American armed forces to Haiti to restore the pro-American
president, Jean Aristide. I examine how the news media, public opinion, and interest
groups influenced these foreign policy decisions.

This dissertation focuses on domestic variables, specifically the news media,
public opinion, and interest groups, impact American foreign policy. As case studies,
I examine the reaction of the U.S. to two humanitarian crises that took place in
1994—the Rwandan genocide and the military Junta's coup in Haiti—to gauge the
influence of domestic politics. As discussed earlier, the end of the Cold War, coupled
with Bush's New World Order doctrine, changed the U.S. foreign policy focus from
Containment to upholding global human security. After the 1992 election of Bill
Clinton, the U.S. furthered the New World Order's idea by focusing on expanding
democracies and free markets (Dumbrell, 2002).
The following section briefly discusses the political, historical background of
the two case studies of this dissertation, the Rwandan genocide, and the Haitian
military coup, to better comprehend the context behind the United States' reaction to
both.
Political Development of Rwanda
Rwanda's path to genocide involved the legacy of the Kingdom of Belgium's
colonialism, which created lasting divisions between the two main ethnic groups, the
Hutu and Tutsi. Mahmood Mamdani's (2001) When Victims Become Killers:
3

Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda provides a post-colonial history
of the divisions between the Hutus and Tutsis and explains the genocide in Rwanda
was due to a mounting tension brought on by the Belgian colonists. After Germany's
defeat in World War I, Germany was forced by the League of Nations to hand
Rwanda over to Belgium ( Mamdani, 2001). Belgium nationalized the two ethnic
groups and imposed European standards of colorism and eugenics onto them. Scott
Strauss (2004), in The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Genocide,
argues Europeans did not invent the two groups but saw the Tutsis as the superior
race. The colonists reconceptualized the two groups by issuing identity cards based
on color tone, nose length, and height. The Tutsis were seen as more elegant and
"European-looking" because of their light skin tone, thin nose, and tall stature, and
were given governmental jobs by the Belgians (Strauss, 2004).
When Belgium pulled out of Rwanda in the 1960s, the Hutus' as the biggest
ethnic group, gained control of the Rwandan Government. The Rwandan
independence movement of the 1960s solidified the Hutus' place as the ruling group
in Rwanda, but unrest between the two groups persisted for decades. Moreover, the
liberation of Africans from their European colonizers was a microcosm of the wave of
Pan-Africanist thought in the 1950s and 1960s that helped bring Rwanda's Belgium
rule to an end (Malisa & Nhengeze, 2018). The social and political inequalities
Belgium introduced to Rwanda produced the Rwandan Revolution in the early 1960s
(Silver, 2015). The Hutus ousted the Tutsi majority, and, once in power, Tutsis
rebelled in a series of conflicts( not to be confused with a crisis) against the Hutu-led
government.
4

The aftermath of the Hutus' grab for power led to decades of tension among
the ethnic groups. The violence in Rwanda bled into the 1990s resulting in a Civil
War. The two sides included the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the
Hutu government. The Arusha Accords gave the perception that the Civil War came
to an end in August 1993. The perceived peace agreements were hosted by the US,
France, and the Organisation of African Unity(OAU) and supervised by the United
Nations( The U.N.) ( The Rapporteur Report, 2014). The Arusha Accords effectively
ended the fighting, acting as a thin peace agreement between the Hutu government
and the RPF by establishing a power-sharing agreement between the two political
factions (Silver, 2015). Peace did not last long. On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President
Juvénal Habyarimana, a Hutu, was assassinated, and this event is credited as the
immediate cause of the genocide (Gourevitch, 2010). However, before the
assassination, there is evidence the Interahamwe militia—a paramilitary organization
operating under the Hutu government's support—was already preparing to round up
and kill Tutsis' (Stanton 2004)
The US was a strong supporter of Rwanda's United Nations Assistance
Mission (UNAMIR) and its peace process in Rwanda. Still, this peace process
between the Hutu-led Government and the Tutsi-led RPF occurred after the U.S. had
re-evaluated its role in global peacekeeping operations due to its botched
peacekeeping effort in Somalia (Barnett, 2002) (Silver, 2015).
Political Development of Haiti
Haiti's political instability can be traced back to the early nineteenth century
when the African slaves liberated themselves and became an independent state in
5

1804 (Coupeau, 2008) (Gaffield, 2007). Before Haiti becoming independent, French
Saint-Domingue shared its half of the island with the Spanish colony San Hispaniola
Santo Domingo for over one hundred years and was populated mainly by slaves
from Africa to work the sugar plantations ( Coupeau, 2008). The harsh treatment of
the African slaves by the French was the primary cause of France losing control of its
colony.
The United States' interest in Haiti started when President Guillaume Sam's
rule came to an end in 1915 (Coupeau, 2008). Rosalvo Bobo's occupation, who was
an anti-American, came into power(Coupeau, 2008). The goal of the United States
was to create a Haiti with American-installed politicians with pro-American leanings.
The U.S.' occupation's broader goals were to restore the economy, keep the country
safe by creating a police force—the Gendarmerie d'Haiti—and establish medical
facilities (Schmidt,1995). American financial firms dominated the Haitian economy at
the time. Haiti's most significant benefactors were the National Citibank of New York,
which held stock in Haiti's two largest American companies (Schmidt, 1995). There
are multiple debates on the influence of America's occupation of Haiti. Some
scholars posit the U.S. played a decisive role in restoring democracy in Haiti. In
contrast, other scholars argue the U.S.' goal was not to promote democracy but to
ensure a dominant American monopoly of Haiti's goods by excluding European
powers.
Haiti's American occupation is quintessential to this dissertation because it
shows what the U.S. is willing to do when the political instability is too close to the
United States to ignore. Moreover, as Brenda Gayle Plummer stated in (1985)," The
6

Afro - American Response to the Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934," domestic actors
such as Booker T. Washington, the NAACP, tried to get the nation to challenge "why"
the U.S. was occupying Haiti in the first place. By 1930, there was a significant
population of about 500 Haitians living in New York City ( Plummer, 1985). Due to a
growing Haitian community in the United States, Haitian journalists such as Joseph
Mirault wrote extensively about Haiti's American occupation issues in the early 20th
century.
Although Haiti's American formal occupation ended in 1934, Haiti was still
strategically important to the United States. The location and closeness are how
Gilburt Loescher and John Scanlan (1984) characterized U.S. interests by stating,
"Strategically situated between the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, Haiti has
long been regarded as within the sphere of American influence" (Loescher &
Scanlan, 1984). Major political issues stemmed from Haiti's American occupation,
including American domination of industries in Haiti, the rise of the Haitian military as
part of the political process, and the migration of Haitians of all social classes to
other states. Before removing President Aristide in 1991, Haiti was plagued by
decades of dictatorships, including Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) and Jean-Claude
Duvalier (Baby Doc) (Schmidt, 1995) ( Trouillot ,1990).
In 1991, Haiti had its first open and democratic election. The elected
candidate was Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who ran on a platform against inequality with
strong anti-military overtones. After seven months of Jean Aristide's election as
president of Haiti, he was deposed by the military. The military coup showed Haiti's
democracy's weaknesses and alarmed some of its regional neighbors, such as the
7

United States. Haiti's indefinite future caused concern to the United States, which
prompted the Bush presidency to enact the Kennebunkport Order.1 The
Kennebunkport Order forced Haitian refugees were traveling by sea to return to Haiti
without offering political asylum requests (Henderson, 1992). Immigration would be
the primary variable regarding American involvement in Haiti.
The Clinton Administration's response to Rwanda and Haiti's violence are
connected because they both occurred soon after the failed peacekeeping effort in
Somalia. The creation of PDD-25 in the wake of the peacekeeping disaster in
Somalia halted and refocused the support of future American-led peacekeeping
operations(Silver, 2015). The Clinton Administration's handling of Somalia, 1993 is
and politically reflected in the Administration's subsequent response to Haiti and
Rwanda in 1994. This dissertation will go beyond the internal narrative of how
Rwanda and Haiti arrived at near-anarchic turmoil but will focus on the question of
American Intervention and how domestic politics influences foreign policy decisions.
Theoretical Framework
This dissertation aims to determine how domestic politics influence the
direction of American foreign policy issues, examine domestic forces such as interest
groups, the news media, and public opinion, and assess their influence on the
foreign policy decision-making process. I employ the theories and approaches to
understand better the foreign policy decision-making process, including Foreign
Policy Analysis (FPA), role theory, and the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT). Foreign
policy analysis explains how foreign policy is conducted; role theory describes how

1

President George H.W Bush, 41st President of the United States

8

the state sees itself within a broader international system. DPT examines how
internal mechanisms within democracies constrain the exu=ecutive in public policy
actions. While their other determinants outside of domestic for foreign policy inputs
such as external sources, individual sources, and government sources, this
dissertation will focus on domestic sources of foreign policy (McCormick,2018).
All of these approaches and theories are necessary for determining how
domestic politics influence foreign policy. In the United States, foreign relations are
handled primarily by the government's executive branch—the president acts as the
military commander-in-chief and is supported by a large team of foreign policy and
defense advisers (Shea et al., 2018). Moreover, the president can quickly act
through executive orders, while Congressional gridlock can cause responding to
international crises slow. Accordingly, I am focusing on the three domestic
categories—the news media, interest groups, and public opinion—influence the
executive branch's judgment regarding foreign policy issues. Using FPA, role theory,
and DPT, I will better understand the influence these domestic forces have on the
foreign policy decision-making process.
Foreign Policy Analysis
As discussed in Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox (2018) by Morin JeanFrédéric and Jonathan Paquin, foreign policy analysis (FPA) is the "continuous
interaction between actors and their environment" ( Jean-Frederic and Paquin 2018).
FPA is not a theory but an approach to understanding the decision-making process.
Moreover, the FPA approach places a premium on contemplating the role of

9

domestic politics in the foreign policy decision-making process as Kaarbo (2015)
states:
FPA refers to a complex, multilayered process, consisting of the objectives that
governments pursue in their relations with other governments and their choice
of means to attain these objectives...Thus foreign policy encompasses the
complicated communications within governments and amongst its diverse
agents, plus the perceptions and misperceptions, the images of other countries,
and the ideologies and personal dispositions of everyone involved. An important
part of the study of foreign policy has been the nature and impact of domestic
politics. (p. 191)
Pluralism is an issue FPA contributes to the foreign policy decision-making
process. A democracy with competing interests of various social groups is a pluralist
state. Levin and McCourt (2018) state that pluralism is "a normative position which
values that diversity, given the public vocation of social science." The diversity of
different political actors makes up the domestic apparatus that influences the
government's decisions, including foreign policy matters( Jean-Frederic & Paquin,
2018). Further, pluralist states rarely have a domestic consensus on foreign policy
matters. By having distinct "culture and identities, subjectivity, and domestic
institutions," in the United States of America, various interest groups will think
differently on foreign policy issues and campaign for decisions best serve their
interests (Kaarbo, 2015). Domestic actors matter because each societal group in
states with checks and balances has different material interests. By viewing pluralism
through the lens of FPA, we can view interest groups, the news media, and public
opinion as influencing factors in the foreign policy decision-making process.
Concerning pluralism, FPA considers varying interest groups' function as
fulfilling a particular void in public policy. Some of these interest groups have more
10

power than others. Interest groups have a more decisive influence over the foreign
policy decision-making process by providing financial support to candidates and
getting them elected or re-elected (Alden &amp; Aran, 2017). Interest groups can
also help provide political support for government leaders. FPA is essential because
if interest groups threaten withdrawal of financial aid or verbal support from a
president, they may be obliged to succumb to the groups' demands. Interest groups
represent different American population segments such as race, age, class, and
gender on various policy issues.
Role Theory
Role theory examines states' roles in an international context. In the foreign
policy decision-making process, role theory, like FPA, focuses on why states behave
the way they do in the global system. Role theory, as mentioned in Rethinking
Foreign Policy Analysis: States Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavior
International Relations (2011), links "psychological processes and social processes
in world politics." States determine how to interact with each other depending on their
domestic climate.
If the state's role in the international system is predicated on its domestic
culture, foreign policy may appear a two-step game. "Diplomacy and Domestic
Politics: the Logic of Two-level Games" (1988) examines in understanding foreign
policy; it will always be a two-tier game. There are competing forces in the domestic
sphere that can impact the state's role on the international stage.
Role theory also connects the self-identity of a state with its role in the
international system directly. The domestic needs of a state can impact the
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subsequent actions in the global system. Domestic power is an area this dissertation
focuses on because it can function as several actors influence the more significant
state's identity; therefore, role theory examines the interaction of constraints placed
on the distribution of power and interests (Walker, 2011). It appears for a
government to concede on its role in the international system, internal analysis of the
state must be conducted by the executive branch first to see what the government
goals the state wants to pursue.
The recognition of role theory is imperative to this dissertation because I am
examining the influence of a nation's domestic climate on its international affairs,
such as engaging in war, humanitarian interventions, etc. Therefore, the direction in
which states interact globally may derive from democratic states' policymakers who
answer the public. Holsti (1970) contributed the scholarship of the domestic politics
influence on foreign policy in his article, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of
Foreign Policy." A critical question Holsti wrestles with is, "What are the sources of
role conceptions held by policymakers?" ( Hoslsti, 1970)" It can be inferred an
external war beyond the control of a state can still trigger domestic groups to express
their views of the proper course of action policymakers need to take.
Holsti posits the domestic climate of a country is evolutionary because it's
constantly changing; therefore, national roles change as well—which is also a notion
posited by FPA. Morin and Paquin discussed the correlation between FPA and role
theory is more robust when states construct a national identity (Morin & Paquin,
2018).
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Holsti alludes to domestic sources' factor into the foreign policy decisionmaking process. The sources that are mentioned:
Location and major topographical features of the state; natural, economic and
technical resources; available capabilities; traditional policies; socio-economic
demands and needs as expressed through political parties, mass movements,
or interest groups; national values, doctrines, or ideologies; public opinion
"mood"; and the personality or political needs of key policy- makers( p. 246).
Role theory shares a lot in common with constructivism, such as their view on
the above sources' expectations. Interest groups, the news media, and public opinion
views on foreign policy are constructed based on the current and past political
history.
How does a country determine it wants to prevent the human suffering of
another country? That is a question constructivist such as Luke Glanville (2003) have
taken up. A government would also intervene in another's domestic affairs drives role
theory into a constructivist's terrain. Maintaining norms is the contention issue when
considering international humanitarian intervention efforts (Glanville, 2003).
Glanville identifies three different society norms: prohibitive, which governs
legal norms of prohibitive behavior; permissive, which governs legal norms of
permitted behavior; and prescriptive, which regulates legal norms of expected
behavior. I focus on prescriptive norms when viewing the question of how domestic
politics influenced the U.S.' reaction to the Rwandan genocide and the coup in Haiti.
If a country's political climate changes, then it may lead to "the changing norms of a
state's interests and may create new interests" (Digression 2014). Previous state
interests are usually relegated to issues in the past and current political feelings. For
example, the United States' failed 1993 military peacekeeping mission in Somalia
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was the immediate cause of the Clinton Administration's cautious reaction to both
Rwanda and Haiti.
Regarding domestic norms' influence on Humanitarian Intervention,
Glanville(2003) provides a rationale of the decision-making process below:
The general problem is that Intervention, even when it is justified, even when it
is necessary to prevent terrible crimes, even when it poses no threat to regional
or global stability, is an imperfect duty—a duty that doesn't belong to any
particular agent. Somebody ought to intervene but no specific state in the
society of states is morally bound to do so . . . The massacres go on, and every
country that is able to stop them decides that it has more urgent tasks and
conflicting priorities; the likely costs of Intervention are too high (p 252-252 ).
The statement above deconstructs the domestic calculus behind other
states' decision-making process by stating the political climate in a society is a factor
in their decision to intervene. The United States, post-Somalia, no longer wanted the
burden of being the world's sole police force. The Clinton Administration also wanted
to refocus his Administrations's attention away from foreign policy and other
healthcare issues (Fallow, 1995).
If such norms prohibit a state's Intervention, what factors might influence a
country to intervene in another country's humanitarian crisis? It is interesting
Glanville argues states can both comply with their norms while providing
humanitarian aid to another country( Glanville, 2003). The problem is how the state
recognizes its morality when debating Humanitarian Intervention. Glanville cites the
Rwandan genocide as an example of prescriptive norms. He states the call for
invention was taken seriously regarding Rwanda when a few states, such as New
Zealand and the Czech Republic sounded the alarm a genocide took place(Glanville,
2003).
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In understanding the domestic role in foreign policy, constructivists possess
an essential component in comprehending role theory because of the belief a state's
interest can be socially constructed; therefore, the domestic interests derive from
what the society thinks is important. Role theory builds on what constructivists have
built on by stating, "Agents……are embedded in the social and cultural institutions of
the states they represent as foreign policy decision-makers" ( Breuning, 2012). The
issue on the domestic side is what role the country should play in the international
community. There is a relationship between a state's political environment and the
interests of the state. Holsti states foreign policy behavior stems "primarily from
policy makers' role conceptions," domestic needs, demands, and critical events or
trends in the external environment" (Holsti 1970). The overall political climate also
plays a prominent role in a democratic country's foreign policy matters.

Democratic Peace Theory

The institutional explanation of how the public has a voice in foreign policy
issues starts with democratic states' structure. It is theorized democratic states are
less likely to go to war with each other. Democracies usually have regular elections
for the top government positions, competitive political parties, and basic human
rights (Griffiths et al., 2014). The idea that the executive can be constrained, in a
nutshell, is Democratic Peace Theory(DPT). John M. Owens(1994) postulates the
philosophy of liberalism created the Democratic Peace Theory. He explains the
following:
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Liberal democracy is a state that instantiates liberal ideas, one where
liberalism is the dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war
decisions. That is, liberal democracies are those states with a visible liberal
presence, and that feature free speech and regular competitive elections of the
officials empowered to declare war ( p. 89).
Liberalism focuses on the idea that a state's domestic interests drive the
foreign policy decision-making process(Moravcsik, 2008). Moreover, states embody
the demands of the domestic population regarding foreign policy-related matters.
The executive branch's idea being constrained by the domestic community has been
studied in regime type theory, the DPT, and variants of liberalism. Even though these
theories represent more of an I.R. theory, the various theories discussed are
indispensable in understanding a democratic state's behavior toward the
international stage.
In understanding the moral ramifications of a democratic country's decision to
intervene or not, analysis is needed in understanding democratic countries' stance
on Intervention to protect human rights and their overall position on the war. Kant's
Perpetual Peace theory states countries that share republican constitutions remain in
a perpetual state of peace.
Kant's stance on a theory of universal hospitality may sound cosmopolitan due
to the idea republican conditions are more likely to be peaceful. Kant is relevant to
this dissertation because of the debate on non-democratic dates that may act.
Moreover, the regime-type of the country may indicate how the international
community treats the state.
Kant pays close attention to how the domestic population is concerned
with war. Kant states:
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[I]f the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be
declared (and in this constitution, it cannot but be the case), nothing is more
natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game,
decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be:
having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having
painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure
of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace
itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future.2
Kant understands the domestic population plays a role in international
Intervention because of the price of war. The domestic population of a country is
significantly impacted when the government is involved in a war. A vital domestic
causality in any war or peacekeeping operations is the loss of life and the economic
burdens of funding a war. These burdens give the domestic population an incentive
to be vocal about getting entangled in international crises.
Michael Doyle's 1983 article, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,"
expands on Kant's theory and gives rise to the DPT to explain how democratic
countries get involved in a war. In his article, Doyle draws from Kant, stating the
three factors for perpetual peace are the following: All states must be republics,
States will gradually establish peace among themselves by the expansion of a
specific union, All states must respect a cosmopolitan law about how they treat
foreigners in their midst. (Doyle, 1983).
Further, Doyle posits various forces push liberal regimes toward peace—
citizens in a liberal state must personally bear the costs of going to war, and liberal
republics respect replies and expect to be respected by them(Doyle, 1986). In his
second article, Doyle states that democracies' constitutional features make their
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http://web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/web%20publishing/KantOnPeace.htm
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regime types very different because their societies are more involved in the decisionmaking process. He continues democratic states are less likely to go to war because
they must answer to their citizens. Citizens pay for wars through their taxes.
Moreover, citizens elect their leaders through open elections, which causes foreign
policy issues to be debated out in the open.
On humanitarian interventions, Doyle writes the United States' political
process puts the domestic poor's needs in the United States above the foreign poor's
needs (Doyle, 1983). Doyle also realizes states that do not respect their citizens'
rights may not adhere to a universal standard of human rights (Doyle, 2005).
Understanding divisions in how states within the international community understand
human rights is critical because it will explain individual country responses to
humanitarian crises abroad.
In Bruce Russett's 1995 book, Grasping Democratic Peace, Russett states
democracies with organized political systems, in general, operate under restraints
that make them more peaceful, but only in their relationships with other political
systems (Russett, 1995).
Russett points out two essential models to illustrate his thoughts: the
cultural/normative and institutional models. The normative model states that
decision-makers will follow the same crisis resolution norms as those developed by
the domestic political process (Russert, 1995). In democracies, decision managers
expect to resolve disputes by compromise and nonviolence, respecting others' rights
and continued existence. Stable democracies respect other democracies. Because
of the separation of powers, the institutional model constrains leaders in democratic
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states; this separation means power is not channeled through one person. There are
multiple branches making decisions. In this model, checks and balances act as
safeguards to ensure one branch does not exercise or abuse its power over the
other branches(Russert, 1995). Checks and balances would explain the expanded
congressional oversight after an enormous loss of life in Vietnam.
Moreover, regarding democratic peace, there are two arguments within the
Democratic Peace Theory regarding the characteristics of peaceful states. Dyadic
peace means democratic regimes are only peaceful with each other. Monadic peace
means democracies are peaceful in their relations with all countries(Russert, 1995).
Previous research shows when addressing the escalation of international crises,
democratic peace is primarily a dyadic process. Democracies determine what type of
state they are dealing with and adjust their techniques accordingly, and democracies
believe fellow democracies will not use force. Like Doyle, he uses Kant as a
foundation by conjecturing the more democracies there are in the world, the more
peaceful. Still, he does not explain if democracies can apply the same democratic
cultural norms to non-liberal states (Russert, 1995).
Also, the Democratic Peace Theory(DPT) primarily focuses on interstate wars.
DPT does not account for democracies taking action against non-democracies that
are imposing human suffering. Intervention is an area of contention in the DPT.
When a state should involve itself in another's matters, the issue is an issue I will
address in the following sections.
The issue of why a democratic state would get involved in a crisis abroad is
the focus of this dissertation because democratic states have been involved in
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numerous disputes throughout history for many reasons. In this viewpoint,
democracies will not go to war with each other, but non-democracies are part of the
Democratic Victory Theory. David Lake's 1992 article, "Powerful Pacifists," states
democracies are most likely to prevail in wars with autocratic states. Lake also says
democracies tend to devote more resources to security to attract more significant
societal support for their policies(Lake, 1992). Democracies turn their battles into
ideological wars; thus, there is a case to be made democracies are more likely to go
to war.
In "Democracies at War," Reiter and Stam explain how democracies win all
their wars: they are better at choosing their wars strategically, and they have superior
military power because democratic culture produces better-skilled fighters( Reiter &
Stam, 2008). The idea democratic states believe they are more likely to win wars is
why democratic states would get involved in wars.
Democratic states do have limits when it comes to getting involved in wars.
Reiter and Stam explore what I mentioned earlier that the American public sensitivity
to casualties; for instance, after the Battle of Mogadishu, the United States scaled
back its peacekeeping operations. Politicians recognized the power of positive public
opinion in the wake of Somalia. Ambassador Robert Oakley, a U.S. special envoy to
Somalia, indicated: "We have studied Vietnam and Lebanon and know how to get rid
of Americans, by killing them, so public opinion will put an end to things" (Reiter &
Stam, 1995). Reiter and Stam studied xenophobia in the United States, explicitly
asking whether Americans care about foreign blood being spilled because of the loss
of life may divide the public on whether the government should intervene or not
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(Reiter & Stam, 2008). The issue of racial differences brings up even more
questions. If a democratic state is willing to go to war because of ideological reasons,
do race relations matter more than genocide? Are there limits to ideological
arguments as to what is a good cause and if it serves the U.S.'s interest? The
majority of wars in which the United States engaged in the twentieth century were
ideological wars to halt communism's spread because the U.S. saw it as a direct
threat to capitalism.
As established earlier, pluralism acts as a constraint on American foreign
policy issues. Congress and the president must answer to their varying constituents,
and when foreign policy affects constituency adversely, politicians are more reluctant
to pursue a course of action. David J. Lorenzo explores three normative binaries that
help explain the motivators behind a state's decision to go to war (or not): an
exceptionalist/non-exceptionalist binary, a moral/practical binary, and a
conservative/reformer binary(Lorenzo, 2018). Lorenzo took these three categories
and made them even more specific to explain a state's pluralist principles better
when considering war. These principles include defensive nationalism, defensive
pragmatism, moral exceptionalism, moral universalism, non-interventionism reform,
and non-interventionist traditionalism (Lorenzo, 2018). These motivating forces may
often clash with one another among pluralist groups in a country and, subsequently,
restrain a state from engaging in war. Indeed, the United States may be a
democracy, but not everyone shares the same foreign policy views.
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The Clinton Doctrine as a Paradox in post-Cold War Politics
Clinton's foreign policy doctrine was based on idealism. It viewed the United
States as the world's moral compass in Bush's New World Order. It carried out this
vision by engaging in peacekeeping efforts to expand democracies and free markets
worldwide (Lorenzo, 2018). This Wilson-inspired doctrine would highlight and
promote democracy promotion. The Clinton Doctrine highlights Kant's spirit of the
Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) because the Clinton Administration initially had
peacekeeping as a significant component of his foreign policy platform. The Clinton
Doctrine was a fundamental departure from the Containment policies part of most of
the presidents of the United States foreign policies of the Cold War era. Unlike the
1990s, there was a lack of a perceived security threat like Communism was the
tangible element of the Cold War. The Clinton Administration, concerned with the
perceived threat being rogue states, can explain the concept of
securitization(Søndergaard 2015).
However, Clinton's response to Haiti and Rwanda's crises might be seen as a
contradiction to this version since the Administration weighed the benefits of
intervening in each crisis to what the United States could gain. John Rawls (1970), in
"A Theory of Justice," argues all societies view human security as a fundamental
right. Therefore, whether liberal states and non-liberals can agree is essential to the
entire international community(Rawls, 1971). The contradictions of the Clinton
Administration's actions regarding humanitarian Intervention did not make his
doctrine a stable foreign policy platform because the U.S. would place a hierarchy on
fundamental rights based on American domestic concerns.
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In a Cold War lens, stability was a constant stalemate between two
superpowers s the U.S. and the USSR. Now with the perceived defeat of the USSR,
the fear of the unknown may be the issue. In the 1990s, the E.U. and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) were strengthened, and according to Francis
Fukuyama, democracy would become the world's defeat regime type due to the
defeat of the Soviet Union(Fukuyama, 1992).
The Clinton Doctrine, in Clinton's first years of office, however bold and
idealistic, faced the issue of how the U.S. finds its role in a post-Cold War where the
Soviet threat does not exist. The U.S. appeared to be the sole superpower with a
powerful military. It did not matter when it felt like most of Clinton's foreign policy, as
Henry Kissinger said, "a series of seemingly unrelated decisions in response to a
specific crisis(Dumbrell, 2002). Dumbrell said despite some of the coherent nature of
the Doctrine because it at first championed a peacekeeping platform but slightly
altered it to "selective engagement," the Doctrine had a consistent goal and was to
go after "rogue states." Combating going after "rogue states" does not always entail
military action because it could just be economic action.
Moreover, the idealistic Clinton Doctrine had an aggressive stance on
democracy promotion abroad. Democracy expansion may be domestically
perceived as the U.S. another long "Vietnam" War. The Clinton doctrine's core
element argues for "liberal hawkism." President Clinton's first actions were to expand
the peacekeeping operation in Somalia with more assertive goals. The Clinton
Administration wanted to improve the poor conditions in Somalia caused by warlords'
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high-jacking the aid. Domestic pressure would force President Clinton to have a
long-term foreign policy that did not include repeating the Vietnam War mistakes.
There is a consensus that the Clinton Doctrine was coherent because of an
apparent lack of focus since the Clinton Administration altered its reliance on
peacekeeping following the death of American Army Rangers in Somalia, 1993,
which put the issue of crucial element "democratic enlargement" into
question(Dumbrell, 2010).
In expanding on a connection to explain Clinton's hesitation on peacekeeping
after Somalia, John Dumbell, again but in a different article, states, Clinton had a
strong. Transatlantic foreign policy. Democratic enlargement could also mean
strengthening alliances with the U.N. and the North Atlantic Trade
Organization(NATO). The Clinton Doctrine has consistently with democratic and
market enlargement in countries in the transatlantic. This element of the Clinton
Doctrine the preference to issues in the Atlantic. Vice President Al Gore clarifies a
call for a more robust NATO in January 1994, when he stated the "security of the
states that lie between Western Europe and Russia affects America's security" (The
Baltimore Sun, 1994). The expansion of NATO could imply that even countries in the
Atlantic ocean near the U.S. but not about nature may garner more attention from the
U.S. than countries farther away.
Moreover, having solid domestic support was his campaign centerpiece when
he beat President George H.W Bush, who did not live up to his economic promises.
The Clinton Doctrine was concerned with protecting democracy abroad and
upholding it within the United States. The Clinton Doctrine would mostly approach
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foreign policy in a two-tier game approach by getting domestic approval and
international support. For Clinton to thoughtfully respond to international crises, the
Clinton White House sought domestic permission after. The Clinton Doctrine shows
domestic acceptance is the first stage of deciding what foreign policy issues to
pursue.
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), role theory, and Democratic Peace
Theory(DPT) help explain the pluralistic relationship between the public and its
government. The connection between domestic issues and a government's foreign
policy decisions is essential to define. Having a more robust understanding of a
foreign power's actions on the international stage may lead to better diplomacy
between those states and because "Cabinets, legislatures, and the public was often
more belligerent than the government heads they were supposed to constrain"
(Owens, 1994). Even government agencies, along with the public, can help constrain
executive decisions made by the president responsible for foreign policy matters. A
dispute FPA has with liberalism is the following question: How can we assume the
government will listen to the public?
Elections provide a bullhorn for the public's concerns regarding foreign policy
matters because they force standing presidents and presidential candidates to
address these concerns. Elections guarantee politicians will work on the issues that
are relevant to their constituents because "voters prefer governments which deliver
favorable outcomes to those which deliver unfavorable outcomes" ( Schultz, 1998).
Political crises increase domestic participation in the foreign policy decision-making
process because volatile events such as war concern everyone. The impact of the
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general election cycle on foreign policy decision-making is relevant to this
dissertation because it directly explains why the Clinton administration's decision to
intervene in one of our case studies—the coup in Haiti.
This theoretical section lays the groundwork for the dissertation's literature
review, focusing on understanding how domestic issues influence foreign policy
decision-making. Foreign policy analysis (FPA) focuses on agents and actors
influence foreign policy decisions; Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) views the system
of checks and balances and elections as vital elements in the foreign policy decisionmaking process. Furthermore, role theory explains how the U.S. sees itself within a
global context. By looking through the lens of these three theories, we can take a
step closer to understanding the major factors that influence a democracy's foreign
policy decision-making process, including public opinion, the media, and pluralist
interest groups.
Research Questions and Unit of Analysis
This dissertation's central research question is: How did domestic
variables influence the Clinton Administration's foreign policy response towards Haiti
and Rwanda's 1994 humanitarian crises? These domestic forces include interest
groups, public opinion, and the news media. Three supporting questions to this
dissertation include:
1. Why did the United States support military action in Haiti but not in Rwanda?
2. What role did the public play in supporting military Intervention in Haiti versus
Rwanda?
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3. In what ways do domestic pluralist groups communicate their foreign policy
views to the government?
Hypothesis
I hypothesize that the news media, interest groups, and public opinion played
a critical role in the Clinton Administration's 1994 decision-making calculus in
considering US-led armed Intervention in Rwanda and Haiti. The presence and nonpresence of the news media, interest groups, and public opinion create a domestic
reality that constrains or gives the American president additional political capital to
decide whether to get the U.S. involved in global crises.
The Clinton Administration's non-response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994
was both a strategic move for President Clinton politically and a response to the
American public's unwillingness to go through another disastrous mission like the
botched effort in Somalia the year before. However, Haiti's coup concerned the
U.S.concerning, precisely the number of Haitian refugees trying to enter the United
States by boat to escape the military regime's instability. The U.S. public did not want
to take on these refugees; thus, Clinton, still consumed with his reelection in 1996,
and foreign policy issues in Clinton's best interest became a priority.
The U.S. news media coverage of the two events differed significantly as well.
In Rwanda's case, the American news did not cove Rwanda as a severe crisis that
could escalate to a genocide. There was an effort to downplay the mass killings, as
the media was hesitant to draw Americans into another military crisis as they had in
Somalia, which ended with 18 American troops' deaths(Dallaire, 2017). In the case of
the U.S. intervention in Haiti, however, the media constantly bombarded viewers with
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the operation, championing the military's power over the Junta(Center for Law and
Military Operations, 1995).
Concepts and Definitions
Public Opinion
Definition:
Public opinion can be summarized as public attitudes on various topics. More
specifically, "Public opinion is the aggregate views of individual adults on matters of
public interest" (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). In foreign policy crises , public opinion
can expose public concerns on war, humanitarian Intervention, and diplomacy.
Researchers capture public opinion through various methods, including surveys,
polls, and focus groups (Morgan & Fellows, 2008). In conjunction with captured
intelligence and cabinet advisers, conventional wisdom results from these public
opinion metrics help the government decide its agenda. Operationalized:
I examine surveys from polling websites from 1993–1996 focus on the
following words or phrases: Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, U.S. involvement, United
Nations, mid-term elections, general election, disapprove, and approval. Based on
statements, memos, and other interagency communication during the Clinton
Administration, I determine if public opinion played a factor in the U.S. responses to
Haiti and Rwanda.
News Media
Definition:
The news media works as a medium, transmitting information to the masses.
The news media's working definition manifested in print news, the internet, and
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broadcast journalism. CNN's creation as the first 24-hour news channel caused an
expansion of the news media that could operate continuously Hoge, 1994). This
dissertation looks at the changing purpose of the news media as an influencing
variable.
Operationalized:
I examine news media not just as a political actor but as a political institution
because of news media's ability to influence viewers and policymakers alike. This
study demonstrates a connection between news media and policymakers' decisions
based on what is covered. Also, the media makes the government more transparent
in its handling of foreign policy matters. Therefore, presidents may be concerned with
just catering to the demands of the elites.

Interest Groups
Definition:
A broad definition of interest groups is "as auxiliary actors that stand between
the government and the mass public, tied to the governmental decision-making
system by channels of communication" (Trice, 1978). When there exists a lapse of
government attention about a specific public policy, interest groups voice their
concerns.
Operationalized:
The success of interest groups is their ability to influence politicians on
issues that concern them. Did the president intervene in Haiti because of the actions
of TransAfrica's Randall Robinson? That is the connection I hope to unearth, a
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relationship concerning foreign policy matters between interest groups and the
president.
Constraints/Variables (Domestic)
Definition:
There are two types of constraints or variables in foreign policy relations—
external and internal. External constraints originate internationally and may include
conflict, crises, or genocide(just to name a few) and have domestic implications.
Internal constraints are domestic conflicts that may be institutional products, such as
checks and balances and the separation of powers. Moreover, domestic sources can
include interest groups, mass media, and public opinion.
Operationalize:
Why did President Clinton authorize military force to restore President Aristide in
Haiti but did not want military intervention in Rwanda? The answer, plainly stated, is
that the president does not have unchecked power in the U.S. and is constrained by
various domestic sources and other government institutions. I will use the term
constraint to imply that they can alter foreign policy as a "source" or "variables."
Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process
Definition:
According to Brule and Mintz (2010) -Foreign policy decision-making is the
"Choices made by individuals, small groups, or coalitions representing nation-states
result in policies or strategies with international outcomes" (Brulé & Mintz, 2010). The
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foreign policy decision-making process reveals the thought process of policymakers
concerning issues of foreign policy.
Operationalize:
As accurately stated in "The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision
Making" (2008), Jonathan Renshon and Stanley Renshon ask the question my
dissertation hopes to answer. "How accurately do world leaders and their close
advisors understand both the international system in which they operate and the
strategic options are available to them?" The answer can be world leaders have to
start with the domestic climate first. My dissertation does not exclusively examine
leadership styles, a foundation in decision-making theories and how the domestic
environment shaped leaders' responses. How did public opinion, the media, and
interest groups factor into the Clinton Administration's actions?
Crisis
Definition:
A crisis is a "disruptive" event. Moreover, in International Relations: Key
Concepts, a crisis is defined as "brief period when one or more parties to a conflict
perceive an imminent threat to vital interests and a very short time to react to the
threat" (Griffiths et la, 2002).
Operationalize:
My dissertation focuses on how the Clinton Administration responded to two
separate humanitarian crises. I do not conflate the term crisis with war, conflict, and
genocide. Those are different terms with various meanings. Moreover, the Clinton
Administration may have perceived Rwanda and Haiti's events as a crisis, and other
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political actors may have perceived the crisis as a civil war, ethnic conflict, and
genocide. Moreover, the events in Rwanda meet the textbook definition of genocide.
In my discussion, the Clinton Administration may have perceived Rwanda's crisis as
a continuation of the 1992 Civil War. Still, the violence in Rwanda is consistent with
the U.N. Convention on Genocide that defines genocide as Article 2 of the
Convention defines genocide as "... any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group." Genocide is
a legal crime that merits a moral obligation for Intervention.

International Community
Definition:
The international community is a collection of states, and the term
international community but typically means it's a unitary actor(Ellis, 2009).
Operationalize:
I agree that the international community operates more as a social unit; not
just countries are next to each other. The international community is more than a
collection of international organizations because of basic norms, such as the right to
life; everyone should agree to abide by a government. If countries are just physical
neighbors but share no values on genocide and other crimes that threaten human
security, then the world would be in a perpetual state of turmoil. The debate on why
we need consensus on gross violations of human rights is out of this dissertation's
scope. The focus of this paper examines crises in which Americans accept the
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government's decision to intervene militarily. As I will argue, it appears the U.S.
operates in its national interests and not the international community's interests
U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations-PDD-25
Definition:
A turning point of the Clinton's White House American foreign policy platform,
titled "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" (PDD-25), was
developed after the tragic loss of American life during the Battle of Mogadishu in
1993. PDD-25, in summary, states the U.S. must make more robust choices in
supporting peacekeeping efforts with military force, reduce the cost of such
interventions, and, most notably, for this dissertation, ensure the president is more
attentive to the views of Congress and the American public.3
Operationalize:
The president's cooperation with Congress and the American public is crucial
to my dissertation because the president stated their opinions matter when
presenting PDD-25. I view the news media, public opinion, and at times, Congress
as an outlet for the public to have their views heard.

The Contribution of this Dissertation

This dissertation will contribute to the discussion concerning just how
important domestic sources are to American foreign policy decision-making. As

3
Also known as "U.S.Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations."
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm
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Haiti's case study showed us, geographical proximity is a concern that can increase
domestic levels of involvement as a sense of urgency and security come into play.
On the other hand, Rwanda is thousands of miles away, is an economically
insignificant country, and therefore the outcome of its crisis would not affect the
United States' interests. Geographical proximity is not the sole external factor
determining armed Intervention; economic interest, close allies' security, and broader
diplomatic strategies play essential elements. I hope that this dissertation contributes
to the idea that domestic influencers, chiefly the news media, public opinion, and
interest groups, can unite to become a potent power that directs policymakers'
foreign policy agenda.
Domestic Power
If the news media, public opinion, and interest groups share a similar
narrative, they form a powerful domestic coalition. This paper posits it may take a
combination of domestic actors to influence the president's foreign policy agenda.
This domestic agreement on foreign policy issues can penetrate and surpass other
political actors such as Congress.
Treating domestic variables on the same level as external variables as
constraints to the president's foreign policy agenda is the scholarship's main
contribution.. Constitutional protections such as freedom of the press and the right to
assemble are additional constraints on the president. In an institutional framework,
voting is the platform in which public opinion matters most. The news media, interest
groups, and public opinion can strong-arm the president and Congress in foreign
policy matters.
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A clear example of domestic variables constraining the president is just after
the tragic loss of American life in Somalia; the American public was outraged
because of the botched mission. This outrage became the motivation for President
Clinton to reverse American foreign policy to focus more on strategic peacekeeping
operations and intervene only when necessary. His subsequent foreign policy
change in peace operations, PDD-25, manifests this public's constraint on the
president.
Moreover, this dissertation hopes to point to clear examples to deconstruct the
state's motion as just a black box, as argued by structural realists. U.S. involvement
in international affairs is predicated by the various forces within the U.S. and out.
Therefore, the diversity among pluralist domestic factions is a factor influence foreign
policy decisions as well.
The international political climate is an additional factor in a state's decision to
engage in armed crsis. For example, the tolerance of war, the global economy, major
natural disasters—these can all act as external constraints on a president's decision
to intervene in an international affair. Throughout my dissertation, I have defined
external vs. internal variables but have focused on domestic variables. The Vietwar
War was a watershed moment for domestic politics because it is the first uncensored
war to be broadcast directly into American households during mealtime. The Vietnam
War produced the Vietnam Syndrome, and the debacle in Somalia created foreign
policy terms as the Mogadishu Line. It is possible to galvanize the American public
due to an external event outside the U.S. Tragic wide-scale loss of American soldiers
generates an expected public response. The political climate is the intersection of
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public opinion, elections, the news media, and ethnic interest groups. Therefore,
understanding the current political environment is essential in any study of U.S.
involvement in military crises

.
This dissertation aims to make a strong case that domestic variables such as
the news media, interest groups, and the public can influence foreign policy
decisions. I am looking at the American public's role in influencing the president and
what the president does on the international stage.
Chapter Summary
This chapter provided a blueprint for the dissertation, which examines
domestic considerations in the foreign policy process by exploring two political crises
in 1994—Rwanda and Haiti. I have provided the background for Rwanda's and
Haiti's political turmoil and discussed how their political crises attracted international
attention. I framed the U.S.' responses to Rwanda and Haiti in the context of the
post-Cold War era when the U.S. was the world's sole superpower. I have
juxtaposed Foreign Policy Analysis, Role Theory, and Democratic Peace Theory as
tools in theoretically understanding foreign policy issues and creates the opportunity
for there to be a domestic reality to foreign policy decisions. The main argument is
domestic considerations can explain why the president gets involved or does not get
involved in foreign crises.
In contrast, the opposite can be attributed to the U.S.'s response to Haiti's
political upheaval. The idea the news media, interest groups, and public opinion can
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form a powerful domestic coalition can explain many foreign policy decisions made
by previous presidents. If there is no consensus in these distinct domestic groups,
the lack of a domestic coalition can justify presidential inaction.
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Chapter 2: The Case for Domestic Politics in American Foreign Policy

Abstract
This chapter is a literature review of the scholarship of the domestic sources of
American foreign policy to understand the Clinton Administration's involvement in
Haiti and Rwanda's political crises. The literature review will assess how presidents
considered these three variables: the news media, public opinion, and interest
groups in the foreign policy decision-making process. Moreover, this chapter will
analyze the academic scholarship that addresses the US response to Rwanda and
Haiti's violence.

The Clinton Administration 1994 response to supporting military intervention in
Haiti, but exercising military restraint is not an isolated case in American Foreign
Policy. In the last chapter, I discussed: Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Role Theory,
and Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) as a theoretical argument that since the United
States is a democracy, domestic sources be considered such as the news media,
public opinion, and interest groups in foreign policy issues. The influence( or lack
of) of the news media, public opinion, and interest groups are central to
understanding the Clinton Administration's response to Rwanda and Haiti's violence.
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The intellectual, political history of the debate of what voice the American
citizen has in foreign policy literature should start with a review of the U.S
Constitution. The U.S Constitution defines the president's role concerning foreign
policy in Article II, Section 2, as the armed forces' commander-in-chief (Ramsey &
Vladeck, 2020). Understanding the constitution's legal language is essential because
the document sheds light on who, in theory, has control of war declarations.
Congress and presidents are answerable to their constituents. Furthermore, the First
Amendment in the U.S Constitution puts a premium on public participation in the
government. The public's political importance of having a foreign policy voice is
demonstrated through public opinion, interest groups, and the news media.
The Constitution is vague about who has control over foreign policy. Congress
has the power to declare war and raise/ finance armies(Ramsey & Vladeck, 2020).
In theory, the president provides guidance on crises, and Congress declares and
finances wars (Article 1 Section 9 Clause 7). U.S. Constitution - Article 1 Section 9
states, “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law” ( Article 1 Section 9 Clause 7). There is a constitutional
relationship between the Presidency and Congress. Congress can limit the
presidential power regarding foreign policy by exercising the power of the purse. The
Constitution could imply that Foreign policy matters are a collaborative effort
between the President and Congress. Still, some presidents have exercised their war
powers without the consent of Congress. Cyrus Vance (1984) calls the constitutional
relationship between Congress and the President is also called the “Twilight Zone,”
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which usually means that the president acts unilaterally. The President and
Congress’s political communication gap leaves room to analyze how the news
media, public opinion, and interest groups impact foreign policy.
The debate over who has constitutional control over the foreign policy
decision-making process does not answer what political actors can influence foreign
policy decisions. Gerhard Casper (1976) has suggested that the constitution does
not provide clear guidance; therefore, the executive branch has been able to have a
more considerable influence on foreign policy issues. Gasper states that “How recent
Presidents have conducted the United States foreign and defense policy suggests an
absence in the practice of constitutional constraints and the presence of surprisingly
few political constraints” ( Casper, 1976).
The rationale behind Congress having an active role in foreign policy is more
than a mechanism to ensure that the President abuses power. Still, the public has
greater access to their Congressmen/women because they are directly answerable
to their district or state constituents. As Lindsay states(1992), domestic politics are
usually taken to account when Congress talks about foreign policy-related matters
because of the Vietnam War(Lindsay, 1992). I propose that Congress is not
permeant sideline on foreign policy matters. Still, public opinion, interest groups, and
the news media can influence Congress to influence the President on foreign policy
concerns.
If Congress is not the only variable that could impact the foreign policy
decision-making process, which influences the president?
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The First Amendment of the US Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances(Article 1).

The First Amendment stresses Americans' importance, not being limited to
speaking what is on their mind and assemble peacefully. Due to the American
Constitution's inclusion of the average citizen in political affairs, this is a reason why
the news media, public opinion, and interest groups can be powerful.
Despite the President being in control of the armed forces and having a more
considerable amount of foreign policy analysts, the domestic population can still
constrain the President's actions. Hodge and Nolan (2017) state that the American
political climate internally and externally determines the hierarchy of foreign policy
matters. The American presidency's dominance in foreign policy issues stems from
being the most capable federal government branch to handle international crises.
The American President has a considerably more decisive impact on foreign policy
due to: being the direct link to the U.S Armed-Forces, appoint officials that oversee
foreign policy issues, and the power to negative and provide readily executive orders
can solve problems similar to treaties. (Krent, 2015). The executive branch has not to
heal with the political gridlock in Congress, and therefore, the executive branch is the
most powerful choice in ending an international crisis. The presidency, which can
also serve as a source for foreign policy, has to weigh choices from an individual(the
President) seeking re-election and grappling with making the public happy.
41

American foreign policy decisions can alter and direct how the international
community responds to a crisis. The post-Somalia shadow weighed not only on the
US, but the new direction President's more Clinton retreat from providing support
from committing American troops in peace peacekeeping operations that were not in
its strategic interests parlayed the international community's response in handling
peace operations(Knnan, 2013). In 1994 the Clinton Administration response to
Rwanda and Haiti's crises highlighted the importance of domestic reality response in
foreign policy crises.
The early 20th century innovations in communication technology such as the
radio transformed the American presidency. During the Franklin Delano Roosevelt
(FDR) presidency, FDR expanded the presidency's scope by steering both domestic
and foreign policy(Leuchtenburg, 1995). At the start of World War 2, Congress
pursued an isolationist policy of not getting involved in World War 2.
Japan bomb’s Pearl Harbor, and President Roosevelt’s declaration of war
against Germany, Japan, and Italy would be the last time the president asks
Congress for formal authorization for war. During Roosevelt's presidency, the US's
political conditions, such as the Great Depression and the Second World War, led to
a much powerful presidency.
The Presidency, Foreign Policy, and Domestic Variables
This section aims to review the literature on how my three domestic variablesthe news media, public opinion, and interest groups have influenced President's
views on foreign policy-related matters, starting with the first "modern." In the wake
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of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt responded to the crisis by escalating it to
Congress for a war declaration President. Moreover, this section will look at select
Presidents beginning with President Roosevelt to understand the role of domestic
attitudes in the foreign policy decision-making process. I will be looking at the
literature of American presidents' foreign policy from 1945 to 1993 that shows how
the news media, public opinion, and interest groups transformed how the US
government conducted foreign policy matters. By analyzing the literature, I see how
interconnected public opinion, the news media, and interest groups are to each other
and influence foreign policy.
President Roosevelt Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality.
In Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the
War Against Nazi Germany (2004), Casey makes a case for domestic inclusion in
the foreign policy decision-making process because FDR believed that Americans
shared his views regarding the threat of Nazism. As Lipperman states, the issue
becomes how the president can mobilize the public on foreign policy issues not
related to wars that may spill over to American soil. According to Casey (2004):
In Lippmann’s conception, when a foreign threat emerges most Americans
initially lag behind their leaders in recognizing potential danger, since to them
it appears too remote to warrant U.S. involvement. In order to shake the public
from this torpor, the government has to engage in a vigorous crusade. This it
does by depicting the enemy as “altogether evil” and thereby inciting the
masses “to paroxysms of hatred.” In adopting this course, American leaders
are able to forge a popular consensus behind the war effort (p. xiv).
Even though Casey's argument may conjecture that the president needs to
influence the public on foreign policy issues, it gets at the point of considering the
people in foreign policy-related matters. In Cautious Crusade, the author uses
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process tracing to link public opinion to policymakers. The policymakers interpret the
public's needs, and then the impact of public opinion data is analyzed to determine
what effect the public has (Casey, 2004). FDR uses domestic sources such as the
news media mobilizing the public by writing stories about the war effort. Moreover,
interest groups such as the Society For The Prevention of World War III (SPWW3),
which held rallies that protested over German atrocities against its victims, were
regularly attended by Congressmen (Casey, 2004). The scholarship for examining
the news media, public opinion, and interest groups is not a recent development
because the domestic inclusion goes back to World War 2.
President Truman Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality.
President Harry S. Truman's focus on including domestic opinion in his foreign
policy decision-making process kept expanding the impact of the news media, public
opinion, and interest groups. Conversely, as Thomas Paterson (1979) states, public
opinion polling suggested that Americans favored an "activist" foreign policy platform
to combat the Soviets during the Cold War (Paterson, 1979).
Studying President Truman's use of foreign policy sheds light on whether
public opinion represents the American people. As Paterson(1979) explains, public
opinion may only be the "elite view of foreign policy issues."
They constituted the small number of Americans who studied the foreign
news, who traveled abroad, who had knowledge, who spoke out. They held
positions in American society that commanded authority and insured
influence—journalists, businessmen, labor leaders, intellectuals, and
members of various interest and citizen groups. They produced the "public
opinion" on foreign policy issues that counted (p. 6).
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The issue of whether the public represents only an elite portion of society is a
fair critique of my argument that public opinion can dictate foreign policy. To correct
the issue of just looking at public opinion, unlike other literature, I juxtaposed public
opinion, along with the news media and interest groups as domestic sources of
foreign policy. In “The Truman Doctrine Speech: A Case Study of the Dynamics of
Presidential Opinion Leadership” (1978), the article references that 84% of
Americans did listen to or read Truman’s speech on his foreign policy platform (
Paterson, 1979). This detail is indispensable because the public was attentive to the
news. Therefore, the news media is a political actor that can influence foreign policy.
The Cold War discussion in the literature provides insight that this period
strengthened domestic support regarding foreign policy issues because of the
Vietnam War protests. Ambrose in Rise of Globalism: American Foreign Policy since
1938 (2010) illuminates that during World War II, Congress was in control of foreign
policy? The post-World War II, when the Republicans took control of the Congress,
the Republican majority wanted to focus on lower taxes, and demobilization.
Therefore with the new domestic agenda that the Republicans had, this would
“severely restricted the Truman’s Administration’s ability to carry on the Cold War
(Ambrose 2010). However, with the looming threat of communism, President Truman
was able to get bi-partisan support as the fear of communism grew, and containment
would become a major cornerstone of American foreign policy (Ambrose 2010).
During the Cold War, the actions of the US can be explained by internal and
external variables. Historically, foreign policy has been an issue of the Presidency
and Congress. After WWII, the Cold War created an uncertain environment where
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Americans would turn to their political leaders to solve the global threat of
communism. Noting the impact of communism is dynamic for this dissertation
because communism was an issue that penetrated American borders; therefore, it
became an issue that impacted Americans' daily lives.
The Truman Doctrine wanted to contain communism, and Truman
implemented his policy without consulting Congress. Eisenhower, even though he
had congressional support, would inform Congress but not consult with them.
Moreover, due to the changing demographics in the United States and the growing
political influence of minority groups in the United States, Congress is not the only
group that can influence foreign policy matters. For example, the United States
recognition of Israel can be attributed to President Truman wanting the support from
Jews in the US during his re-election campaign. Scholars such as Bruce Russert
have stated that the president takes the public's temperature to see how they feel
about international issues while also gaining congressional support(Russett &
Deluca, 1981). This is called the “triangle of force,” where the president has two
contends with domestic and congress on foreign policy-related issues.
President Johnson Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency saw an escalation of the Vietnam
War. At first the Vietnam War received bipartisan support during the “Gulf of
Tonkin’s” incident because of the concern of communism expanding (Meernnik,
1993). The Vietnam War brought a paradigm shift in foreign policy studies because
of the prominence of the news media, interest groups, and public opinion disapproval
of the war effort. Scholars such as Lunch and Sperlich (1981) state that even though
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respondents in one of the surveys conducted that most people thought that the
Vietnam War was a mistake, they still submitted US involvement (Russett & Deluca,
1981). The scholars note that by the end of the Vietnam War, there was a clear
public consensus that the US should not be involved in the Vietnam War. The rising
number of American causalities “activated” the American consciousness against the
US involvement in Vietnam. Lunch and Sperlich uphold the idea that Americans will
initially “rally round the flag.” Yet, public sentiment is fluid, and public support
changed due to the growing number of American soldiers dying(Lunch & Sperlich,
1981). At the start of the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam, the
president had 61% support for the Vietnam War, and by 1971, only 28% supported
American involvement in Vietnam (Lunch & Sperlich, 1981).

How did public opinion penetrate the oval office during the Vietnam War?
While keeping in mind, that the Vietnam War is considered the first “Television War” (
Spector, 2006). American saw the horrors of the Vietnam War broadcasted in there
homes during the evening news. Melvin Small in (1987) ” Influencing the Decision
Makers: The Vietnam Experience,” states “ citizens have written letters and
telegrams, convened meetings, demonstrations, and marches, published petitions,
broadsides, and manifestos, and formed organizations to do all of the above in an
attempt to influence their government.”
The Vietnam War increased the journalists' objective nature, as Halin (2005)
states that the “journalists became more inclined to report information critical of
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official policy” (Hallin, 2005). By a content analysis, Halin shows that even though the
Vietnam War, journalists were able, for the most part, to remain objective. Herman &
Chomsky, (2002) connect the news media with public opinion because the Vietnam
War's negative news coverage helped broaden opposition against it (Herman &
Chomsky, 2005). Moreover, interest groups play a dominant role in influencing
foreign policy because Congress represents the US; therefore, there will be different
factions within Congress with other interests.
The Vietnam War challenged some of the dominant structural views in
American foreign policy that disregards public opinion as part of the decision-making
process. The American public has a role in shaping foreign policy decisions. Gabriel
Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) were first looking at the importance of an engaged
citizen.
The idea that in a democracy, the culture supports public debate on public
policy issues is proof that domestic politics have a foreign policy role (Almond and
Verba 1963). For Almond and Verba, social scientists cannot separate the public
from analyzing public policies. However, as Katz and Powlick note in response to
Almond and Verba (1998), does public opinion become activated?
In "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam" ( 1967), Verba contend for the
president to implement large-scale military operations, they need the American
public's consent. Moreover, scholars in "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam"
used data from different cities in the United States to make their conclusions about
the public opinion implications on the foreign policy process. The scholars make a
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novel contribution that the president can sideline the popular public opinion view in
favor of what the elites want. President Johnson was aware of the public's growing
discomfort; however, he would increase the US military presence in Vietnam.
The Vietnam War was viewed as the first televised war that was uncensored;
this idea does not mean the American public is attentive.
In ” War and the Inner Circle: Democratic Elites and the Politics of Using
Force,” (2015) contends that even though the public was not well-informed regarding
the latest reports on the Vietnam War. Much of the activism regarding opposing the
Vietnam War came from the college scene; young people is just one part of
American society. Not everyone in the US is up to date on foreign policy; therefore,
“rarely informed enough to hold leaders accountable” (Rosati et al., 2015).
President Johnson ran on a less agressive foreign policy platform versus
Barry Goldwater (Matthews, 1997). The Vietnam War still produces questions
regarding the role of public opinion. President "Johnson feared political punishment
if he withdrew from Vietnam more than if he engaged in war" (Downes, 2009).
President Johnson's evolving stance on the Vietnam War means that domestic
politics had to play some role; an alternative explanation of public support could only
represent what elites wanted regarding the Vietnam War. President Johnson wanted
to continue implementing policies in his Great Society programs; therefore, he would
need a majority of support from his democrat party base.
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President Nixon Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality
The academic scholarship concerning domestic influence over foreign policyrelated issues is evident in President Nixon withdrawing troops from Vietnam.
Ambrose states that the Nixon doctrine dealt with the Vietnamization policy, which
turns over military control to the South Vietnamese ( Ambrose & Brinkley, 2011).
Nixon knew that “ for the sake of American domestic tranquility, he had to cut back
on the American commitment to Vietnam, which meant, in turn, accepting an
outcome short of victory” ( Ambrose & Brinkley, 2011). Nixon knew the war was not
winnable and was concerned about losing domestic support. In “Differing Evaluations
of Vietnamization” ( 1998), Scott Sigmund Gartner cites that even though most of the
public outrage came from the left, even Republicans in President Nixon’s political
base wanted the US out of the Vietnam War (Gartner, 1998). Moreover, that
President Nixon wanted the anti-war movement to end, and ending the draft would
make middle-class youths lose their interest in protesting the war( Glass, 2012).
President Carter Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality
At the end of the Vietnam War, domestic politics have become a perceived,
trustworthy, independent variable. The news media, public opinion, and interest
groups have all influenced foreign policy matters. President Carter’s rationale for
making human rights the leading platform of American Foreign Policy because of the
correlation between the democratic tradition of the United States, and protecting
freedom (Schmitz & Walker, 2004).
At the start of President Carter's presidency, he promised a foreign policy
agenda "that the American people both support... and know about and understand"
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(Katz, 2000). President Carter's position on human rights consisting "of 'the right to
live under a rule of law that protects against cruel, arbitrary and degrading treatment,
to participate in government and its decisions, to voice opinions freely, to seek
peaceful change (The Department of State Bulletin 1977). This idealist Wilson
foreign policy states that American foreign policy principles should transplant
American domestic values to the rest of the world. Kraig examines the foreign policy
of the Carter presidency as a tragedy because it is impossible to fulfill. Kraig
examines the Carter presidency problem as similar to what scholars said about
Wilson in that Carter tried to impose his moral views on the world ( Kraig, 2002).
Moreover, Schimitz and Walker (2004) stated that the irony in President Carter fully
implement his foreign policy agenda came from domestic backlash human rights was
not on the top of the list of priorities for some policymakers.
The Carter presidency's importance in understanding American foreign
policy's domestic constraints is to know how public opinion impacted Ronald
Reagan's loss. On average, Carter's average public opinion rating was around 47
percent(Katz, 2002). The question becomes, why did Carter ignore the public
concerns about his foreign policy. The answer lies in the "Carter Administration's
mistaken assumption that public opinion on foreign policy was grounded in emotions
and malleable to presidential leadership" Moreover, Carter believed that the data
gathered from public opinion sources was incoherent and did not follow a narrative.
Ultimately, Carter's White House did not give him an accurate assessment of his
foreign policy's American public's feelings.
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Yes, his overall foreign policy platform had an idealistic cache because he felt
that people in the world had the same right to life as Americans did. In the 1970s, the
United States was still healing from the hard-fought Civil Rights Movement of the
1960s. President Carter believed, like President Wilson, the US actions represent the
gold standard for human rights policy.
In President Carter's implementation of human rights as the centerpiece for
his foreign policy platform, he never addressed how the United States would play
that role internationally. Moreover, what was missing from his human rights platform
was how national security interests would be factored into his advancing democratic
change. The consensus with Carter's foreign policy is that consistent polling showed
that the public was for the United States to maintain an active military and that the
threat of arms was still a concern of the American people.

The literature that

discusses the Iranian Hostage Crises is a critical case in demonstrating what can
happen when a President ignores the public because of the high volume of news
coverage; it heightens public opinion and interest groups that advocated intervention.
Therefore, in "Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy
Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis" (1989), "the
news media covered the hostage crisis dominated the national conversation
regarding foreign policy."
The telecommunications expansion of TV's power on foreign policy decisionmaking by providing unfiltered news documenting the was already occurring because
of the Vietnam War. The Iran Hostage Crises heightened the study of television
news's impact on the foreign policy decision-making process because of the wall-to52

wall coverage of Iran's crises. The emotions of seeing the American Embassy in
flames could have constructed a feeling of resentment among Americans. The three
major networks' content analysis during the Iran Hostage crisis demonstrates a
changing the political narrative of coverage that changed drastically when Iranian
protesters took people, hostages, because a hostage crisis turned into a human
drama news story. Furthermore, ABC News created Nightline, a new news program
that could keep the public informed about the embassy's crises. President Carter
would subsequently lose to President Reagan in 1981.
President Reagan Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality
The Ronald Reagan presidency(1981-1989) is characterized as being a great
communicator and was “in tune” with public attitudes( Sigelman & Whissell, 2002).
Reagan utilized television to convey his feelings on major foreign policy issues, such
as the US involvement in Lebanon in 1983. Before the US involvement in Lebanon,
the American public believed that President Reagan did not have a clear agenda
(Gilboa, 1990). Before the invasion, President Reagan gave a televised speech-Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada--that could sway public
opinion. In his remarks, Reagan addressed the public concerns by noting the
region’s strategic interest in the West ( Welch, 2003). The debate over the
effectiveness of Reagan’s televised addresses to the public is more contentious than
positive. Empirical studies(2003) that have tested whether the televised speeches
changed public opinion are slim.
The Reagan doctrine aimed to have a global collation to curtail the Soviet
Union's expansion. His "policies toward anti-Communist resistance groups varied
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considerably" ( Gilboa, 1990). However, Pach reassesses the Reagan Doctrine
(2006). President Reagan's foreign policy had to reassure: "Congress and the public
that they sought not 'open-ended, sterile confrontation' but "stable and constructive'
long-term relations with the Soviets" (Pach, 2006). President Reagan The Reagan
administration was concerned about the spread of communism but understood the
issues the American public would have with American soldiers engaged in another
crisis. President Reagan used guerilla fighters in Afghanistan to fight against the
Soviets and did not use American soldiers. His doctrine champions the use of covert
operations to curb Soviet influence.
Moreover, President Reagan’s Administration had to contend with issues of
immigration. Understanding immigration is essential because, in 1981, the US
entered a recession; therefore, immigrants who often scapegoated were the focus of
a task force. President Reagan started to understand immigration issues in the US.
President Bush Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality: Fog of a post-Cold
War America
The George H. W Bush Presidency (1989-1993) saw the Cold War's formal
end. The literature that explores the American incursion into Somalia starts with the
Bush Administration. During President Bush (41st President) Administration, two
pivotal peacekeeping operations originated from the United Nations (UN) Security
Council Resolution 678 occurred: the First Gulf War(1990-1991) that included
Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. The operation results were to
remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991; the Unified Task Force was tasked with
ensuring humanitarian aid delivery to Somalia. The President called the Iraq
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invasion of Kuwait the “defining moment” in setting a new foreign policy for a “new
world order.”4 The United States could operate freely now as the sole world
superpower.
Moreover, it is imperative to understand that the UN could be of use. The US
strategically used the UN to accomplish its goals by having the UN set a deadline for
Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait. In regarding Congress as constrained, President Bush
knew that he had to keep Congress in the loop, and even though it was not a war
declaration, he asked Congress for the use of force in clearing Iraq from Kuwait.
Bush used Congress as an asset in accomplishing his goals because he was fearful
of the constraint of Truman's actions in Korea (Ambrose & Brinkley, 2010).
What is crucial in the staging of the post-Cold War issue would be Bush’s
Speech before a Joint Session of Congress in which he spoke of a “New World
Order.” Ambrose summarizes President Bush’s actions as being the world
policeman. However, Melanson is more cautious in stating that Bush viewed the US
as a world police force. In a post- Cold War era, the First Gulf War was a test that the
US could be active in international crises that do not evolve to a long-term military
engagement turning into another Vietnam War. Since the US defeated communism,
this gave room for operations in Iraq and Somalia. What remains central in President
Bush’s strategy was that he was concerned with removing Iraq from Kuwait, not
occupying Iraq, and having Saddam Hussein stand trial. Bush was involved with swift
action that had a clear timeline of objectives and an exit strategy.

4
Bush, George, writer. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis
and the Federal Budget Deficit." Transcript. In Address by the President. September 11, 1991.
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The first Gulf War in the early 1990s shattered the Vietnam Syndrome, but a
shadow still lingered on any decision the president would make on foreign policy
issues. But the use of American soldiers in a military crisis is important enough for
President Bush to say, "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for
all" (Melanson, 2015). Melanson's ideas are a prelude to the US being the world
superpower. Bush stated that there would be more democratic revolutions, room for
democratic growth only if the US were the world leader.

The public opinion polls following the first Gulf War were favorable, but the
American public was still concerned about military forces. However, Melanson states
that people could be persuaded when there were national interests at risk. As
Jentleson argues (1992), economic interests can sway public opinion that US
intervention variables in the first Gulf War stemmed from oil concern.
The end of the Cold War in 1991 saw an explosion of domestic variables as
part of the decision-making process, such as the news media, public opinion, and
interest groups. Since American peacekeeping in Somalia was one of the first
primary military operations after the Cold War, the American public response to
commit to another military may seem promising, but it's still uncertain. In the wake of
the disaster of US involvement in Somalia, the Army Rangers' deaths activated the
publics' fear of another Vietnam War occurring.
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President Clinton Foreign Policy, and the Domestic Reality
Domestic politics' political arguments can be a defining factor in the foreign
policy decision-making process draw on public opinion, interest groups, and the
news media. The literature will cover the changing post-Cold War perceptions of
public opinion, the news media, and interest groups. This section will explain how
interest groups, the news media, and public opinion influenced how President
George H.W Bush and President Bill Clinton intervened in Somalia. The rationale for
including Somalia as part of the literature is inherent because disastrous American
involvement in Somalia was predicated on interest groups, public opinion, and the
news media. This section will also provide a framework for the idea that interest
groups, public opinion, and the news media can work as a domestic system.
In the 1990s, cultural life in the United States was changing because of the
growing access to telecommunications, which allowed people to access information
faster. By the 1990s, some scholars report that at least 30% of American families
had cable access(Carey & Elton, 2010). Cable channels provide additional niche
channels such as MTV, CNN, Disney, and others. The sociological imagination that
Mills stated that people react to the environment.
Public opinion is paramount in American politics because public opinion can
impact policymakers' decisions. Barbara A. Bardes and Robert W. Oldendick's book
Public Opinion examines the fundamentals of how public opinion data is collected
and how it contributes to American politics. Concerning foreign policy, the authors
contend that Americans rank the most critical foreign policy priorities as relevant to
them (Bardes & Oldendick. 2017). The authors build on their argument by giving the
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history of foreign policy and public opinion. Bardes and Oldendick use examples
such as the Vietnam War to highlight that Americans wondered what relevance the
crisis had to them (Bardes & Oldendick. 2017).
The changing political, cultural norms of post-Cold War American foreign
policy that challenge the idea that military power should be the foremost source of
influence is Joseph Nye's soft power coinage. Nye (2008) defines soft power as
"getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than
coerces them." Therefore, soft power is predicated on the preference of “others.” The
national interest can explain foreign policy issues' American cultural relevance; public
opinion can help understand the decision-making process (Nye, 2008). For instance,
Nye states that "Part of America's soft power grows out of the openness of its society
and polity and the fact that a free press, Congress, and courts can criticize and
correct policies" ( Nye, 2008).
Concerns that the U.S. military in a post-Cold War era did not have a tangible
threat such as the Soviet Union caused attitudes that defense spending such be cut
(Frank, 2012). The values over what is a military necessity have changed. The
ambiguity over defense budget spending after the Cold War is essential in
understanding the U.S.'s future role because it raises a fundamental question if the
U.S. does use military force for what interest? Understanding countries' political
values are vital in analyzing political participation such as public opinion, news
media, and interest groups
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President Clinton came to office in 1993 with an already expanded attentive
public because of telecommunications' growth. Regarding public opinion, polling is
viewed as the most common form of public opinion. Research shows that the issue
with public opinion polls is that, yes, Americans answer questions related to foreign
policy. Still, at times, the average American may not be as well-versed in foreign
policy issues(Powlick & Katz, 1998). This issue is addressed in latent foreign policy
constructs because survey polls do not get to the public concerns' underlying
problems. Yes or no answers do not tell policy-makers the “why” question.

The Power of the Domestic Reality in Foreign Policy Decisions
Domestic Reality: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
“Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision
Making” By Knecht and Weatherford examines the issue of whether presidents listen
to public opinion on foreign policy issues. Like Holst, the authors are trying to debunk
that American public opinion is sporadic (Knecht & Weatherford 2006). The research
address how attentive is the American public when it comes to foreign policy
concerns (Knecht & Weatherford, 2006). The search shows that Presidents care
about what the American public thinks about foreign policy issues. Optimistic public
opinion rewards presidents with political capital in approval 708(Knecht &
Weatherford, 2006). Positive public support will increase their political power. The
authors do ask, does public opinion impact foreign policy? The authors state that it
deals with the foreign policy event (Knecht & Weatherford, 2006).
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The literature exposes that American public opinion on foreign policy-related
issues can be stratified by race. African Americans were among the most consisted
groups in lobbying the Reagan Administration in stopping Apartheid in South Africa.
Barbara Bardes and Robert Oldenick flesh out how public opinion data is
measured and how it impacts American public policy issues such as foreign policy.
The first step in understanding public opinion and its relevance to American foreign
policy is how information is disseminated to the American public.
Domestic Reality: News Media and Foreign Policy
Robert Entman's book Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion,
and U.S Foreign Policy examine how the news media frames news of foreign policy
significance. This book is taking a bold leap by asserting that this is the primary way
Americans get their information. Entman uses a cascading model to demonstrate
how data related to foreign policy is framed. The foreign policy issues start at the
policymakers, then move to the journalists and the public ( Entman, 2007). The Cold
War's early years made it easy for presidents to control the media, which limited the
range of news media ( Entman, 2007). Entman states the end of the Cold War let
journalists become more liberated(Entman 2007). Entman says that since elections
do not bound journalists, they are free to be the activist voice by covering issues
such as interventions that included Bosnia and Somalia.
As a democracy, journalists can be viewed as an invisible branch of the
government(Braernan, 1985). Historically, the news media has been a government
watchdog, which can be traced back to the Tea Pot Dome Scandal news media
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coverage. Throughout the 20th century, the news media has been pivotal in
uncovering the Vietnam War's truths. Moreover, the news media can directly cause
pressuring the US government to intervene in foreign policy-related issues.
The watershed moment in the news media's elevation influence on
government policies would be the Vietnam War. As Strobel states in Late-Breaking
Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations (1997), this was
America's first "living-room war." The news media coverage of the Vietnam War
allowed millions of Americans to get updates on the war. An essential contribution of
the history of the news media and the Vietnam War was that journalists could offer
commentary such as Walter Cronkite. The latter said that "It seems now to more
certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam will end in a stalemate"
(Strobel, 1997). Strobel summarizes the Vietnam War literature by concluding," Many
have seen Vietnam as a 'television war.' They argue that the vivid and mostly
uncensored day-by-day television coverage of the war and its brutalities profoundly
impacted public attitudes(Strobel, 1997). The poll data does not support such a
conclusion. They clearly show that whatever impact television had, it was not enough
to reduce support for the below the levels attained by the Korean War when TV was
in its infancy until casually levied far surpassed those of the earlier war" (Strobel,
1997).
The catalyst for public outrage was the growing number of casualties in
Vietnam; this also became Somalia's case (1992-1993). The news media is a way for
Americans on foreign policy-related issues. The news media did not frame the death
of the American soldiers in Vietnam in a positive context as WWII and South Korea.
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The birth of cable news such as the Cable News Network (CNN) had created
a new space for the news media where Americans could get constant updates on
breaking news. CNN's first test coverage for covering wars was the first Gulf War.
CNN was able to provide round the clock coverage into the unfolding events in Iraq.
(Strobel, 1997).

61% percent of Americans thought CNN did the best job among

the TV networks (Strobel,1997).
Moreover, between 1982-2004 the daily newspaper circulation in the United
States was about 59 million (Peterson, 2019). About 71% of people would read the
newspaper more than once. During these years, there were over 50,000 journalists
out in the field. A good majority of the United States was concerned enough to read
newspapers daily consistently. Due to the high numbers of Americans reading
newspapers, I can see where my two case studies fall within them.
Strobel summarizes that the Cold War ended freed the American media
from the status quo agenda, US/Soviet Union relations (Strobel, 1997). The media
coverage of different issues concerning crises, such as humanitarian interventions, is
an example of the news media's freedom to frame stories their way instead of the
Cold War's status quo. During the post-Cold War, the news media and the
international community often clashed on how news media covered the
peacekeeping operations (Strobel, 1997). An example of the tense relationship
between the US media and the UN was in Bosnia because the UN blocked
journalists' access to specific regions because of an understand the UN and Bosnian
government had with each other. For instance, the UN refused the release of a video
showing Bosnian Croats blow up an ancient bridge in Mostar (Strobel, 1997).
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Does the American public care about issues of U.S foreign policy? The
literature consensus follows the elite-centric model that contends that Americans are
ill-informed on U.S foreign policy issues. Scholars that support this claim are Holsti,
Knecht, and Weatherford. The elite-centric model that Holst states vary from two
political theories. His realist claim for the impact of U.S foreign policy and public
opinion states that it does little to influence U.S foreign policy. The realist opinion
also says that the public is often ill-informed on foreign policy issues (Holsti, 2004). If
public opinion does seep its way into the decision-making process within the realist
school, it will have ill consequences. Holst demonstrates that this theory's variant
would be the "CNN Effect" ( Holsti, 2004). The "CNN Effect" is contributed to the
Clinton Administration getting involved in crises such as Bosnia that did not pose any
strategic value to the United States. Moreover, realists such as George F. Kennan
states that Americans are emotional when examining other nations' internal conflicts
(Holsti, 2004).
The liberal school states that public opinion should be at the center of the
foreign policy decision-making process ( Holsti, 2004). Holst says the liberal tradition
to this stance on public opinion has gone back to Jeremy Bentham, his work "PublicOpinion Tribunal," which is called public opinion to be the sole remedy for the
government (Holsti 2004). The end of the Cold War saw an explosion of Americans'
access to U.S foreign policy issues due to the availability of 24-hour news channels
such as CNN.
Furthermore, another domestic variable that adds to the domestic consensus
in the United States is interest groups. Political mobilization is predicated on
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individuals who share like-minded attitudes; they either form interest groups or
pressure groups. As Baumgartner and Leech states (1998) that interest groups
spring up out of disturbances that are going on. The importance of interest groups
can also be traced back to Alex De Tocqueville's works, who saw the rise of different
groups as an inspiration for upholding the virtues of democracy. Lastly, as the US
becomes more diverse, minority groups need to be broadly represented. Interest
groups can be the link between group concerns and the political institutions of the
US. From a research perspective, locating interest groups can be difficult because
not all issues act in a collective sense. In Interest Groups and Lobbying: Pursuing
Political Interests in America (2016), Holyoke unearths the complexities of the
diversity of interest groups related to mobilization. Holyoke (2016) states:
American society is extremely diverse, and so the number of diﬀerent interests
that are felt intensely enough to motivate people to form an interest group is
probably unknowable. Not every individual interest leads to a mobilized
interest group, often only because there are not enough other people who
share the same interest to form a group, or because people with similar
interests are too geographically dispersed (though today this is not the barrier
it used to be). (p. 12)
Domestic Reality: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy
Since telecommunications have enhanced how Americans receive
information, interest groups cater to specific policy issues due to the diversity and
pluralism in the US. As mentioned earlier, the First Amendment to the constitution
gives freedom of speech and peacefully assembles. Still, Founding Fathers such as
James Madison, who contributed to Federalist No. 10, provides cadence to interest
groups because it is part of the American political process.
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In A History of The U.S. Political System: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions
(2010), the chapter “ The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era
Origins,” Tichenor and Harris state three significant variables of interest groups: (1)
the aggregate number of organized interests; (2) the variety of organized interests;
and (3) the nationalization of organized interests.
Interest Groups have clout with all branches of government: Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial branches. The two main government branches relevant to
my study regarding interest groups are Congress and the Executive Branch(Harris,
2010)(Ambar, 2010). Congressmen/women, especially in the House of
Representatives, Congressmen/women typically listen to constituency concerns
since they have frequent elections. The Executive Branch may appear to be more
challenging for interest groups to penetrate. Still, suppose the political environment is
fragile. In that case, the President will need support from non-government actors
such as interest groups since the President represents the entire nation, then the
President has to have broad appeal. Interest groups can help the President advance
public policies if it's in the respective interest groups' interest. Moreover, if the
President is seeking reelection, interest groups can offer political support because
interest groups represent various populations.
The Congressional Black Caucus(CBC) is one of the oldest black interest
groups in the US that dates back its roots to 1871. The CBC's original purpose was
to strengthened communication because of black representatives and the House of
Representatives leadership(Erhagbe, 1995). CBC has evolved over the issues to
focus on foreign policy-related issues-particularly in Africa. In “The Congressional
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Black Caucus and the United States Policy Toward Africa: 1971-1990,” (1995),
Erhagbe states that the CBC's success regarding foreign policy issues was modest. I
think that the success of CBC relies on building coalitions among other interest
groups. CBC does influence because it is a congressional interest group that can
directly influence foreign policy. After all, the CBC has a direct link since all of its
members are in Congress.
However, for Rwanda and Haiti, most of the activism from Interest groups
stem from ethnic interest groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus and the
TransAfrica. In Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy (2008), David Paul and Rachel
Paul tackle the importance of ethnic lobbies in foreign policy issues. One of the most
successful African-American interest groups that focus on foreign policy is
TransAfrica, founded in 1977(Gerhart, 1999). The organization has had considerable
influence on US relations with countries in Africa and the Caribbean. Moreover,
TransAfrica was the first African-American interest group that solely focused on
foreign policy-related issues.
The success of the ethnic groups often is predicated on how close they are to
the decision-makers in power, such as Congress and the Executive Branch. Some
interest groups such as TransAfrica have offices in Washington, D.C. Additionally, it
is essential to remember that interest groups may share other goals with other
interest groups so that interest groups may form coalitions. I will demonstrate that
when I discuss the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica. How much power
does an ethnic interest group have? As the U.S. becomes more ethnically diverse,
the impact of ethnic interest groups may be more significant. Moreover, during the
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Clinton Administration, both TransAfrica and CBC tried hard to dismantle American
foreign policy's perceived racism because Africans are not seen as equals (Leanne,
1998).
Case 1-Literature- Clinton Administration Response to Rwanda, 1994
The Clinton Administration's response to the genocide in Rwanda was
predicated on the events in Somalia. The literature agrees that the US's inaction to
use the military was 18 Army Rangers(Barnett 2004) ( Annan, 2013). Scholars such
as Doyle and Sambanis (2003) characterized the US's inaction because “Rwanda
genocide was the stepchild of the disaster in Mogadishu.” The American perception
of Rwanda's violence was seen as another opportunity for the US to get involved in
unnecessary wars.
The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War(2006) in Rwanda by Scott
Straus mentions The 1993 Arusha Accords as crucial in ending the civil war that had
taken place in Rwanda over three years. The Arusha Accords were constant statutes
and frameworks in place through which a stable and all-inclusive government would
be adopted and continuously developed(Straus, 2006). Through the Arusha Accord,
the Rwanda Patriotic Front – which was generally Tutsi – and the Hutu government
were provided with a political platform to reform politics and productively share power
(Straus, 2004).
The Clinton Administration was well aware of the events leading up to and
shaping the Arusha Accord (Power, 2004). However, they invested minimal – if any
– diplomatic and international relations resources to ensure that the country would
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stick to the Arusha Accord precepts and come out strong and build a better and
productive country. Suppose the Clinton Administration had invested in the political
stability of Rwanda during and after the Arusha Accords. In that case, there is a
possible chance that the world would have never played host to the infamous
genocide.
There were several challenges experienced by the peacekeepers and
international observers in Rwanda. In investigating and reporting, the peacekeepers
faced difficulties birthed from the secretary general's current government position.
Apart from being the secretary-general, Jacques-Roger Booh Booh also served as
the special envoy to Rwanda. In 1994, the State Department provided a report,
which detailed the threat of ethnic cleansing within Rwanda’s borders. Suppose the
policymakers in America were aware of the looming threat of ethnic cleansing in
Rwanda. In that case, the Clinton administration should have done much more to
ensure that the genocide did not occur.
Here are the primary debates that the literature tackle: what intelligence the
US had in Rwanda, UN and US differences in Rwanda intervention, and what could
the US have done, and why did the Clinton Administration be reluctant about getting
involved.
Alan Kuperman's book The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention discusses the
U.S. involvement in Rwanda. His book focuses on three circumstances that the U.S.
could have intervened to stop Rwanda's genocide; he combines these three
scenarios with lessons learned from Rwanda. The flawed logic of looking at if the
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U.S. government could have intervened means that the Clinton Administration
already had the political capital to garner support, which the Clinton Administration
did not have. By the end of April, any efforts to continue the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) would be futile( Kuperman, 2001). Also,
Kuperman states that for maximum intervention, the U.S. would have to provide
15,000 troops. Rendering 15 000 soldiers in Rwanda paints a problematic picture
that a full-scale intervention following the disastrous peacekeeping in Somalia would
have been brutal( Kuperman, 2001). Moreover, there would have been causalities,
and that would have lost American support, which would be another foreign policy
failure for President Clinton.
Samantha Power A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide look
at the chronological history of the United States' reaction to genocide over the
twentieth century. She gives a foreign policy analysis over why the US government
reacted to the crises. Regarding the problems in Rwanda, she explores why the US
acted slowly to stop the genocide. Power debunks Rwanda's intelligence issue and
states that the US had operational intelligence throughout Rwanda's crisis. Power
breaks away from Alan Kuperman, who blamed the intelligence failure as a primary
reason why the US did not aggressively act to stop the genocide. Power was able to
her connection to get intelligence reports, memorandums, and briefing that revealed
what the US knew at the time. For instance, she mentions a Commission report from
1993 that states:
The commission’s March 1993 report found that more than 10,000 Tutsi had
been detained and 2,000 murdered since the RPF’s 1990 invasion. 10
Government-supported killers had carried out at least three major massacres
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of Tutsi. Extremist, racist rhetoric and militias were proliferating. The
international commission and a UN rapporteur who soon followed warned
explicitly of a possible genocide(p. 228).
The issue that the U.S. knew little about is wrong. In essence, Power validates
Rwanda's lack of strategic value as the reason for the Clinton Administration's
inaction in Rwanda. Correspondingly, Power highlights how Congressional Power of
the purse meant that Congress over half a billion dollars because of what Power
describes as an "insatiable UN appetite for missions" (Power 2002). Regarding the
aftermath of Somalia, Power notes that republicans thought Clinton was too trusting
of the UN (Power, 2002). The immense contribution of Power's work is her
acknowledgment of the role that PDD-25 played in the decision-making process.5
Based on the PDD-25 guidelines, Rwanda did not meet US requirements for
supporting a peacekeeping operation.
Power contends that “ Domestic political forces that might have pressed for
action were absent” ( Power, 2001). Power makes the point that perhaps the
presence and (absence) of domestic variables can make the issues seem “clear.”
The Clinton Administration had to grapple with handling the crisis in Rwanda could
have been handled differently if domestic sources made considerable attention that
the president would respond.
Michael Barnett’s Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda
focuses on the dilemma that the United Nations (UN) Security Council faced during
the genocide in Rwanda. Barnett highlights the American role in the Security Council

PDD-25 is also known as "U.S.Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations."
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm
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while discussing the crisis in Rwanda. Barnett agrees that the end of the Cold War
gave UN relevance again (Barnett, 2002). Barnett argues that the 1993 US Somalia
debacle compelled the Clinton Administration in the wake of public outrage to amend
its policy on multilateral peacekeeping operations that would directly affect the United
Nations. Furthermore, Barnett states that the UNAMIR could not maintain the Arusha
Accords' implantation because of the lack of local resources in Rwanda (Barnett,
2002). Force Commander Romeo Dallaire did not have enough military support.
Barnett also shares the information of a cable that Dallaire sent to New York.
An informant told Dallaire that the Hutu Government was making a Tutsi's list and
moderate Hutus, and the Interahamwe was stockpiling weapons. The country was at
an immediate threat of mass murders. Kofi Annan, who oversaw the UN
peacekeeping department, told Dallaire not to raid the warehouse where the
weapons were and turn over the intelligence to the Hutu government. Kofi Anan
clarifies his position in his memoir Interventions: A Life in War and Peace that the
international community had no "appetite" for humanitarian interventions because of
the US in Somalia (Annan, 2013).

Twenty million dollars became a concern that hindered the Clinton
Administration's support of a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, not because of the
cost but because President Clinton did not want to justify another peacekeeping
operation to Congress. Barnett states(2002):
The countries that were most sensitive to the cost of the operation were those
that were expected to pick up the largest part of the bill. In short, the United
States, which according to the UN’s assessment rate would absorb one-third
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of the total cost. The Clinton administration was less worried about its total
share, which amounted to $20 million, than the fact that it would have to justify
the operation and its cost to an increasingly hostile Congress. Congress
would want to know why the UN was setting up another operation and why it
cost as much as it did. (p. 71)
Barnett agrees with the Kuperman intelligence gap because he states that the
Clinton Administration did not believe that Rwanda's crises had derived into a
genocide. Consequently, the US did not take Romeo Dallirares cables earnestly.
Furthermore, when the President carrying Hutu President Habyarimana was shot
down, Somalia's images came up; thus, the US wanted to close the UNAMIR
operation. During the outbreak of violence in April, the US interests were to support a
complete withdraw of the UNAMIR(Barnett, 2002). Barnett also gives insight into how
the Clinton Administration wanted to manipulate and strong-armed the UN Security
Council to protect the Clinton Administration's stance on de-strengthening the United
Nations. The vehicle that the US used to indicate UN policy was PDD-25. What
makes Barnett work even more important is that he agrees with Power that even
though PDD-25 was signed in May, it was informally in effect. Barnett (2002) states:
For several months the Clinton administration’s tough love strategy, which
was designed to keep congressional critics of the UN and the administration
at bay, had been on display. Above all else, this meant limiting the
peacekeeping bill and shrinking the number and expense of those operations
that did not involve American national interests. This strategy was in full force
in its policy toward Rwanda(p. 101).

Barnett states that Clinton had to show Congress that he could take
hardliners' problematic humanitarian crisis approach (Barnett, 2002). Barnett
determines that the US shared part of the moral accountability for the Rwandan
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Genocide and that the US response was in fear of another Somalia. Moreover, the
UN failed because of the Security Council's veto power; the member-states
entertained the US as they were trying to see if the events in Rwanda merited being
considered genocide or just a continuation of the 1992 Civil War. In 1998, President
Clinton apologized in Rwanda 1998 for the international community's inaction,
including African nations, to stop the violence in Rwanda ( Bartnett, 2002).
Case Study 1-The Role of the News Media
Regarding the news media response to Rwanda, the literature presents a
census that there was a lack of American coverage. During the early stages of
framing the story in Somalia, NGOs were present on broadcast news, making a case
for intervention. NGO's to the media that was not happening to Rwanda. As
Kuperman pointed out, Western media attempted to scapegoat the failure of
intervention to the international community. Still, the media shares the blame
because the industry failed to mobilize the public (Chaon, 2007). It is important to
note that the political climate towards supporting peacekeeping operations did
change. Strobel's analysis of the US news media coverage in Rwanda is drastically
different from Somalia and Haiti. Strobel uses data from Vanderbilt University to
show the number of times that the US media mentioned Rwanda. In summary, the
American news media appears not to have the political will in covering Rwanda's
violence.
The Media and the Rwanda Genocide( 2007) address the impact of the
coverage or lack of news coverage in stopping the genocide. Steven Livingston
states that Rwanda's news coverage reflects the recent loss of life in Somalia. The
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outcomes of Somalia was a factor in American news media coverage regarding
Rwanda. American policymakers blamed Somalia's news media coverage for forcing
the U.S. to intervene (Livingston, 2007). U.S. policymakers did not want that to be an
excuse to intervene in Rwanda.
Moreover, Livingston states that when the genocide in Rwanda was occurring,
these were the international stories being covered: the refugee crises in Haiti and
Nelson Mandela( Livingston, 2007). Livingston gets to the issue at hand, and that is
if the news content has a role in foreign policy affairs. Interestingly, Livingston states
that most of Rwanda's news coverage was not about the genocide but the refugee
crises. As the genocide in Rwanda stopped, and now it was time to deal with the
aftermath.
"Who Failed in Rwanda, Journalists or the Media?" ( 2007) continues the
conversation on what role the news media had in not giving substantive coverage to
Rwanda. Chaon mentions journalists' background as being a cause of the lack of
news coverage because of the simple truth that journalists are not genocide experts.
Chaon (2007) states:
Most journalists are not experts in genocide. Many of them – myself included
– arrived in Rwanda with very little knowledge of the country. So, it was
tempting, especially at the beginning, to speak of the civil war, of these
massacres as a perverse return of a civil war, and to link these massacres to
previous massacres since 1959. We failed to understand that the killing was
something totally new, that this was not a continuity of what had happened
before.
During those first few days in April, special correspondents were much more
likely to use words like 'chaos', 'anarchy' and 'furore'. They were reporting on a
resumption of the civil war. In the field, it was easy to be confused and view
the massacres as a 'side effect' of the fighting (p, 162)
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Chaon makes the argument that the news media reflected the overall
American sentiment regarding Rwanda. Just like the politicians, the news media did
not understand the totality of not covering Rwanda as a genocide. Most all the
evening news coverage from the “Big Three” Networks-ABC News, CBS News, and
NBC News rarely called the violence in Rwanda a “genocide.” Most of Rwanda's
American evening news coverage tried to code the crisis as “Civil War.”
Linda Melvern’s chapter “Missing the Story: The Media and the Rwanda
Genocide" in The Media and the Rwanda Genocide blames the reporters'
competence in covering the story. During the height of the genocide in April,
newspapers such as the New York Times were calling the situation “uncontrollable
spasm of lawlessness and terror” (Melvern, 2007). Melvern contends that for the
West, Rwanda was not worth the coverage. Alan Kuperman always noted that the
West was portraying Rwanda as a civil war. The news media was not getting and
quoting the right amount of death totals. Also, he notes that the reporters focused on
the capital Kigali which only accounts for 4% of the Rwandan population (Kuperman,
2007).
The glaring issue is the lack of wall-to-wall coverage of Rwanda's genocide
because it was not an American news story. The shadow of Somalia impacted the
news coverage of international events. The issue is that does the media share in the
same cosmopolitan nature that, on paper, the Clinton Doctrine champions? The
problem is that news outlets choose to cover the problems that will increase ratings,
and at times crises abroad do not merit the news media’s attention. As Roger
Silverstone stated:
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The baseline of my argument is that the world’s media are an increasingly
significant site for the construction of a moral order, one which would be, and
arguably needs to be, commensurate with the scope of global
interdependence. Insofar as they provide the symbolic connection and
disconnection that we have to the other, the other who is the distant other,
distant geographically, historically, sociologically, then the media are
becoming the crucial environments in which a morality appropriate to the
increasingly interrelated but still horrendously divided and conflictful world
might be found, and indeed expected(p. 8).
It appears that, at times, the media can be an extension of government, which
does not mean that the media is not an independent institution that operates on its
own. Coverage of the Rwandan genocide could have produced the “CNN Effect,”
which critics say was the reason why the US intervened in Somalia. In 1994, crises
in Africa, which does not cause any immediate American border issues. At the time,
Roger Silverstone characterized the media’s lack of coverage because some of the
news media did not see the Rwandan genocide hurting the international system
(Silverstone, 2013).

The New York Times ( NYT) is frequently mentioned in the literature as
covering the Rwandan Genocide. The New York Times has been cited as the paper
of record. It has a track record of raising awareness of Larry Kramer’s constant
critique of the government during the early stages of the AIDS epidemic. The
question becomes, what was the American news media coverage in 1994? The
NYT, who reported on this issue, published numerous papers. However, criticisms
arise on what more NYT could do, such as posting more images. It is unclear on the
impact of paper news in 1994 because of the growing power of 24-hour news
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coverage and the increased use of improved technology that allows fast
communication from abroad.
The literature presents an argument that coupled with American disinterest,
the continent does not have the technological foundation to support journalists. Fair
and Parks (2001) summarize issues in coverage of the Rwanda genocide by stating:
For media organizations, coverage of Rwanda's 1994 genocide was
challenging. Logistically, U.S. news media had to scramble to gain entry into a
country where conditions were deteriorating rapidly. Organizationally, because
few U.S. newsgroups support regular reporting from Africa and still fewer
operate bureaus on the continent, scarce resources for international reporting
had to be redirected from regions thought to be of greater geopolitical and/or
cultural interest to American consumers. Journalistically, U.S. reporters were
dropped into a region where they knew little, and where their government
advocated disinterested noninvolvement. Hence, reporting on the Rwandan
genocide was typical of U.S. coverage of Africa generally. Journalists relied
on stereotypes (p.36).
A percent of the American media covers international issues such as the
Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and Somalia. In April 1994, during the
genocide's height, the American press was being dominated by Nirvana lead singer
Kurt Corbin's death. The trend from the literature is that American media involves
Americans. Such international crises that receive the most news media coverage
involved military American Armed Forces.
The news media response to the Rwandan genocide from existing literature
draws the argument that I am making that concerning the other factors, the news
media can influence the foreign policy decision-making process. As I will examine in
my case study chapters, the absence of the media can send signals to policymakers
that the coverage of issues like in the previous year-1993, images of starving
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children dominated the news, and the US intervened. In retrospect, concerning
Rwanda,
Despite the media being absent in Rwanda, some conclusions can be made
beyond the mischaracterization of Rwanda's violence being merely tribal. Still, only
the West is capable of solving Rwanda’s problem ( Thompson 2007). However, this
“problem” has been downplayed by the media as the violence being part of the civil
war status-quo element. Tribal wars, warring clans, and sporadic violence are may
what the press thinks about Rwanda, which is similar to Orientalism (Harrow, 2005).
The lack of understanding of Belgium's ethnic divides and colonialization made
Rwanda even harder to explain to viewers. The problem becomes, “Does the West
want to intervene in Rwanda?”
The West intervened in Somalia because of the wall-to-wall coverage of
violence in the country. It is not a question that the news media did not report the
crisis; perhaps other stories captured Americans' attention. An answer could be that
Rwanda was not experiencing issues that could be fixed by “aid,” such as health
crises. Western writers tend to focus on topics such as “AIDS” more than physical
violence. In the case study concerning Haiti, the AIDS epidemic brought news media
attention to Haiti because of a theory that patient zero came from Haiti.
Peter Viggo Jakobsen provides an analysis of UN humanitarianism following
the end of the Cold War. This article is essential because some of Jakobsen's cases
are Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda, critical to this study. Jakobsen starts by stating that
the end of the Cold War saw a new type of humanitarianism: peace enforcement
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operations and military force. Jakobsen weighs factors such as national interest,
humanitarianism, and the CNN effect as factors for UN support of peacekeeping
operations (Jakobsen, 1995). The CNN effect is a theory that the mass constant
media coverage of crises impacts foreign policy states. For example, the author fails
to demonstrate how national interests played an important factor in these operations'
outcome. Furthermore, Jakobsen states that Rwanda invoked Somalia's images to
the American public ( Jakobsen, 2000).
Print and Television news is how news agencies presented the events in
Rwanda to the American public. In the following chapters, I will analyze the New
York Times' importance because the newspaper was one of the mediums that
attempted to cover Rwanda's violence. From the available literature, the New York
Times is characterized in "Representation or misrepresentation? The New York
Times's framing of the 1994 Rwanda genocide" (2010) as trying to downplay the
level of violence in Rwanda. Historically, the news media has benefited from agendasetting; newspapers can help steer the public into paying close attention to "news of
value."
Scholars can do textual analysis to explain a narrative that dominated the
New York Times coverage of Rwanda's political violence. Tendai Chari's textual
analysis reveals how many articles the New York Times dedicated to informing the
public about the genocide brewing in Rwanda. Chari's analysis is novel because of
the attempt to argue that the western news media is often portrayed as victims
needing “Western Saviors” to help stop their suffering. Perpetual anarchic conditions
is a standard narrative that dominates how the west views Africa( Chari, 2010). The
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preparators of the genocide often used machetes and other sharp objects during the
violence. Readers can view the NYT coverage of the brutal nature of the genocide
as stereotypical because Chari contends that the paper coverage of Africans as
“savages.”
The role of the media absence during the Rwandan genocide is essential
because prominent interest groups such as Human Rights Watch concern that there
was a lack of American media coverage in Rwanda. As an official from the Human
Rights Watch in the LA Times commentary -“So where are the journalists?” Due to
varying views on the news media's role in Rwanda, that is one of the reasons why
the news media is an independent variable in this study.

Case Study 1-The Role of Interest Groups

Interest groups have been cited as a potential domestic source for American
foreign policy decisions. As defined in Chapter 1, interest groups are like-minded
individuals trying to lobby for change. A subfield within the interest groups' impact on
the foreign policy decision-making process understands ethnic interest groups.
Ethnic interest groups are defined by Ambrosio (2002) as "politically relevant social
divisions based on a shared sense of cultural distinctiveness." Due to Rwanda and
Haiti immigrant's presence in the US, it is imperative to look at the lobbying efforts of
groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus(CBC) and TransAfrica.
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Hadest notes that the African-American community had a lack of interest in the
crises in Rwanda. The article "Erosion of American National Interests" conveys the
importance of understanding a states' domestic culture helps explain its role in
foreign policy issues. For instance, "For an understanding of American foreign policy,
it is necessary to study not the interests of the American state in a world of
competing states but rather the play of economic and ethnic interest America
domestic politics" (Huntington, 1997). The U.S.'s evolving domestic interest is vital
because Huntington, a prominent realist, understands the impact of ethnic politics in
the U.S. This idea is explored more in the edited book Ethnic Identity Groups and
U.S. Foreign Policy.
In the chapter "Identity, African-Americans, and U.S. Foreign Policy:
Discerning Reactions to South African Apartheid and the Rwandan," Fran Scott and
Abdullah Osman examine the African-American community reaction to those two
events. Black Americans have always felt a close kinship to Africa. However, at the
end of the 20th century, policymakers such as Randall Robinson has admitted that
African-Americans had little knowledge about Africa( Scott & Abdullah, 2002).
Concerning this dissertation, the 1990s is essential in understanding AfricanAmerica to issues in Africa. There were various issues in the 1990s, such as civil
wars, genocide, starvation, and natural resource exploitation ( Scott & Abdullah,
2002). Scott and Abdullah's chapter engages in ethnic interest groups' power
because it shows that the American-American community-supported more sanctions
in South Africa. Black American activism in South Africa is due to the increasing
number of black Congressmen/women ( Scott & Abdullah, 2002). African81

Americans could relate to Blacks' struggles in South Africa because of the similarity
between Apartheid in South Africa and racial segregation in the US. What made the
African-American voice heard on the issue of Apartheid was different interest groups
such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and most important the
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). The CBC proposed over 30 pieces of legislation
opposing Apartheid ( Scott & Abdullah, 2002). This activism culminated in 1986
Congress passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAA) ( Scott & Abdullah
2002). The CAA prohibited investment or loans to Africa and prevented goods from
coming into the US from South Africa (Scott & Abdullah, 2002).
The African-American reaction to Rwanda's genocide was different because
the black community was ambivalent about that issue. Like Hadest, Scott and
Abdullah agree that there was a lack of interest among African-Americans about the
US taking a more active role in Rwanda (Scott and Abdullah 2002). Interestingly, the
authors note Rwanda's distinction as a black-on-black issue and not a black on white
political problems such as South Africa (Scott & Abdullah 2002). Congressmen Alce
Hastings, a Democrat from Florida who was a member of the House Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Africa, recalled that Rwanda was not a vital interest to
African-Americans. Hastings states that “Africa seems so far away, and there is no
vital interest my constituency sees.” This critical because Hastings's actions of being
vocal on this issue rely on his constituency seeing the genocide as a problem or not.
The literature discusses that the Human Rights Watch( HRW) sounded the
alarm that Rwanda was about to experience political violence(Straus, 2019).
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TransAfrica and CBC seemed concerned about Rwanda's violence, but the interest
groups did not advocate aggressively for military intervention like Haiti.
Scott and Abdullah also examine the CBC's actions to force the Clinton
Administration into a more active role in stopping the genocide. CBC's limited efforts
were writing letters to President Clinton to support former UN Secretary BoutrosGhali and the Organization's call for additional troops. The letters came with a caveat
on American involvement because they would have come from neighboring African
countries and not the US. Other actions include the CBC boycotting a White House
conference on Africa as a sign of protest to Clinton African policies. As Scott and
Osman note, it is unclear if the CBC would have helped Rwanda's people. Scott and
Osman also examine other Congressmen/women's actions regarding the genocide.
Most notably, Carol Mosely-Braun, a Senator from Illinois who called for military
intervention as the last, advocated economic sanctions(Bergbower & Schmitt, 2015).
The CBC position's bottom line is that the Organization was one of the few that
supported the Clinton Administration to take a more aggressive response to the
carnage occurring in Rwanda. Rwanda's CBC response shows that there was not an
urgency in the black community to get involved.
Case Study 1-The Role of Public Opinion

Norms drive public opinion; therefore, it is essential not just to analyze public
opinion but also to understand the political culture in 1994. As Martha Finnemore
stated (2002), "the pattern of intervention cannot be understood apart from the
changing normative context in which it occurs." The literature surrounding Americans'
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public response to Rwanda shows Americans as being disinterested in Rwanda
because of Somalia's anxiety climate in Washington, D.C. As summarized in the
literature, the American public's initial response right after Somalia showed mixed
support for intervention. The literature references the loss of life in Somalia, 1993, to
the US, not supporting military response. A robust military response could not
happen because of Rwanda's proximity to Somalia and the lack of distance between
Rwanda and the US. However, as Berinsky (2009) states as I echoed the "casualties
hypothesis," the view that the American people will shy away from international
involvement in the face of war deaths." A leery public already premediated the
shadow of the looming genocide in Rwanda from the loss of life in Somalia. In a
“Solution From Hell” (2004), Wertheim states:
Americans did not yet feel their government had a duty to attempt forcible
intervention to stop genocide. That norm was still developing. The
administration did have humanitarian interventionist impulses, displayed
before the Somalia debacle, and a low- to midlevel interagency task force on
Rwanda convened to gather intelligence and devise intervention scenarios (p.
153).
Public opinion in the US response to genocide in Rwanda was ambivalent.
The literature suggests that the public did not favor intervention. As Burkhalter (1994)
“It takes a certain degree of a public and congressional clamor to capture his
attention - and a high degree when the crisis is in Africa.” The connection between
public opinion and the Clinton Administration, ” public opinion is needed to support
my argument that public opinion and the media and interest groups' silence did not
compel the Clinton Administration to use military force like Haiti.
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Case 2-Literature- Clinton Administration Response to Haiti, 1994

Domestic support is what separates the two case studies apart from each
other. There was domestic support for the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti
vs. Rwanda. The United States did not want a recurrence of American casualties in
Somalia, so The Clinton Administration's involvement in Haiti required domestic
support ( Livingston & Eachus, 2010). Haiti's political problem for the removal of
President Jean Artiside triggered an immigration crisis in the United States.
Regarding the Clinton response, this literature review covers why Clinton intervened
in Haiti:
•

An influx of Haitian refugees

•

The base of support for intervention (as highlighted in the ethnic interest group
sections)

•

Regional stability
The 1990 Presidential election in Haiti saw President Jean-Bertrand Aristide

as the country’s first democratically elected president (Coupeau, 2008). President
Aristides’s election was a perceived political watershed moment in Haitian history
because of its history of dictatorships and isolation from French colonialism. When
President Aristide became president, he promised equality and took a robust antiAmerican stance (Coupeau, 2008).
Numerous political and economic problems plagued the Presidency of
Aristide. As Steve Coupeau (2008) notes in Haiti's History, most of Haiti's budget
depended on foreign loans, but President Aristide was resistant to globalization. The
unemployment rate was at 80%. Haiti lacked a stable police department, and this
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void was filled by the Army, who became the representative face of coup
supporters(Coupeau, 2008). Haiti still had old hardliners from the Duvalier
dictatorship who had much say in the government and now harbored hatred toward
President Aristide. Haiti's political climate, already tense, was acerbated by a rival
faction bill within Aristide's government. The new political power gave President
Aristide six months to make all necessary public administration changes and
magistracy.
In the year following his election, the chief problem that President Aristide
needed to correct was expanding the military. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Haiti's
political developments before the Aristide presidency were challenging, but its goal
was ideal since its inception. The United States had established the army in 1915
because of Haiti's US occupation and its domestic order source. However, now its
goal was to protect against the external enemy(Dupuy, 2018). As Alex Dupuy (2018)
explains, there were no conditions for Haiti's democracy in 1990. The idea of a head
of government heading dictating political and economic participation rules was a
threat for the elites. The military was part of the elite, which gave the elites political
agency to take political action against Aristide. Tonton Macoute (military unit in Haiti)
did not tolerate the social reforms that Artiside wanted.
Another problem he had to deal with was the economy. Economically,
President Aristide was trying to reform a corrupt economic system. Even though he
campaigned on an Anti-American platform, he worked with the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (Girard, 2002).
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In the following year, Girad notes he was removed from power by the Haitian
army under General Raul Cedras. A de facto military regime was created by the lack
of political leadership stemming from President Aristide's exile. Emmanuel Constant
working for the CIA, knew of his abuse of human rights, yet they continued dealing
with him without protest but still supported the military junta (Girard, 2002). His
actions contributed to the rise in power of the controlling army group and General
Raul's army's terror. Furthermore, Girad argues that their past actions allowed them
to free a known human rights abuser. In terms of implications, the US risked the
world, knowing that they stood by as Haiti's economy weakened due to the closure of
factories and a dying tourism sector. President Aristide was exiled for three years, a
period within which the country descended into chaos characterized by mass
violations of human rights. Karin Von Hippel in "Democratisation as Foreign Policy:
The Case of Haiti" called the military rule barbarism. Von Hippel states:
During its tenure, the Cedras regime was responsible for various acts of
barbarity, including the arrest, torture, murder, and destruction of property of
thousands of ordinary Haitians and many prominent Aristide supporters.
Three thousand Haitians were killed, tens of thousands were believed to be
displaced while an estimated 300,000 were unable to live at home for fear of
prosecution(p. 98).
Furthermore, the Haitian army's actions served to terrorize its helpless citizens
due to the deep racial divisions within the region, thus necessitating foreign parties'
intervention. Army officers executed children, raped the women of people they
suspected to be guilty, and murdered priests within the localities (Girard, 2002).
In 1994, President Clinton made a direct threat to Haiti's militia and sent
troops to the nation, reinstituting President Aristide in the process (Stotzky, 1997).
87

The United States intervened in Haiti to bring back democratic rule by giving a voice
to its black, impoverished majority. Subsequently, Aristide had the help of UN
forces. American troops moved in and received little resistance as they helped Haiti
introduce a democratic rule, which started with President Aristide's reinstatement.
Because of Haiti's situation, many people fled the country, and the US
experienced a problem with Haitian refugees. It is essential to understand this
problem with Haitian refugees, and to do so, a review of legislation from the Carter
Presidency is necessary. The Refugee Act of 1980 is one of the causes of Haitian
immigration to the US. Reports indicate that 125,000 Haitian refugees came to the
US. The problem that the influx of refugees created was a major cause of US
intervention in Haiti in 1994(Von Hippel, 1995). In the early 1990s, there was an
influx of refugees from both Cuba and Haiti. American patience was bleak, and
Florida sued the federal government for 1 billion dollars because of the drain on
social welfare problems( Von Hippel, 1995). President George HW Bush's solution to
slowing refugees' influx to the US was the Kennebunkport Executive Order 13286.
This order required the US Coast Guard "to enforce the suspension of entry of
undocumented aliens by sea and the interaction of any define vessel carrying such
aliens" (Dastyari, 2015).
The impact of this order, as Evelyn Cartright highlights in "The Plight of
Haitian Refugees in South Florida," was that the Kennebunkport Executive Order
became a US presidential campaign issue in 1992. President Clinton characterized
this policy as immoral; he states that "it is a blow to the principle of the first asylum
and America's moral authority in defending the rights of refugees worldwide" (
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Dastyari, 2015). Clinton went further with his campaign rhetoric and said that the
Clinton White House would reexamine forced repatriation policy (Opitz, 2002). When
Clinton took office, the reparation policy continued, but he wanted to increase the
diplomatic dialogue between Haiti and the US. The executive order is imperative in
its legal, political, and social reactions(Opitz, 2002). With help from the United
Nations, the Clinton Administration created a timeline in which the military would
return political control to Aristide( Opitz, 2002).
Another issue of Haitian refugees coming to the U.S. was the issue of HIV.
Published in 1994 during a hostile time for being with HIV/AIDS, Ira J.
Kurzban(1993) stated that in 1994 would be quantitated in Guantanamo Bay. Haitian
advocacy groups, such as the Haitian Centers Council, complained that the U.S.
rejected HIV-positive refugees without legal counsel( Kurzban 1993). Not only was
immigration a chief concern of the U.S. intervention in Haiti, but scholars such as
Framer (2002) stated that the “United States foreign policy discourse on Haiti
constructed the Haitians as a threat to the U.S. population in terms of public health
(carriers of HIV and AIDS).”
The literature summarizes that the US-led response to political upheaval in
Haiti was not solely because of the rhetoric of protecting a country's democratic
infrastructure but because of Haiti's proximity to the U.S. to refugee crises. Moreover,
Jefferies (2001) states that "the U.S. invasion came as a result of pressure from
lobbyists and interest groups." Since Clinton sidestepped Congress by intervening
without Congress's consent, the question becomes what mechanisms forced the
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Clinton Administration to intervene. Domestic support from interest groups, the news
media, and public opinion compelled the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti.
Case Study 2-The Role of the News Media
As in late September was preparing to invade Haiti to restore President
Aristide to off, almost one thousand journalists covered the story. However, the US's
arrival in Haiti to include the first stages of US intervention was slow. Strobel states
that journalists were where they wanted to do. For instance, CBS Evening News
anchorman Dan Rather interviewed Lt. Gen Raoul Cedras, the U.S military's target,
the day before US troops arrived (Strobel, 1997). The news media took cues from
the coverage in Somalia and was careful not to reveal US strategy to the enemy by
not using powerful lighting.
The American news media coverage of Haiti is one of the domestic
constraints featured in this dissertation. I am contending that the Clinton
Administration considered the American public in their actions. One of the most
important events that show that the American public constrained Clinton because
that, on October 11, the USS Harlan Country was on its way to Haiti for an agreedupon UN-approved intervention in Haiti. However, this was days after the death of
the Army Rangers in Somalia. A CNN poll found that two-thirds of the public opposed
Haiti's intervention thinking that this would be another Somalia(Strobel, 1997). Also,
the news media had a role in how Americans processed the death of the army
rangers in Somalia. The press showing images of a dead American being dragged in
Somalia's streets stuck a chord with the American public.
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An important issue that Strobel raises is the stiff relationship between the
military and the press. Tense news media and American military relations stem from
the Vietnam Wars news media coverage, which did not put the US military in a
positive image because of stories like the My Lai massacre. All the military likes to
cover all aspects of wars. Meanwhile, during Haiti's media coverage, the military
spokesman said, "We didn't have anything to hide. We couldn't hide anything"
(Strobel, 1997). Strobel makes the argument that the news media coverage in Haiti
acted as a constraint on US intervention.
Strobel does not believe that the news media was responsible for the US
intervening in Haiti. The big push for the Clinton administration was policymakers. As
mentioned in the next section, ethnic interest groups such as the Congressional
Black Caucus(CBC) and TransAfrica were fundamental in getting the Clinton
Administration to use force in Haiti. The media did help create a pervasive presence
in Haiti that forced the Clinton Administration to intervene (Strobel 1997).
Case Study 2-The Role of Interest Groups
Due to Haiti’s prominence in the US, there has been a trend of community
activism within Haitian ethnic enclaves about Haiti's issues. As mentioned earlier,
Haiti's negative attention was heightened in the 1980s because of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic; Haitian organizations marched in the streets because Haitians were added
to high-risk groups of people that could contract HIV/AIDS(Wah and Pierre-Louis,
2004).
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Haiti had 400,000 immigrants in places such as New York City Wah and
Pierre-Louis, 2004). Haitians had American allies because of the prevalence of
Haitians in the US. The interest group advocacy was a primary reason why the
Clinton Administration restored Aristide to office in 1994. Götz-Dietrich Opitz’s
“Transnational Organizing and the Haitian Crisis, 1991-1994” examines different
groups' advocacy efforts. The Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica put
political pressure on the Clinton Administration(Optiz 2004).
The CBC had a significant influence on drafting American foreign policy
towards Haiti. Pamphile (1999) stated that:
The Congressional Black Caucus, which had grown from twentysix to forty
members after the 1992 election, was a vital force in shaping Haitian policy. It
created a special task force headed by Representative Major Owens of New
York to coordinate activities related to the Haitian crises(p.56).
Charles Rangel, a Congressman from New York and CBC member,
encouraged many people with political power in these interest groups to put political
pressure on Clinton(Optiz, 2004). Optiz notes that one of the many goals of the
Haitian Community in New York City was a resistance-embargo mobilization that
would forcibly return President Aristide to power. Congressional members kept Haiti
alive in DC by actions such as Randall Robinson’s hunger strike in Spring 1994.
Opitz perceived that these interest groups did not have large bases of
support. As stated earlier, what made the US intervening in Haiti difficult for the
broader African- American issue was that it was not a black/white issue. The amount
of Haitians in the US and its geographical position helped sway the Clinton
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Administration. Moreover, potential election problems in the 1994 mid-term and
1996 presidential election were other reasons why President Clinton intervened in
Haiti. As Opitz notes, a considerable number of Haitians now had US
residency(Optiz, 2004). This situation caused anxiety for the Clinton Administration
as many saw him as going back on campaign promises.
Furthermore, it is essential to note the comfort level of Haitians being in the
United States. In Atepick’s (1999) Pride Against Prejudice: Haitians in the United
States, he explains how Haitians have always maintained political representation in
the United States, but at this time, places like Miami had an increased presence.
Somalia still cast a shadow on the Clinton Administration decision-making
process for Haiti. On October 11, 1993, in an invention agreement with the U.N., the
U.S. used the USS Harlan County, which was equipped with 225 US and Canadian
soldiers, to help President Aristide return to power. As Girad (2004) notes: "The
situation was even worse on the dock, where U.S. Embassy attaché Vicky Hudleston
hoped to welcome the troops. As uniformed Haitian police stood by, members of
Emmanuel Constant's Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH)
surrounded her vehicle, wielded machetes, chanted "remember Somalia," and
assaulted Embassy spokesman Stanley Shrager. Nine T.V. news crews were there
to film this scene and the Harlan County as it waited all day at sea for orders, and the
ship's captain became concerned. The tragic impact of the U.S. connection in
Somalia proved to make any other U.S. involvement complicated even though
Emmanuel Constant, in an interview with "60 Minutes," Ed Bradley claimed that the
Somalia signs were a ploy.
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The Clinton Administration and Haiti” illustrate the CBC's influence on
advocating a strong response to Haiti's military dictatorship. Even though a postSomalia Congress did not favor Haiti intervention, the CBC wanted President Aristide
to return to power(Pastor, 1996). “The Clinton Administration and the Americas: The
Postwar Rhythm and Blues” also points to the CBC involvement in getting the Clinton
Administration to intervene in Haiti. The CBC kept Haiti's situation on the Clinton
Administrations' list by doing a hunger strike(Pastor, 1996). This action could be a
reason why the Clinton Administration intervened. The CBC was also instrumental in
getting the chief negotiator to the Haitian military replaced by Bill Grey, a CBC
member.
Case Study 2-The Role of Public Opinion

Furthermore, the Clinton Administration did intervene in Haiti. Phillippe Girad
in "Operation Restore Democracy" explores the political reasons why the US
intervened. On September 15th, 1994, President Clinton appeared on TV to tell the
United States that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 permitted the
US to remove Haiti's military. According to President Clinton, the military junta
violated the agreement that they would return Aristide to power. As a part of the
mission, President Aristide did return office. Whether the public opinion was a
domestic variable in the Clinton Administration intervention in Haiti is inclusive. In the
fall of 1994, 78 percent of Americans thought Haiti's intervention should have
Congress's support(Fatton, 2015).
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In conclusion, why did domestic pressures force the Clinton Administration to
intervene in Haiti? Robert Fatton’s (2015) chapter Haitian History: New Perspectives
explains the role of domestic pressures:
It is unlikely, however, that domestic interests represented a sufficiently
powerful constellation of constituencies to force the issue. The Clinton
administration had shown repeatedly that it could ignore and even
alienate its allies in the African-American community at no real cost.
Furthermore, while the Haitian refugees posed a political and moral
dilemma for the president, they could be—and indeed were—rerouted to
shores far away from Florida. Finally, with more than two-thirds of the
U.S. public opposed to any military intervention, the Clinton administration had
little to gain from invading Haiti and risking the loss of American lives. In fact,
President Clinton himself thought a military strike against the “de factos”
might well “ruin everything he had worked all his life to build(p.305).

President Clinton's pending refugee crisis is one of the main factors that
caused the United States to intervene in 1994. Clinton stated, “Three hundred
thousand more Haitians, 5 percent of their entire population, is in hiding in their own
country. If we do not act, they could be the next wave of refugees at our door” (Optiz,
2004). The nightmare of a refugee crisis from Haiti is essential because it would be
perceived that despite the image that the United States is trying to uphold democracy
in Haiti, it is more of a security problem that the Haitians represent. The solution
would be to fix Haiti's internal issues so people would not be tempted to come to the
United States.
Patton (2012) quoted Laennec Hurbon, a prominent Haitian intellectual, that
the intervention was a “Kantian idea of a human universal had begun to emerge as a
concrete reality in the geopolitical sphere.” The literature gaps will address this in the
gaps because President Clinton appealed directly to the UN, not Congress. Senate
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Minority Leader Robert Dole said wasting an American life for Aristide’s return was
not worth it. The Clinton Administration barring an invasion was because of the lack
of national interests, so Clinton appealed to the UN. The UN got more involved in
the situation in Haiti than the US did. Patton is not sure why the US intervened in
Haiti. Girad contends that there was no democracy to restore. According to PDD-25,
the Haiti mission results in ware mission because “US planners defined ‘exit strategy’
in Haiti to mean ‘the planned transition to the host nation of all functions performed
on its behalf by peace operations forces” (Reimer, 1997). President Aristide was in
power, but General Cedras forced him to leave, and President Aristide was ousted
from power yet again in 2004.

Gaps in the Literature: The Domestic Puzzle

This literature review has exposed many gaps; since this is a case study that
examines domestic constraints' importance, I discussed the general literature on
foreign policy and the three domestic, independent variables-news media, public
opinion, and interest groups. Understanding regime type is essential because public
opinion and media institutions thrive under democratic regimes, ensuring that public
opinion and media organizations are a central part of the democratic process. In
some non-democratic states, the media may be censured, and public opinion is not a
part of the decision-making process. In the literature regarding democratic peace
theory, public opinion is essential to the decision-making process because public
officials are elected and rely on public support to keep their public office.
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The literature review has attempted to show how the separation of powers
constrains the president's actions. However, there is not enough literature that
explicitly discusses American foreign policy interest in humanitarian Interventions.
Some of the writing slightly mentions the lack of knowledge in Africa. This lack brings
up more critical questions addressed in my alternative theories section in Chapter 1
regarding constructivism: how Americans perceives crises. The literature does not do
a good job stating whether Americans understand war in the same humanitarian
intervention view. Only Samantha Power in Problem From Hell alludes to the
concern that the media did not frame Rwanda as a genocide. Still, policymakers
were indifferent and saw Rwanda as a continuation of their Civil War.
President Clinton was influenced by the public outrage at the disastrous Battle
of Mogadishu in Somalia that claimed American lives. The literature has a consensus
that this tragedy forced the Clinton Administration to reexamine its foreign policy
platform regarding humanitarian interventions. Therefore, the Clinton Administration's
inaction in Rwanda was a political casualty because it lacked the US's strategic
interest. Plus, the Somalia crises constrained the Clinton Administration's
peacekeeping efforts in Somalia. The literature demonstrates that activism from the
Black community was a factor in President Clinton's response to supporting a US-led
UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti.
Regarding my three domestic, independent variables: the news media, public
opinion, and interest groups, there are not many studies that focus on all three
domestic sources collectively in foreign policy studies. Part of my dissertation will
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look at each independent variable as a separate variable in my case studies, but I
will analyze the interaction between them.
The literature is consistent with the premise that Americans are more inclined
to advocate humanitarian intervention if there is some connection, such as
geographic proximity, concerned groups, and strategic significance. The idea that
elites are prone to exert more significant foreign policy influence changed at the end
of the Cold War. The immigration wave in America is more inclined to advocate for
their country of origin(Shalin, 1995).
A lingering issue that cannot be avoided is situated the Clinton Doctrine in
Rwanda and Haiti. The Clinton Doctrine encourages the expansion of democracies
and markets. The Clinton Doctrine is a platform that safeguards the institution of a
“democracy” while not ignoring the concerns of the domestic population. The Clinton
Doctrine expects domestic support in foreign policy issues. I discussed the Clinton
Doctrine in Chapter 1, and I summarized the Clinton Administration's actions in this
chapter. The chief tenants of the Clinton Doctrine include expanding democracies
and markets in a globalizing world. However, these seem almost identical to George
H.W Bush’s New World Order platform. As Melanson notes, the Bush Administration
knew that there would be a contingent of American forces in Somalia Clinton was
inaugurated. It could also appear that Bush saw Operation Restore Democracy as an
opportunity to rebuild Somalia's political subculture. Economic development that
occurred in Haiti has been called “New World Imperialism” (Dupuy, 2007). Moreover,
Haiti's economic interest and geographical interests were more interested since Haiti
is close to the United States.
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Since this dissertation is just a two-nation case study--Rwanda and Haiti, I left
the discussion of NATO out of this dissertation because NATO and the Clinton years
is usually seen through the crises in the former Yugoslavia. However, the expansion
of NATO can be a potential problem for discussion and conclusions in this
dissertation. If the Clinton Administration wanted a more robust NATO, does that
mean that the administration cared about enlarging democracies, and perhaps
Rwanda is an outlier?
The first case study about the US response to genocide in Rwanda
demonstrates a substantial amount of literature about Rwanda's genocide. There are
two themes in the broader literature about the internal causes of the genocide and
the international community’s response to the genocide. This dissertation is
concerned with the global perspective, more particularly the United States response.
The literature does examine what factors caused the Clinton Administration not to
intervene in genocide in Rwanda. The primary cause is an external factor, which is a
crisis. The Clinton Administration's handling of the Somalia crisis in 1993 that
resulted in 18 Army Ranger deaths caused the Clinton administration to reexamine
its position on peacekeeping support.
Further, the 18 Army Rangers' death caused the American public sentiment
against other wars, such as the Vietnam War, to resurface. Moreover, American
soldiers' media images being dragged in the middle of the street did not win over
public support. It is important to note that President Clinton was in his first term of
office, and the United States had not seen a Democrat two-term president since
Franklin D. Roosevelt. President Clinton would take a cautious approach with his
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foreign policy agenda; thus, Rwanda's genocide would be a casualty of Clinton’s
Administration policy regarding peacekeeping operations.
The literature regarding the scholarship on the US response to the rule of a
group of high-ranking Haitian military Junta rule is not as substantial as that of the
Rwandan case. There is literature that cites some of the Clinton Administration's
response to Haiti as what happened in Somalia. The crises in Somalia caused the
United States to be more strategic in selecting peacekeeping operations. Haiti fits
that profile because if the United States had not intervened, it would have triggered a
massive immigration crisis with thousands of refugees coming to the United States.
Plus, unlike the Rwandan crises, there were vocal interest groups that were
pressuring the Clinton Administration to intervene. Another issue that this
dissertation discusses is the minority position that domestic politics can influence
foreign policy decisions. It could be assumed that the Clinton presidency is an outlier
There has not been a direct study that has considered both the Rwandan and
Haitian cases together. Both of these crises occurred in 1994, and they both
demonstrate the willingness and extent of the Clinton Administration’s stance on
peacekeeping. These crises occurred during the same year, making this a critical
study that examines how the American media, public opinion, and interest groups
influenced the foreign policy decision-making process.
The Clinton Administration intervened to remove the military dictatorship in
Haiti but did not intervene in Rwanda's genocide. The Democratic Peace Theory
would examine the United States intervening in Haiti over ideological reasons that a
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military coup should not overthrow a democratically elected president. The reasons
for Clinton not intervening in Rwanda is not explained by the democratic peace
theory nor by the Clinton Administration policy of Democratic Enlargement. The only
explanation within the liberal theories would be the United States' internal democratic
structure that made politicians accountable to the public.
The literature forces the question about the implementation of the Clinton
Doctrine. Was the Clinton Doctrine just a naïve ideological experiment on Wilsonian
idealism? There are gaps because the theoretical elements of liberalism prefer
liberal states in the international system versus the Clinton Doctrine's application.
The investigation for implementing the Clinton Doctrine emphasizes the spread of
democracy. A lack of a democratic government could explain why the United States
did not support intervention in Rwanda and supported a military intervention that
bought the democratic President Jean Aristide's return in Haiti. The issue with the
Clinton Doctrine is the absence of public opinion.
This vast amount of literature used so many varied sources, such as
interviews, media coverage analysis, and document analysis. However, there are still
no definitive conclusions that domestic constraints can impact foreign policy
decisions. The only conclusion that can be made is that Somalia is a factor in the
Clinton administration decision making process in 1994. Yes, there is much analysis,
but there are still unanswered questions, such as a definitive answer as to why
Somalia caused the media not to cover Rwanda, why was Haiti covered?
In 1994 there have been polls, news media reports, and interest groups that
supported American Armed-intervention in both Rwanda and Haiti, but only Haiti
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received Armed-intervention. This dissertation hopes to examine the following three
domestic sources equally: news media, interest groups, and public opinion to
determine if those domestic forces played a role in the foreign policy process. Going
back to one of my central research questions - how did domestic sources influence
the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy response towards Haiti and Rwanda's
1994 humanitarian crises? Their literature has no firm comparative answer for all
three domestic sources: news media, interest groups, and public opinion influence
the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti but not Rwanda.
Moreover, this dissertation will highlight and expand on existing connections
between the domestic sources that I mention: news media, public opinion, and
interest groups. For instance, it is noted in works such as “Interest groups in the
media: Bias and diversity over time” (2012) that for minority interest groups to get the
news media's attention, they have to stage protest events to get a more significant
news media presence. Connections between the news media, interest groups, and
public opinion will be explored in the Haiti case study when I highlight how
TransaAfrica had to stage a hunger strike to respond from the Clinton Administration.
All of the literature demonstrates that domestic influence has been critical in
foreign policy since World War II. Moreover, three domestic sources appear in the
vast foreign policy literature as essential variables: news media, interest groups, and
public opinion. Rwanda and Haiti's 1994 crises have not been comparatively studied
from the influence (or lack of) public opinion, interest groups, and the news media.
Therefore, this dissertation will expand the conversation that domestic power
sources in the United States can potentially dictate foreign policy.
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Chapter Summary

The literature demonstrates that domestic actors can constrain the
executive. I reviewed the American foreign policy relationship with the news media,
public opinion, and interest groups. There are times that domestic actors can
supersede the voice of Congress by appealing directly to the president. The literature
shows that the political climate is essential in understanding the power of the
domestic actors. For instance, despite domestic pressure about the U.S involvement
in the Vietnam War, the Johnson Administration placed external variables such as
the threat of communism over domestic variables such as the prevalence of
protesters against the Vietnam War.
This dissertation will expand on the argument that domestic politics can
influence foreign policy by simultaneously examining public opinion, the news media,
and interest groups as one cohesive unit. I will add to the literature by adding a novel
claim that, yes, domestic politics can influence the foreign policy decision-making
process. Still, the domestic actors are more effective as a coalition.
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Chapter 3: Methodology

Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research process of this dissertation.
This study will assess whether domestic variables -news media, public opinion, and
interest groups influence American foreign policy. This dissertation will examine two
case studies that look at two foreign policy crises in the Clinton Administration that
occurred during the same year: The military junta crises in Haiti and the Rwandan
genocide, both occurred in 1994. These two cases demonstrate a causal
relationship between domestic variables and the foreign policy decision-making
process. Due to this dissertation's case study nature, I rely on debates (not the full
list) such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wallstreet Journal
query search, the Vanderbilt News Television archives, and the Clinton Library,
along with context from interviews I have collected from policymakers.
Introduction
This mix-method study will demonstrate that the news media, public
opinion, and interest groups can influence Haiti and Rwanda's foreign policy
decision-making process. The American public has often been cited as a reason for
American policymakers' decision making in foreign policy. One of the primary
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sources of information that Americans get their information about
national/international issues is the media. This dissertation will use two contentious
cases of 1994--the Haiti military junta and the Rwandan genocide. To understand
why the Clinton Administration intervened in Haiti but did not in Rwanda can be
partly explained by domestic constraints such as the American public and domestic
considerations. I am writing this dissertation out of Michael Doyle and Bruce
Russert's position that the American people can constrain foreign policy decisions,
making the democracies less prone to war. The idea that policymakers should
research foreign policy from domestic sources is not a new endeavor.
Philosophy of Research Design
The core of this research deals with how the Clinton Administration
considered domestic sources-news media, public opinion, and interest groups during
the decision-making process. The number of documents and interviews that will
comprise this dissertation will make a strong but not absolute case that the Clinton
administration considered the public their decision-making process. The quest for
knowledge and truths will be backed up by argumentative evidence to not turn into a
highly interdisciplinary studies normative dissertation. To figure out what roles the
news media, public opinion, and interest groups played in the Clinton
Administration’s decision-making calculus it will require me to utilize field outside of
political science such as media studies.
Research Methods in Politics (2008) underscores the importance of theory
and laws in political science. I have attached myself to liberal thought, such as the
Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) and Foreign Policy Analysis(FPA). The theories
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explain how the separation of powers/checks and balances constrains the president
from acting pliantly in foreign policy matters. The dissertation is not the positioning of
a new idea of how domestic politics influence the presidency. My dissertation is part
of a new novel approach to foreign policy that considers its internal structure
internationally. Robert Dahl in Governs? Democracy Who and Power in an
American City asked his research question: “Given the existence of inequalities like
these, who governs in a democracy?” (Dahl, 1961). I am sure that I am addressing
my research question, which is similar to Dahl’s in a mixed-method approach: What
is the impact of the American public upon the government?”
Dependent Variable: -Political Culture of the US in 1994
Independent Variables: News Media, Public Opinion, and Interest Groups
According to most research method books in political science and Rogers
Piecework, an independent variable is a cause ( Pierce 2008; Vaus 2001). My
independent variable is counter to Almond and Verba, who looked at civic culture as
mutually constitutive. In Research Design in Social Research, Vaus explains these
variables' need to interact with each other.
Regarding the horrific aftermath of the US experience in Somalia in 1993
shaped the US's political culture in 1994, the United States made it clear that they
would support UN involvement in situations where the outcome was not viable or
interfere with the US's interests. The fear of American lives being put at risk is
necessary because the two cases Rwanda and Haiti, fit the framework of that
statement. The situation in Rwanda was unstable, therefore, not viable for a peace
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enforcement peacekeeping operation, and Haiti being geographically close to the
United States posed problems.
Political will is an important intervening variable because, in the case of my
dissertation, the intervening variable that is political will manifests itself in "U.S.
Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." (PDD-25). PDD-25 as an
intervening variable is even more critical because of its language regarding public
and congressional support. This dissertation argues that there are domestic
constraints to American foreign policy because PDD-25 directly mentions the
American public and congressional support.
Moreover, the high cost of peacekeeping operations can impact a
peacekeeping operation's “political will.” Also, the budget of the UN is essential in
understanding the US decisions in 1994. According to this policy, the Clinton
administration wanted to reduce the US contribution of peacekeeping funds to 25
percent. This would appear to give the US more control in the number of
peacekeeping operations the UN would undertake. The United States would be more
vocal on peacekeeping operations since their financial contribution was reduced.
Decoding Political Norms: An Interdisciplinary Endeavor

The dynamic fluid culture of the 21st century is essential to understand
the social climate of the 1990s. It is vital to state that President Clinton inherited the
presidency during a turbulent time. This dissertation is grounded in political science,
but this research is concerned with understanding the domestic priorities in the early
1990s. Understanding how the American public grappled with perceiving Rwanda
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and Haiti's issues will require understanding the "texts." As Couldry states, "Our
cultural life is saturated by texts, especially media texts. Cultural studies cannot,
therefore, do without textual analysis" (Couldry, 2000). The United States was
grappling with the aftermath of the LA Riots, immigration issues, and the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. The public social and political awareness of Rwanda and Haiti's events
reflects the climate in the US. This dissertation wants to understand the "how and
why questions" of power news media, interest groups, and public opinion influenced
the Clinton Administration's response to 1994 events in Rwanda and Haiti from a
postmodernist angle. Therefore, it is essential to examine the events in 1994 in the
context of the time's current social reality. For instance, in "African-American
Newspaper Coverage of the AIDS Crisis," African-Americans were impacted
disappointed in the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Still, the mainstream media did not provide
full coverage that showed there was inequality.
For decades, news agencies have been criticized for their lack of awareness
in covering sensitive issues such as race. My dissertation looks at the role of the
news media in the decision-making process. As Jenkins and Gadget argue (2011),
"traditional mainstream news media serve up a view of the world that may not be
representative of American pluralism and that diverse views about issues that affect
our lives are often absent in traditional mainstream storytelling." As stated in my
literature review, it is uncertain whether journalists are thoroughly informed about the
events that they report on to the public.
This dissertation attempts to understand what activated the public to become
more vocal in 1994 concerning the Clinton Administration's actions to Haiti and
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Rwanda. Bicchieri (2014) defines norms as "a behavior that is collectively approved
or disapproved in a group or population and is enforced by sanctions."
Understanding social norms is crucial to this dissertation because of the connection
that social norms have to political action. Social norms as a constructed phenomena
are the precursor to understanding policy-making.
Case Study Approach and Case Selection: Methods

My dissertation's main objective is to determine the extent of news media,
public opinion, and interest groups on the foreign policy process. As mentioned
earlier, my research is drawing on three different theories/approaches to understand
the extent of domestic power in the foreign-policy decision-making process. I am
juxtaposing -Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Role Theory, and Democratic Peace
Theory (DPT)to understand why the Clinton Administration intervened in Haiti but not
Rwanda. I will compare public opinion, news media, and interest groups in both
cases- Rwanda and Haiti.
This dissertation will follow a theory-guided( the connection of domestic
variables to foreign policy decision) case study approach to answer the research
question and prove that the news media, public opinion, and interest groups can
impact the American foreign policy process. The impact and influence of the news
media, public opinion, and interest groups in the two case studies will contribute to
the theory that domestic politics can impact foreign policy. The case study method is
defined as gathering and analyzing data as a particular example and then making
broader generalizations based on the findings.
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To prove the potentiality of American domestic politics influencing the foreign
policy decision-making process, I look at an example of where domestic forces were
instrumental in influencing the decision-making process. My case study approach will
focus on an instrumental approach to case studies because I am looking at particular
policies that reflect the argument that domestic politics impact foreign policy
decision-making. Compton-Lilly (2012) states the power of instrumental case studies
shows “the ability of researchers to connect local actors and practices to general
policies and the ways those policies act on people and influence communities.”
While the crises in Rwanda and Haiti are separate, but they occurred in the
same year, I can study both cases comparatively because the Clinton Administration
used military force to intervene in Haiti but not Rwanda. The political climate of the
US in a post-Somalia environment is directly related to both crises. Understanding
the intent of political actors post-1993 should take the “cultural pulse” into
consideration, which I refer to as what is perceived as usual. Journalists are bound
by the “conditions of the cultural, political, and historical climate” ( Allen, 2017).
The primary tool that I will use in evaluating domestic variables' role in foreign
policy decisions will be using document analysis. Document Analysis is the
"systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both printed and
electronic material." I will be analyzing hundreds of documents, and the use of
document analysis will allow me to pinpoint relevant information by using keywords
to streamline my search. To determine what role the domestic plays in the foreign
policy decision-making process concerning my cases, I need to identify keywords as
codes.
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I will be using two historical case studies from 1994--Rwanda and Haiti to
prove the power of my three independent variables: news media, public opinion, and
interest groups. Using a case study approach provides an intensive study of the
news media's power, interest groups, and public opinion. The problem in this
dissertation is determining if there are domestic sources of American foreign policy.
Examples from case studies are needed to prove my argument that the Clinton
Administration considered the American public when making foreign policy decisions.
In the hopes of using case studies, political scientists can develop a domestic power
theory by stating that public opinion, the news media, and interest groups can unite
to form a powerful political domestic actor.
This dissertation will examine two case studies to prove a causal relationship;
an approach referred to as the comparative method. In Political Science: The State
of The Discipline, David Collier uses Arend Liphard's as the analysis of a small
number of cases entailing two observations key to permit a statistical analysis" (
Collier, 1993). Two case studies will allow this dissertation to have a more in-depth
analysis of independent variables- news media, interest groups, and public opinion
play in American foreign policy. Two comparable case studies of states with similar
political circumstances are needed, such as Rwanda and Haiti. Both have a
predominately black population with a history of tensions in 1994. Amidst the
implementation of PDD-25 that represented the public concerns for peacekeeping
operations following the US disastrous peacekeeping operation in Somalia, this
dissertation needed two case studies that the Clinton Administration was fearful of
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the American public's backlash. The causal relationship of the domestic variables
supports the selection of these two case studies.
Researching foreign policy decisions from the domestic level reflects the
changing paradigm transformation in presidential decision-making in foreign policy
issues that welcomes the study of domestic variables in foreign policy issues. The
US's failures in Vietnam War created unprecedented public outrage; the power of the
protests forced the United States into a period of isolation that would end until the US
involvement in the first Gulf War in the early 1990s. The idea that the news media,
interest groups, and public opinion are essential variables stems from the
longstanding liberal-realist debate. Realism does not account for change, and
structural variants of realism ignore regime types such as democracies as
international peace factors. On the surface, the aftermath of the 18 Army Ranger's
death in Somalia would provide the United States' rationale for not being open to
supporting humanitarian interventions with peace enforcement features. In 1994, the
United States sent US armed forces to restore order in Haiti, but the Clinton
Administration did not do so in Rwanda. I am looking at my cases of why the US said
"no" to Rwanda and "yes" to Haiti.
I break away from theories that dated theories of public opinion, such as the
Almond-Lippmann consensus. Public opinion has been ignored as an essential
factor in foreign policy research because average citizens are ignorant and cannot
understand international crises
This dissertation's approach will not be purely bound to one traditional
methodology, such as quantitative and qualitative, to analyze the news media's role,
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public opinion, and interest groups. Due to this case study's complexity, I need to use
different approaches to yield the same expected results. The analysis of domestic
politics’ impact in post-Cold War academic literature is a paradigm shift in
understanding foreign policy outcomes, such as using theoretical frameworks such
as DPT, Role Theory, and FPA. Using mix-methodologies examines if the Clinton
Administration considered three domestic variables-interest groups, news media,
and public opinion in their decision-making during the crises in Rwanda and Haiti.
My research echoes the "transformative paradigm, which is a framework of belief
systems that places a priority on social justice and human rights" because I will use
mix-methods to unearth the role that domestic politics play in foreign policy
decisions. ( Doyle et al, 2019).
The inclusion of the news media, public opinion, and interest groups has been
studied more in liberal theories of foreign policy that focus on regime type because of
pluralism. Different political actors such as the news media, public opinion, and
interest groups can act on a public policy issue or ignore it. This dissertation is not
asking whether the United States should be involved in humanitarian interventions.
Still, I am concerned about the extent that the news media, public opinion, and
interest groups have in the foreign policy decision-making process.
Questioning the "record" is a primary way of analyzing issues in a case study.
As SAGE states, documents are a "record of human activity" that can give political
context problems (Olson, 2014). Since I want to know how the Clinton Administration
came to its decision in 1994 regarding Rwanda and Haiti, I need to know what was
said. The use of documents gives me the ability to see what was being discussed in
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1994 and what context. Using documents, I endeavor to determine what these
records can tell me about the connection linking the domestic and executive branchforeign policy decision-making process. I will use documents from 1994 to analyze
any documents involving the Clinton Administration's response to Rwanda and Haiti.
These documents may be memorandums within different agencies, press briefs,
news articles, television news broadcasts, interviews, and policy directives.
My dissertation is trying to make the argument that domestic variables can
influence the foreign policy decision-making process. I am specifically looking at
public opinion, news media, and interest groups. Since I am studying the news
media as an influencer in the foreign policy decision-making process, I need to
examine Rwanda and Haiti's media coverage. I am using the ABC News, NBC
News, CBS News, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wallstreet
Journal to look at its news coverage regarding Rwanda and Haiti
Document analysis is only one tool in my mix-method approach to
understanding domestic politics’ role in foreign policy decisions. This dissertation
examines if domestic politics such as a disgruntled public can influence foreign policy
issues; therefore, interviewing policy officials such as politicians will be essential in
this dissertation. While the literature states that the Clinton Administration did read
the nation's pulse for foreign policy decisions following the debacle in Somalia,
policymakers were expected to understand the political climate and the actions of the
Clinton Administration. Therefore, this dissertation will be using elite interviewing in
conjunction with other methods. In "Interviewing Political Elites," in Doing Research
in the Archives, authors define political elites as "ex-Presidents and Cabinet
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members; Senators and Representatives; Supreme Court Justices; White House, the
executive branch and congressional staff; political party and congressional campaign
committee officials; lobbyists and media personnel" ( Peabody et al. 1990).
In "Political Science and Archival Research," Scott Frisch and Sean Kelly
explain the available data in these archives, such as public opinion, electoral
strategy, political party information, redistricting efforts, and career information on
politicians ( Frisch and Kelly, 2012). These authors state that quantitative methods
have outshined archival research in political science; however, within the archives
can be information that can be quantified. There is a relationship between doing
archival research and content (textual) analysis. For example, examining the content
of President Clinton's interviews in the context of this dissertation can be more
beneficial if the scholar looks at the number of times that he mentioned either caseRwanda and Haiti. In “The Search For the Elusive Executive,” by Brandon
Rottinghaus, this chapter shows why archival research is vital to this dissertation's
objective. Rottinghaus asks: “So, do presidents lead or follow public opinion?” That
question is the basis for this dissertation regarding the consideration of the domestic.
Rottinghaus states that quantitative analysis usually answers this question.
Modern archival research- the use of online databases is essential because it
dismisses the idea that the relevant scholarship should be satisfied with existing
questions. The archives can find new answers to problems that have been solved
with other research methods because of the vast quantity of archives' documents.
The digitalization of some of the archives in The New York Times, The Wallstreet
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Journal, The Washington Post, The Vanderbilt Television Archives, and Clinton
Library will keep this dissertation from being a seven-year endeavor.
The advantages of document analysis described by Bowen are the availability
of primary source mater, cost-related reasons, coverage, reliance, and coverage. A
significant amount of the documents used in this dissertation comes from public
records such as the Vanderbilt News Archives, The New York Times, The
Washington Post, The Wallstreet Journal, and the Clinton Library. Moreover, I can
see the documents as it was written in 1994, my interpretation of the documents may
differ from others, but the information stays the same.
Counting patterns will be the primary tool used to discuss the impact of
domestic variables in foreign policy. Looking at how many times the word “genocide”
was used refers to Vivo counting. Vivo coding is defined as the “practice of assigning
a label to a section of data” ( Given, 2008). As Bazeley states in “ From Codes and
Counts to Content Analysis,” counts are significant to mix-methods. The benefits of
using counts include:
Use of counts communicates more effectively and reliably than does use of
vague terms such as “most” or “some” to indicate more or less frequent
occurrence of some feature in the text.
Counts can be viewed as reflecting the importance of various emergent
themes and topics, although frequency and importance are not necessarily
synonymous.
Counting summarises patterns in data, such as from comparative and
relational matrix analyses, and can allow possible interrelationships to be
more easily identified for further exploration (p. 3-4).
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News as Archives
Table 1 1994 Print News Coverage of Case Studies
Print News Coverage 1994
Countries Coverage

Amount of Times the
New York Times
Covered the Country

Amount
of Times
the
Washing
Post
Covered
the
Country

Amount
of Times
the
Washing
Post
Covered
the
Country

Haiti

1468

1707

534

Rwanda

805

441

214

My chief task in completing my research is to specifically correlate the Clinton
Administration to my three independent variables-News Media, interest groups, and
public opinion. I will utilize The New York Times( NYT), Wallstreet Journal(WSJ), and
The Washington Post(WSP) to gauge the impact that newspapers had in the policymaking process. Newspapers are defined as “systems of interconnected networks,
created through communication” ( Syvie & Witherspoon 2002). I realize that news
agencies make choices in what they use to cover because they are a business
organization. As stated, the primary task is to organize information that is of use to its
audience ( Sylvie & Witherspoon 2002).
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Table 2 Comparative Coverage of Select US Print News Mentioning "Rwanda"
and "Haiti
1994 Print News Coverage of President NY Times Washington The
Clinton Public Opinion and Interest
Amount
Post
Wallstreet
Groups
of Times Amount of Journal
Times
Amount
of Times
Key Query Words(Title)

Frequency Frequency

Frequency

President Clinton

6516

7404

3345

President Clinton Public Opinion

802

358

159

President Clinton Human Rights Watch

121

85

33

President Clinton Public Opinion foreign
policy

226

69

35

President Clinton Congressional Black
Caucus

80

159

49

President Clinton Amnesty International
USA

72

1

1

President Clinton Randall Robinson

29

57

57

President Clinton TransAfrica

13

42

42

President Clinton Rwanda

227

227

119

President Clinton Haiti

878

878

878

I have the task of making the argument that domestic sources had pivotal role
in pushing the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti, and the lack of support
reaffirmed the Clinton Administration’s not to recommend military force in Rwanda.
Codebook Rules for query searches:
a. Dates: 01/01/94-12/31/94
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b. Exclusion Words-There are irrelevant phrases such as the “United
States” that could be excluded because it does not show patterns.
c. Keywords as Codes: President Clinton, President Clinton Public
Opinion, President Clinton Human Rights Watch, President Public
Opinion foreign policy, President Clinton congressional black
caucus, President Clinton Amnesty International USA, President
Clinton Amnesty International USA Rwanda, President Clinton
Amnesty International USA Haiti, President Clinton Public Opinion
Somalia, President Randall Robinson, President Clinton
Transafrica.
d. Coding Technique: Vivo coding
e. Analysis Approach: The use of search engines, filtering devices,
basic software Excel
f. Databases: Clinton Library, The New York Times, Roper Center
Archive, Vanderbilt Television News Archive, Washington Post, the
Wall Street Journal
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Measuring News Media

RWANDA AND HAITI MENTIONED
BROADCAST AND PRINT NEWS IN
1994 - AMERICA NEWS MEDIA
Rwanda

Haiti
1391

83

Rwanda
Haiti

137

67

118

70

150

1609

800

633

509
214

ABC
News
83

NBC
News
67

CBS
News
70

NY
Times
800

WSP

WSJ

633

214

137

118

150

1391

1609

509

Rwanda

Figure 1 Rwanda and Haiti coverage in the News Media
Due to the violence occurring in Rwanda and Haiti in the early 1990s, I have to
locate data; I will have to contend with available data in newspapers and government
documents. I will use convenient data because The New York Times( The NYT), The
Washington Post, and The Wallstreet Journal (WSJ) archives are available online. I
will use The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wallstreet Journal
coverage of Rwanda and Haiti's crises by conducting a content analysis of searching
for keywords: public opinion, interest groups, and other news agencies. I only use
these sections in the print news: news, editorial, commentary. While I only look at the
evening news “Big Three” News Networks: ABC News, CBS News, and NBC news.
I am looking at how domestic actors influenced the foreign policy decisionmaking process. The news media plays a role in the literature review because both
the public and government rely on the media for information. The media role is
essential because it theorized that the media reflects public opinion( Donsbach &
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Patterson, 2012). The public relies on the media for up to date information about
political crises. The news media can help set the agenda of various issues because
the news media appeals directly to the public. As McComb stated:
The power of the news media to set a nation’s agenda, to focus public
attention on a few key public issues, is an immense and well-documented
influence. Not only do people acquire factual information about public affairs
from the news media, readers and viewers also learn how much importance to
attach to a topic on the basis of the emphasis placed on it in the news.
Newspapers provide a host of cues about the salience of the topics in the
daily news – lead story on page one, other front page display, large headlines,
etc. Television news also offers numerous cues about salience – the opening
story on the newscast, length of time devoted to the story, etc. These cues
repeated day after day effectively communicate the importance of each topic.
In other words, the news media can set the agenda for the public’s attention to
that small group of issues around which public opinion forms (p. 1)
News media is central to daily life, shedding light on public policies (Flick &
Chamberlain, 2012). The use of the news media is imperative to this dissertation
because it "understands media's influence and functions. Analyses need to link
specific texts (e.g., news items) to the socio-political contexts and practices within
which these are produced and embedded" (Flick and Chamberlain, 2012). The
research tool to understand the impact of the media is content analysis. The use of
the news media can accomplish the following:
News analysis can answer questions about how controversies surrounding
issues of public concern are played out, who are identified as key
stakeholders, and how their positions within the controversy are constructed.
News analysis can also establish what issues and stakeholders are ignored
and provide information about alternative representations that can be
developed(Flick & Chamberlain, 2012, p.3).
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In agreement with the Sage Handbook on Qualitative Research, the media is
part of the decision-making process since there is a casual relationship between the
audience, including policymakers and the news outlets themselves. News media is
central to daily life, shedding light on public policies (Flick & Chamberlain, 2012). The
use of the news media is imperative to this dissertation because it "understands
media's influence and functions. Analyses need to link specific texts (e.g., news
items) to the socio-political contexts and practices within which these are produced
and embedded" (Flick & Chamberlain, 2012). The research tool to understand the
impact of the media is content analysis.
By the numbers, The New York Times, compared to the other newspapers,
only appears to have done a stellar job as a print newspaper on its news coverage
on Rwanda and Haiti. Still, the evening news coverage is not comprehensive. My
question becomes, why is that? From my review of the media sources, I analyze
specific issues such as the crises in Rwanda being portrayed as a "tribal war."
Moreover, the media use is just one tool I will use because I can use polling data to
determine how the news media coverage influenced the public and what the
policymakers responded to the coverage.

The strength in analyzing the news media is to determine there is a
relationship. I am assuming that the result is some government (in)action. Part of the
puzzle that I am trying to understand is if public opinion, interest groups, and the
news media are separate and influence the public independently. Is the news media
a continuation of public opinion or vice versa?
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Measuring Public Opinion Polls
Table 3-Number of Times Where Polls Dedicated Questions to Rwanda and
Haiti
Roper
Number of Questions
Studies/Datasets First Date of
iPoll:Sample

94 Poll

of 1994
Public
Opinion Polls
Rwanda

25

13

04/30/1994 05/03/1994

Haiti

343

76

1/15/941/18/1994

The use of public opinion polls as a part of my mix-method approach may
appear to be straightforward. Still, policymakers may interpret the public opinion polls
differently depending on who reviews the poll results and how the questions are
framed. Polls are intended to represent the rationale of voter insight into elections
and public policy decisions. Public opinion polls are predicated on the idea that the
results may shape the decision-making process. I am using polls to determine if they
played a role in influencing the Clinton Administration's decision-making process on
Rwanda and Haiti. In "Do Polls Influence Opinions? Investigating Poll Feedback
Loops Using the Novel Dynamic Response Feedback Experimental Procedure," the
issue on the extent of public opinion polls influence the opinion is examined. Public
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opinion polls help political actors see where the public is thinking about various
issues (Arnesen et al.,2017).
Studying public opinion can be done by researching the news media.
Journalists write on what the pulse of the nation is in their own view. As stated in
Public Opinion in the 21st Century: Let the People Speak?(2006), Brooker states
that:
The print media are also important as conduits of opinions from editorialists,
columnists, and ordinary people who write letters to the editor. Most large
newspapers print the opinions of their editors and run the articles of liberal
and conservative columnists. Most also print letters to the editor that that allow
ordinary people the power to express practically any sort of opinion (Brooker,
2006)
Furthermore, due to my dissertation on domestic variables before-mentioned
as news media, public opinion, and interest groups on American foreign policy, it
would be negligent not to examine American attitudes on Rwanda and Haiti. I am
looking only at select databases that express whether the US should have been
involved in Haiti and Rwanda in 1994. I will admit that my polling data may not
provide a conclusive answer that shows American concerns, so I analyze the polling
results discussed in the news media.
I will be counting the frequencies of how public opinion is mentioned in the
news media because I am trying to establish a connection between domestic politics
and foreign policy. I need to see how the news media covered public opinion and
how it differed in Rwanda's coverage and Haiti. Schulz asks a familiar question “A
lasting question of public opinion research concerns the relationship between public
opinion and media messages: Do news media mould [mold] or mirror public
opinion?” That is a question that I hope to provide light to in doing content analysis.
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Public opinion polls are relevant to this dissertation because they were done
during a vulnerable time in the Clinton Administration. President Clinton came into
office as the Democrat president since President Jimmy Carter. Few poll studies
examine political phenomena during a non-presidential race. This dissertation is
looking at political issues rather than the election itself.
Moreover, the polls' use is just one tool to understand how domestic politics
influence foreign policy. What is not often explained in public opinion data is political
awareness on a foreign policy issue. Richard Eichenberg (2018) examines this
problem in "Public Opinion on Foreign Issues" by addressing citizens' political
perceptions of what influences citizens' opinions. The consensus that Eichenberg
challenges are that the public mostly aware of issues such as war.
An issue that I will address in the analysis of public opinion on Rwanda and
Haiti is public opinion's coherence. As Eichenberg explains, if a person is against a
political issue, all of their different responses should follow that same reasoning. That
is one of the problems of polling data on Rwanda and Haiti. For example, some polls
find positive reactions for the UN to keep and maintain world peace. Still, when a
similar question is asked about American involvement in UN peacekeeping
operations, the responses are negative. Also, sometimes, the wording of the survey
may influence a particular reaction from the respondent
The use of public opinion polls will gauge the pulse of the public's stance on
US involvement in Rwanda and Haiti. The issues of reliability in polling have been
addressed. However, polls still shed light on what the public thinks as Eichenberg
states that the public is more informed on global crises issues and that their
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responses are rational. Besides, I understand that not all American society segments
are represented in public opinion polls; therefore, public opinion polls may not reflect
Americans' diversity.
Measuring Interest Groups

Table 4 Interest groups and Haiti coverage of the Print News-1994
Interest groups and Haiti coverage of the
NY Times WSP

WSJ

Print News-1994
Sections Selected: News, Commentary, and
Editorial
Keyword:

Frequency Frequency Frequency

Congressional Black Caucus

85

257

59

Congressional Black Caucus Haiti

24

64

19

TransAfrica

15

60

4

TransAfrica Haiti

15

51

3

Human Rights Watch

80

83

22

Human Rights Watch Haiti

8

12

2

Analyzing the impact of interest groups on foreign policy issues may appear
hard. Still, I will use archival information from the print news sources to gauge how
often the various interest groups advocated for Rwanda and Haiti intervention. To
stay grounded, I will primarily look at the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC),
TransAfrica, and the Human Rights Watch to gauge how much attention was paid to
getting the Clinton Administration to intervene in Rwanda and Haiti.
126

Integrating Elite Interviews
One of my methods of analysis will be from examining archival documents
and numerical polling data. Nevertheless, I still have unanswered questions that
documents and numbers cannot answer. After doing a preliminary analysis of the
documents by looking for obvious patterns or themes to narrow down the
information, I still have not addressed it (Nastow, 2019).
For me to understand the context and rationale in the decision-making
process, I will conduct elite interviews. These people are designated as elites
because they are "an individual who holds or has held some powerful position that
has afforded the individual unique knowledge or information from a privileged
perspective" (Nastow, 2019). I only targeted a select few government officials for
elite interviewing because they are difficult to reach since high-ranking officials. The
interviews will back up the evidence presented in my content analysis of domestic
variables' role in the foreign policy decision-making process. The documents will
provide what the perceived social reality was at the time, and so will the interviews.
Elite interviews "can demonstrate unique views of reality, from a privileged or
powerful standpoint; but triangulation with additional sources can provide insight into
other perceptions" (Natow, 2019). These government officials have served in the
George H.W Bush and Clinton Administrations.
1. Prudence Bushnell- Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
2. Joseph Nye-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs
3. High Ranking State Department Official
4. High Ranking Member in the House of Representatives.
5. Senior Member of the Clinton Administration
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Elite interviews is a research tool that is prominent in foreign policy analysis.
Conducting interviews with senior officials involved in the decision curve will help me
understand my two case studies' thought process. I will interview only 5. I will
choose these interviewees because they will answer questions that the documents
and data cannot. I plan to interview after I have done a preliminarily coding analysis
of the papers. I plan on interviewing State Department Officials, journalists, and other
policy officials.
Patterns and Frequencies
1. Number of times in which Rwanda or Haiti was mentioned in the “Big Three”
channels television networks- ABC, NBC, and CBS
a. I will look at how long the segments were when Rwanda and Haiti have
discussed the “Big Three Networks.
2. Number of times that The NYT , WSP, WSJP, mentioned various interest
groups in the context of Rwanda and Haiti
3. Public Opinion will explore the general American attitudes regarding whether
the Clinton Administration should intervene in Rwanda and Haiti.
4. I will examine various documents that show whether the Clinton White House
heeded the concerns of the news media, public opinion, and interest groups.
A Compass For Domestic Power: Expected Results
I have explained how I will examine and measure by primary sources in
proofing that domestic sources can influence the foreign policy decision-making
process am not going to argue that I have a formula that denotes the American
domestic power and influence on foreign policy because that would be a reach. One
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could look at the prevalence of news coverage, the data from public opinion, and the
pressure of interest groups to determine if the messages from all three elements
unite to form domestic power.

Figure 2 Domestic Power
The way my text art appears, one may conclude that I am prescribing a
formula, but I am no. I suggest that if the news media covers a that reflects public
opinion and support from interest groups that create domestic power.

I hope that I will answer my research question: How did domestic constraints
influence the Clinton administration’s foreign policy response towards the 1994
humanitarian crises in Haiti and Rwanda? All of my various ways of conducting
research will unite. I will be examining the public opinion polls, and then I will see if
the Clinton Administration changed positions based on public opinion. I will also be
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looking to see if Washington, DC, relied on the news media and if interest groups
played a role in political decisions.
Biases Subjectively, and Limitations
I do reconcile my "outrage" on how the Clinton Administration did not
intervene in Rwanda regarding my dissertation. As an African-American male, I
believe that sometimes the United States' involvement in Africa and the Caribbean
occurs because of domestic racial issues in the US. Reminiscent of what Romeo
Dallaire said in his memoirs, I would perceive that the US does consider race in
interventions. I understand that this is a radical opinion, which is why I am sticking to
government, opinion polls, and other archival sources. I do want to rely on
arguments that are logically and solidly supported by sources. Additionally, it is
essential to note that since I was only three years old when the crises of my
dissertation occurred, I hope to be able to be more objective in my arguments than
people who were living at the time.
Another potential problem of the dissertation is the lack of field experience in
Rwanda and Haiti. I have not traveled to Rwanda nor Haiti. I know that being in the
countries adds to the credibility of the scholar. I do not feel that the fact I have not
physically traveled to my regions will be a significant weakness in presenting an
accurate statement about domestic variables' issues on American foreign policy. My
dissertation is an American foreign policy paper, and I am confident that I understand
what the "cultural pulse" was in 1994.
From examining some of the early data, I have noticed that Republican
politicians tended to be outspoken about any humanitarian intervention in 1994. If
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that were the case, then the outcomes would already be determined. The three
variables that I have selected, the news media, public opinion, and interest groups,
will keep my dissertation's focus.
My dissertation uses a case study approach, which can mean that I am
cherry-picking my cases. I chose two cases that occurred during the same year to
demonstrate the American opinion's influence in foreign matters. I could have
selected more recent cases, such as the genocide in Darfur, Libya. I could have
even done a quantitative analysis of all the peacekeeping operations during the
Clinton Administration. It was challenging to look for two cases in a year that show
where the US government approved one case of peacekeeping and denied another
case because of the American public.
How can it be proven that the American public is solely responsible for
influencing foreign policy decisions? The realist assumptions will challenge this
question: the state is the highest actor, and the government should ignore domestic
considerations. There are questions such as the US intervening or not intervening
based on security alone. The US has been known to intervene in a crisis to secure
its security. When the US intervened in Haiti in 1994, the Clinton Administration
could assume that a military dictatorship in the Caribbean could present unforeseen
problems for the US.
Query Searches and its limitations

I understand that my data may not appear to be representative. Since I am
making the case that the news media can be an actor in the foreign policy decision131

making process, I need to examine Rwanda and Haiti's news coverage. I mentioned
earlier that The New York Times referenced Rwanda 696 times in 1994. A few
articles that deal with the mountain gorillas of Rwanda might be the amount of my
data size. I am confident that it's just not numerical data, but the context that the data
provides helps me convey my domestic political argument.
Also, I do realize that my query search analysis how many times “Haiti” or
“Rwanda,” was mentioned in the New York Times, The Washington Post, and The
Wallstreet Journal during 1994 may be perceived to be problematic because how
does one know if all of the articles that featured the word “Haiti” focused on the 1994
crisis at the time.
Above are the number of times that the following countries: Somalia, Haiti,
and Rwanda were mentioned in the New York Times, The Washington Post, and
The Wallstreet Journal. I also added Canada and South Africa to demonstrate that
The New York Times will cover other countries in an active political crisis. When
Somalia dropped in coverage in 1994, it can be attributed to the fact that the US did
not consider Somalia a significant issue in 1994. Therefore, due to the US not being
in direct conflict with Somalia in 1994, the attention that New York Times gave
Somalia was 50% less than the following years.
It may appear that my use of the print news is not an overall consensus of
Americans' foreign policy. As noted, newspapers are events recorded by humans in
their worldview.6 As discussed in “How Newspapers Reveal Political Power” ( 2015),

6
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newspapers are often constrained in what they can cover because of competition.
Therefore, the news media will focus on issues that are directly consequential to the
public.
I understand that newspapers' costs will cut down on who is reading the
newspapers, so I have numbers from the big network channels: ABC, NBC, and
CBS. Also, I realize that my query search does not provide any content on the actual
news story. That is okay for this dissertation because I have patterns in the
headlines. I was able to use Wordstat that did a content analysis of the popular
words of news media headlines.
The rationale has been provided for the two states that I have selected, but
why did I cherry-pick the news media's focus, public opinion, and interest groups to
examine my cases' outcomes? The argument that I am making is that domestic
actors can influence American foreign policy decisions. Domestic actors outside of
the presidency on the institutional level can include the government branches such
as Congress and the Judicial. Society is the focus of this dissertation. I want to
explain the possibility of culture-shaping American foreign policy. As stated in the
Foreign Policy Analysis Toolbox, there are three major societal actors-the American
public, the media, and interest groups. There are some truths as to why I am
covering certain media outlets such as The New York Times ( NYT), The Wallstreet
Journal( WSJ), and The Washington Post (WSP) and news organizations such as
ABC, CBS, and NBC because the articles and summations of the evening
broadcasts have been digitized and are easily accessible. It is known that CNN was
heavily involved in these cases from the literature review, and I will do my best to use
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the Clinton Library Presidential archives to uncover their involvement in news
coverage. As a political scientist, I took a risk by choosing two case studies before
the internet revolution, so most of the data will be primary sources that I can readily
access.
Why Consider Public Opinion Data?
One of the issues that public opinion data shows is that sometimes it may not
be a genuinely representative sample of how the public feels about a problem. The
issue of public opinion polls is because the selection of the people surveyed may not
be a total reflection of how the entire public feels about specific foreign policy issues.
The value that I see in public opinion data is the numerical amount of times that
pollsters considered asking how Americans think about Rwanda and Haiti. Suppose
polling agencies devoted more time to understanding the public views on Rwanda
and Haiti. In that case, that is important because it shows that one issue is
dominating the public attention than the other.
Chapter Summary
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the processes I will use to demonstrate the
influence of my three independent variables in foreign policy-related issues. I will use
archival data that is readily available online. To understand why the Clinton
Administration intervened in Haiti but not Rwanda, I will have to look at the nation's
domestic pulse manifested in the data from the news media, public opinion, and
interest groups. Moreover, I will juxtapose my archival findings with interviews from
policy-makers directly involved in foreign policy decisions on Rwanda and Haiti. Also,
the lack of coverage is a factor that I will look at in discussing the influence of the
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news media, interest groups, and public. If more attention from the three
independent variables is more important in one case over the other, that may show
the public is concerned. Conversely, if there is a lack of attention in my three
independent variables on one case, that may indicate that the public is not worried
about the foreign policy issue.
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Chapter 4 – The Clinton Administration 1994 Response to the Crisis in
Rwanda
Abstract:
Chapter 4 will examine the impact of the news media, interest groups, and
public opinion in the Clinton Administration response to Rwanda's 1994 violence. I
look at each independent variable-news media, interest groups, and public opinion in
determining whether these domestic sources either pushed the Clinton
Administration for military intervention or pushed the Clinton Administration not to
intervene.
Introduction: American Political Culture at the Fog of Genocide in Rwanda

The US rationale of the Clinton Administration's reaction to Rwanda's
genocide resulted from the changing political culture where the American public
witnessed the 18 Army Ranger's death in Somalia. Compounded the American
casualties in Somalia, along with the recent memory of the Vietnam War, domestic
support for humanitarian intervention would need to be reconsidered. Public opinion
polls from October 7, 1994, USA Today showed a consensus that the nation wants
troops to come home.7

7

https://www.csmonitor.com/1993/1015/15183.html
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The fallout of the Battle of Mogadishu's debacle that resulted in American
casualties placed some of the blame on the American news media's role. Following
the defeat, the fault was being cast by George F. Kennan on television support
because it triggered people's emotions in supporting foreign policy blindly. Kennan
makes his thoughts on the negative role that television cameras have on the foreign
policy decision-making process by stating( New York Times, 1993):
Having gone into Somalia like a savior, America does not seem to know how
to get out. If we stay and try to bring some sort of law to a country that has
known little of it, there are likely to be more pictures of American dead. (The
more significant number of Somali dead will not, of course, receive as much
attention.) If we leave, there will probably be new scenes of misery from that
unhappy land unless its rulers, having learned a lesson, bar television crews
(p. 26).
Kennan's critique of considering domestic sources in the foreign policy
decision-making process is crucial because he is discounting public opinion's
positive role in the foreign policy decision-making process. Moreover, the burden is
now on the news media to cover important stories to the American people. Important
issues could include commonly shared oppression, such as race.
Policymakers involved in the overall direction of Clinton's foreign policy
platform-Madeline Albright place the blame of the debacle on the point that the
partnership between the UN and the US was not clearly “straightened out.”
Moreover, the UN did not have the aptitude support to ensure the success of longterm peacekeeping operations.
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The images of Americans dragged in Somalia's streets led to a decline in
peacekeeping operations' public support. An October 19th, 1993 article-“Democracies
Have to Fight Wars of Interest and Conscience” by Brian Beedham sheds light on
the problem that democracies face. That is the issue of where the national interest
lies. Beedham cautions policymakers on only looking at the strategic interest of
potential peacekeeping operations.
Moreover, Somalia shows the power of the news media's role in foreign policy
decisions. From the Clinton Library show from dates in October, the Clinton
Administration surveyed ABC, CBS, and NBC’s press clips. The news media
coverage is essential to my argument that there is a connection between the public
and the presidency.8 The Clinton Administration paid close attention to how the news
media framed and coverage the debacle in Somalia.
In late 1993 following the death of 18 Army Rangers in Somalia, the Clinton
Administration tightened its then assertive foreign policy platform-Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD-13) that placed peacekeeping as its centerpiece in foreign
policy.
In May 1994, the Clinton Administration rolled out its new stance on engaging
in peacekeeping operations called PDD-25- “Reforming Multilateral Peacekeeping
Operations.” This new policy directive is vital in understanding the Clinton
Administration's response to violence in Rwanda and Haiti. PDD-25, according to
Albright, would keep peacekeeping as an option if there was support at home to
ensure long-term support of American-led peacekeeping operations.

8

https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47316

138

The first significant point of reform for peacekeeping is that the US must make
strategic peacekeeping decisions that will advance the United States' interest. The
question of what constitutes American interests teased out in the 6th major issue of
improvement that focuses on the role of cooperation “between the Executive, the
Congress and the American public on peacekeeping operations.” This reform area is
essential in understanding the prominent role that my independent variables will play
in the foreign policy decision-making process. PDD-25 further states that the US
support of long-term peacekeeping operations predicated on the “bipartisan support
of Congress and the American people.” Moreover, PDD-25 was a reflection of the
domestic attitudes towards peacekeeping. The subsequent Clinton Administration’s
stance on peace operations designed to prevent “electoral punishment,” and the
Clinton Administration’s decision-making process in Rwanda is a reflection of the
American publics' concern for the United States involvement in peace operations”
(Conteh-Morgan, 1998).
Early in the Clinton Administration's first term, National Security Advisor
Anthony Lake outlined the Clinton Administration's goals, which replaced
communism's emphasis on democratic enlargement (Friedman, 1993). In the same
article from the New York Times, Mr. Lake also highlights healthcare as a top priority
of the Clinton Administration. Meanwhile, another New York Times article, “United
Nations Is Finding Its Plate Increasingly Full, but Its Cupboard Is Bare. On
September 27, 1993, the article demonstrates that 6th, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations-Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was concerned that the UN was taking too
many peace operations that can handle (Foreign Policy, Left Unclear, 1993). In the
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article, Mr. Anthony Lake commented that the entire Administration supports
engagement and American leadership in the world(Foreign Policy, Left Unclear,
1993).
On May 6th, 1994 New York Times article- “New U.S. Peacekeeping Policy
De-emphasizes Role of the U.N.,” summarizes the new policy directive-PDD-25 as
constraining the United Nations role as a world policeman. PDD-25 is essential
because, in 1993, the Clinton Administration placed a rank on peacekeeping as its
centerpiece. Also, the policy directive is a reflection of issues of American
peacekeeping in Somalia and Haiti. The main point made in PDD-25 is that the
“United States cannot resolve the conflicts of the world but does not believe that the
United Nations is capable of making and keeping the peace, particularly when
hostilities still exist.”.
Some more considerations that the United States would focus on in debating
whether to commit to peacekeeping includes( New York Times, 1994):
They include a threat to international security, including an urgent need for aid
after widespread violence or rioting; a sudden interruption of a democracy, or
a gross violation of human rights; consent of the parties; the availability of
money and troops; a mandate appropriate to the mission, and a realistic
strategy to end the mission(Section A, p. 1).
The Clinton Administration states that issues such as the sudden interruption
of democracy, violence, and gross violations of human rights would be essential
factors in the US supporting peacekeeping operations.
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Rwanda: From the Shadow of Somalia to the Question of Rwanda

The Clinton Administration Response to Rwanda's violence came when the
United States was rethinking its role in foreign affairs because of the botch
peacekeeping in Somalia, 1993, that led to 18 Army Rangers' deaths.
The violence in Rwanda escalated to a legal definition of genocide. The
tension centered on the issue of the balance of political power. At the start of the
genocide in early 1994, Rwanda was controlled by its Hutu majority. The two main
ethnic groups in Rwanda, the Tutsi and the Hutu, have experienced division,
Belgium’s colonization of Rwanda was partially constructed. After World War 1,
Belgium’s reorganized Rwanda's social structures led the Tutsi minority to run the
country while the Hutus worked manual labor jobs. Belgium’s reclassified the ethnic
groups where light skin was classified as Tutis, and darker people were issued Hutu
identity cards.

The American news coverage of Rwanda's events occurred when
telecommunications became more accessible because of the creation of 24/7 news
channels such as CNN. The “Big 3” public networks covered Rwanda's events
consistently less than the events in Haiti. The information gathered has been
compiled by the Vanderbilt University Television News Archives service. I analyzed
the coverage of the evening news that typically airs for 28 minutes Eastern Standard
Time.
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Rwanda Print News Coverage -Only included
the following sections: news,
commentrorary, and editiorial
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Figure 3 1994 Print News Coverage of President Clinton via Source: ProQuest
Table 5 1994 Broadcast News Coverage of Rwanda as a “Civil War” via
Vanderbilt News Archives
Big Three Coverage of Rwanda as Civil War
NBC CBS

Rwanda Headlines Per Network ( Number of times Civil

ABC

New

New

New

s

s

s

45/67 41/70 63/84

War Mention/Total Rwanda Headlines)
Percentage

67%

.
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59%

75%

Interest Groups
Table 6 Interest groups and Haiti coverage of the Print News-1994 via Source:
ProQuest: NYT, WSP, and WSJ
Interest groups and
Rwanda coverage of
the Print News-1994
Sections Selected:
News, Commentary,
NY Times WSP
WSJ
and Editorial
Keyword:
Frequency Frequency Frequency
Congressional Black
85
257
59
Caucus
Congressional Black
Caucus Rwanda
1
8
1
Congressional Black
Caucus Percentage of
Coverage
1%
3%
2%
TransAfrica
15
60
4
TransAfrica Rwanda
0
3
0
TransAfrica Rwanda
Percentage of Coverage
0%
5%
0%
Human Rights Watch
80
83
22
Human Rights Watch
17
18
1
Rwanda
Human Rights Watch
Rwanda Percentage of
21%
22%
5%
Coverage
The Clinton Administration's lack of support in an aggressive intervention
force, which may have stopped the Rwandan genocide can be seen through the little
attention that interest groups gave Rwanda. Ambassador Prudence Bushnell
commented that one of the few agencies that pushed for intervention was the Human
Rights Watch (HRW). Other agencies concerned about Rwanda's violence included
the Congressional Black Caucus(CBC) and TransAfrica. It is essential to understand
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that even the absence of a substantial amount of interest groups showing concern
for a crisis can able a government not to intervene because of the perceived lack of
public support. Interest groups act as an extension of public opinion. This supports
the narrative of the policy change reflected in PDD-25- that the US should support
intervention if there is buy-in from Congress and the American public.
Moreover, this section aims to demonstrate a dialogue between the White
House and various interest groups. Lastly, I will highlight that the White House did
respond to the requests of these interest groups. Still, because of a lack of public
interest, the Clinton Administration did not push for military intervention. In my
discussion of Haiti and the role of interest groups, it is evident that the amount of
public pressure from various interest groups supports a US intervention in Haiti.

Congressional Black Caucus Plea
Documents from the Clinton Library and George Washington University show
CBC's effort to rally support the Clinton Administration to intervene in Rwanda to stop
the killings. Moreover, CBC has expressed frustration that the US government has
struggled with having a uniform policy of protecting human rights in Africa because
there is a lack of respect in seeing Africans as equals.9
The CBC's actions may prioritize the interest groups' support in getting the
Clinton Administration to stop Rwanda's genocide. As Wendy Theodore points out in
“The Declining Appeal of Diasporic Connections: African American Organising for
South Africa, Haiti, and Rwanda” ( 2008) points out the failure of CBC to get the

9

https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/stable/pdf/1166823.pdf
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Clinton Administration to stop the genocide is a reflection of a waning connection that
African-Americans have towards Africa.10 As mentioned, the US reluctance to stop.

Public Opinion
Table 7 1994 Public Opinion Polls Rwanda via iRoper Polls
Roper iPoll:

Number

Sample of

of

1994 Public

Questions

Studies/Datasets First Date of 94
Poll

Opinion
Polls
Rwanda

25

13

04/30/1994 05/03/1994

Based on just the headlines for the New York Times, it appears that Rwanda
received more coverage in the context of the refugees versus the coverage that
examines Rwanda as a genocide. In a rough estimate, the New York Times featured
under 60 articles regarding Rwanda and public opinion.

Biting the Bullet: Contextualizing Domestic Variables and Theoretical
Framework in the Aftermath of Rwanda

10
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The Clinton Administration 1994 discussion on not supporting American
forces indirectly intervening in Rwanda is not isolated to the US's tragedy in 199,
Somalia. The spotty public opinion polls coupled with non-comprehensive coverage
from the news media and non-consistent activism from interest groups. My
dissertation examines how the news media, public opinion, and interest groups role
in the Clinton Administration debates regarding intervention in Rwanda and Haiti.
As shown, the news media coverage did not effectively illustrate the fact that
the violence in Rwanda was not a continuation of the 1992 Civil War between the
Hutu government and the Rwandan Patriot Front (RPF). After Hutu President
Juvénal Habyarimana's plane shot down on April 6th, 1994, the Arusha Accords'
already fragile peace came into question. Shortly after the president's death, the
crisis became a one-sided war where the Hutu-led government and other
paramilitary forces tried to eradicate all Tutsis from the earth's face. From the data on
Rwanda's evening news coverage, only two out of the big three networks-ABC and
CBS labeled the crisis as genocide. On April 28, 1994, the US State Department
Christine Shelley answered a direct question on whether Rwanda rose to the legal
definition of genocide.11 Ms. Shelley response was: "...the use of the term 'genocide'
has an exact legal meaning, although it's not strictly a legal determination. There are
other factors in there as well.
In April 1994, the Clinton Administration made it clear that Rwanda's crisis
was not a genocide. Coding the crisis as genocide may have increased international

11

https://www.democracynow.org/2014/4/7/refusing_to_call_it_genocide_documents
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pressure on considering a peace enforcement operation that would intervene on
behalf of the Tutsi victimization.
Various presidents of the United States have made their comments on stating
that another “Armenia,” “Holocaust,” and “Cambodia” from occurring again. In an
indictment against the Germans accused of the war crimes in the Holocaust. The
term has been stated that the twenty-four defendants during the Nuremberg trial
“conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and
national groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories”
(Associated Press, 1945). President Truman wrote the first annual report regarding
the UN to Congress, and he stated that America had been a symbol of “freedom and
democratic progress to peoples less favored than we have been. We must maintain
their belief in us by our policies and our acts,” (President Truman, 1949). Moreover,
President Truman highlighted that the term genocide is considered a crime under
international law. President Truman comments on the US backing the term genocide
and perhaps helping to prevent another genocide.
On April 20, 1990, President George H.W Bush made a commented stating:
The United States responded to the victims of the crime against humanity by
leading international diplomatic and private relief efforts… On this
75th anniversary of the massacres, I wish to join with Armenians and all
peoples in observing April 24, 1990 as a day of remembrance for the more
than a million Armenian people who were victims. I call upon all peoples to
work to prevent future acts of inhumanity against mankind, and my comments
of June 1988 represent the depth of my feeling for the Armenian people and
the sufferings they have endured(Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: George Bush, 1990).
President George H.W Bush did not refer to the Armenian crisis as genocide.
The hesitation of labeling crisis a genocide from Raphael Lemkin's creation dates
back to Jimmy Carter, who, like President Bush, did not call the violence in Armenia
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a genocide on May 16th, 1978. President Reagan was one of the first presidents to
call the events during the Holocaust, Cambodia, and in Armenia a “genocide.”12
Theories of the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy in Examining The US
Response to Rwanda
The Clinton Administration response to the genocide in Rwanda came at a
changing shift in the public's role in foreign policy decision making. Ambassador
Prudence Bushnell stated that domestic politics drive the foreign policy decisionmaking process. The epilogue of the end of the Cold War by scholars such as
Francis Fukuyama said that countries after the Cold War would eventually embrace
democracy.
Fukuyama was not entirely inaccurate when stating that democracy would be
the norm because, based on my evidence, the domestic population in the United
States became more politically conscious. I do not argue that in a post-Cold War,
citizens are educated on complex issues such as genocide, military juntas, etc. The
profound else of life lost in Vietnam resurfaced when the Army Rangers were killed in
Somalia. The creation of PDD-25 reflects the importance of the American people's
impact on the foreign policy decision-making process. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)
supports my idea that the domestic response to Rwanda's violence derived from a
concern that further US support in peacekeeping operations may lead to another
drawn-out Vietnam War. It appears that although the 1990s saw more global cultural
divisions, in liberal states such s the United States, the public wanted to have an
active foreign in deciding how the Clinton Administration would use troops.

12

https://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.63/current_category.4/affirmation_detail.html
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The Clinton Administration, in the shadow of role theory, refocused its
foreign policy goals after the disaster in Somalia. The role of the United States, as
mentioned in the PDD-25, is not to be the world police. The idea that the United
States realizes that they cannot solve all of the world's problems is shown in the
Clinton Administration's response to Rwanda's genocide. The country of Rwanda is
small, and the perception was that there were no viable strategic gains that would
sway the American public to intervene in Rwanda. As mentioned earlier, the Clinton
Administration would not support an aggressive military task-force in early April to
stop the one-sided killing by the Hutu-led government.
Perception of US Interest in Rwanda/ Policymakers Interview Response
Methods/Patterns of Activism used by Domestic Actors:
1. Isolated News coverage that presented the violence in Rwanda as a “Civil
War.”
2. Basic outrage from interest groups but no consensus that wanted intervention.
a. Ambassador Bushnell did point that the Human Rights Watch was one
of vocal groups.
3. There was no majority of the American public that wanted intervention in
Rwanda
4. A former House of Representative who was on the House Chair Committee of
Foreign Policy that I interviewed represent ambiguous census that
Washington D.C had on Rwanda.
The Clinton Administration's 1994 response to Rwanda's genocide occurred
when the American public was still reeling from the loss of afflicted from the tragedy
in Somalia that cost American fatalities. In my analysis early on, I made my case that
the news media, interest groups, and public opinion show that the American public
did not want the burden of potential long-drawn-out crises that leads to a conflict that
would put Americans' lives right.
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I interviewed various policymakers that were involved in the foreign policy
decision-making process. Two of the policymakers who agreed to go on the record
stated that the US response to Rwanda's genocide directly reflects the 1993 US
involvement in Somalia. Ambassador Prudence Bushnell, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated that the “Domestic politics drive foreign
policy” decision process.13 Moreover, I asked Ambassador Bushnell a question on
which interest groups were invisible in trying to attention to Rwanda's violence, and
she informed me that the Human Rights Watch(HRW) was one of the few interest
groups that were vocal about violence in Rwanda. Ambassador Bushnell's statement
backs up the data from various news outlets that showed HRW mentioned Rwanda
more in the news vs. Haiti.
The confusion about Rwanda being an extension of the “Civil War” over a
“Genocide” is backed up by the policymakers I interviewed. A high-ranking Democrat
who sat on House Foreign Affairs Committee called the crises in Rwanda a “Tribal
War.” Ambassador Prudence Bushnell told me she told Debra Winger, who played
her in the HBO Film Sometimes in April( 2005) accurately captured how politicians
felt about Rwanda's violence in a post-Somalia world. From HBO Film Sometimes in
April:
Politician: The rebel forces are “Tutu or Hutsi” [ Hutu and Tutsi]
Ambassador Bushnell: Tutsi and Hutu
Politician: Which are the good guys?

13
Ambassador Bushnell was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs( 1994-1996) and
Ambassador to Kenya ( 1996 to 1999)
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Ambassador Bushnell informed me that quote is based on real events, and
Washington D.C was not equating the violence to be one-sided, and some policy
policymakers were indifferent about the ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are a protected
groups under the United Nations guidelines for the formula for genocide.
As noted earlier, the news media covered events in Rwanda consciously in the
shadow of Somalia. The television news and print news often mischaracterized
Rwanda's events: Tribal War, Ethnic Conflict, and Civil Wars. The Clinton
Administration Press Briefings in 1994 did not devote a large of time discussing what
the United States can do in Rwanda.
The Clinton Administration's framing of Rwanda's violence continued the news
media's characterization of the violence as a “Civil War.” Due to the violence not
being viewed as “systemic” and “one-sided,” coding the crises as a general conflict
such as a “Civil War” gave the Clinton Administration cover in not labeling the crisis
in its early days as a genocide. The Clinton Administration's refusal of calling the
crisis a “genocide” is visible in a 1994 State Department Briefing conducted by
Christine Shelley cautiously answered a question from Reuters correspondent Alan
Elsner “How many acts of genocide does it take to make genocide?” Ms. Shelley
replied by “Alan, that’s just not a question that I’m in a position to answer”
(Democracy Now, 2014).
The Clinton Administration inherited an activist foreign policy agenda because
President George H.W Bush had the US military unblock the roads to allow
humanitarian aid to come through. After all, warlords in Somalia were hijacking the
humanitarian assistance being provided by the international community. By 1994, it
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appears that special interest groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus,
TransAfrica were preoccupied with the events going on in Haiti (which I get to in the
next chapter.
TransAfrica failed to bring attention to the violence in Rwanda. When
TransAfrica was mentioned in various news media, the food hunger strike by Randall
Robinson was the defining policy event of TransAfrica in 1994, not the cr in Rwanda.
Public opinion polls point to Americans having negative attitudes towards
intervention in Rwanda.
Chapter Summary
The lack of domestic pressure from the news media, interest groups, and
public opinion led the Clinton Administration not to push for military force to stop the
genocide in Rwanda, 1994. The domestic reality of 1994 showed that not many
Americans wanted American troops on the ground in Rwanda. The Clinton White
House was not pressured by the news media, interest groups, or public opinion to
intervene in Rwanda. The human tragedy that resulted in genocide in Rwanda did
not activate the domestic pulse in pressuring President Clinton to intervene in
Rwanda. The combination of the three independent variables is essential to note. As
demonstrated in the Haitian response-it, it took various domestic variables to push
the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti.

152

Chapter 5: The Clinton Administration 1994 Response to the Crisis in Haiti
Abstract
Chapter five will examine the impact of the news media, interest groups, and
public opinion in the Clinton Administration response to Haiti's 1994 violence. I look
at each independent variable-news media, interest groups, and public opinion in
determining whether these domestic sources resulted in the Clinton Administration's
push for a US-led intervention to remove the military junta rule. The Clinton
Administration had considerable domestic support to intervene in Haiti vs. Rwanda.
Clinton Administration and Haiti: From the Shadow of Somalia to Action
The political capital came from substantial news media coverage and various
interest groups in advocating the Clinton Administration to use military force to
reinstall President Jean Aristide to power. Moreover, due to Haiti’s proximity to the
US, there is more of a historical relationship between the United States and Haiti.
Haiti's root issue is the country had suffered from instability for decades, and this
heightened instability intensified when the Duvalier family was ousted from power in
the 1980s(Morley & McGillion, 1997). In 1990, Haiti made history by having its first
democratic election when a popular priest-President Aristide, won 60-70% of the
vote(French, 1990). In September 1991, President Aristide’s governance came to an
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end when he was forcibly removed from office by a military coup(Impact of the
September 1991 Coup, 1992). President George H.W Bush's policy in Haiti was
ambiguous because of President Aristides' commitment to change Haiti's economy
by empowering the poor.
Haiti's political instability is not just an isolated event because Haiti's instability
was a campaign issue. Then-Governor Clinton referenced Haiti during the October
15th, 1992 debate moderated by ABC News Carole Simpson. Ms. Simpson asked
Governor Clinton:
Question (by Simpson) Governor Clinton, the president mentioned Saddam
Hussein. Your vice president and you have had some words about the
president and Saddam Hussein. Would you care to comment?
Answer (excerpt): And number three, we need to be a force for freedom and
democracy and we need to use our unique position to support freedom,
whether it’s in Haiti or in China or in any other place, wherever the seeds of
freedom are sprouting. We can’t impose it, but we need to nourish it, and
that’s the kind of thing that I would do as president — follow those three
commitments into the future(Presidential Debate).
The 1992 Presidential Election in America saw the defeat of incumbent
President George H.W Bush and President William Jefferson Clinton's election. At
the start of his presidency, Secretary of State-Warren Christopher noted that Haiti's
solution would include President Jean Aristide. (Kreps, 2007). Early on in the
discussions, there was an attempt by the Clinton Administration to solve the political
issue in Haiti internally by trying to offer a compromise that would please both the
Haitian military and the economic elites of Haiti.
The direction of the Clinton Administrations' policy regarding Haiti changed in
May 1994 when President Clinton signaled that military junta that “it was time for
them to go.” Moreover, the cloud of Somalia seemed to be lifted from the discussion
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of military options because President Clinton was now considering military force. The
Clinton Administration's decision to intervene in Haiti can be perceived from domestic
pressure leveled on the Clinton Administration from various interest groups. The
literature acknowledges the importance of domestic support inside the United States
as the political capital that President Clinton needed in justifying military intervention
(Kreps, 2007).
News Media
The news media coverage differed in the number of times that The American
news media mentioned Haiti and Rwanda in 1994. Haiti's political issues already
activated Haiti's news media because the refugee crisis escalated into an
immigration crisis in the United States. The Haitian refugee crisis in the United
States, therefore, had become a social problem.
The news media has appeared not to cover Haiti as a third-world country
struggling to maintain democracy. There was a balance of power issue in Haiti,
which could be viewed as a "Civil War" was perceived to be "political instability." The
refugee crisis that triggered an immigration crisis in the US penetrated the United
States at the domestic level. People's lives were being impacted by the influx of
immigrants coming to the US from Haiti.
The intense domestic connection between the Clinton Administration, interest
groups, public opinion, and news media strengthen my position that these domestic
variables influenced the Clinton White House to intervene in Haiti. TransAfrica and
CBC's activism appears to have kept the crises in Haiti in the news. Randall
Robinson, who was the director of TransAfrica, went on a hunger strike. I note that
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this is important because the Clinton Administration was aware of Mr. Robinson's
actions in bringing awareness to Haiti's story.
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Figure 4 News Coverage-Haiti sources via ProQuest & Vanderbilt News
Archives
Interest Groups
The impact of various interest groups such as the Congressional Black
Caucus, TransAfrica, and other community groups has played a pivotal role in Haiti's
Clinton Administration intervention. One of the most significant factors that pushed
the Clinton Administration to intervene is the public hunger strike of Randall
Robinson. Moreover, many community-based organizations in New York City
advocated military force support in returning President Aristide to power. I agree that
the strong support of interest groups and Haiti's news media coverage gave
President Clinton the support he needed to send a military force in reinstating
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President Jean Aristide to power. The advocacy from interest groups benefited from
numerous local groups and national groups.

Table 8 1994 Print News Coverage of Interest Groups Mentioning of Haiti
Interest groups and
Haiti coverage of the
Print News-1994
Sections Selected:
News, Commentary,
and Editorial
Keyword:
Congressional Black
Caucus
Congressional Black
Caucus Haiti
Congressional Black
Caucus Percentage of
Coverage
TransAfrica
TransAfrica Haiti
TransAfrica Haiti
Percentage of Coverage
Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch
Haiti
Human Rights Watch
Haiti Percentage of
Coverage

NY Times WSP
WSJ
Frequency Frequency Frequency
85

257

59

24

64

19

28%
15
15

25%
60
51

32%
4
3

100%
80

85%
83

75%
22

8

12

2

10%

14%

1%

Analysis of Interest Groups Coverage
The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) took a vocal and public role in
rallying the Clinton Administration to stop Haiti's violence. The CBC’s prominent role
demonstrated in just the coverage of media outlets mentioning CBC’s dismay of
inaction by the Clinton Administration as part of restoring order in Haiti.
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TransAfrica must be a significant domestic variable that pressured the Clinton
Administration into intervening in Haiti. Randall Robinson, who was the executive
director of the TransAfrica Forum, initiated a hunger strike in early April 1994 to get
the Clinton Administration to hear Haitian political refugee alyssum requests. There
is a connection between the plea of Randall Robinson’s hunger strike because of the
Clinton Administration. In an opinion piece from the New York Times (1994),
President Clinton is quoted as saying, “I understand and respect what he is doing"
and added: "He ought to stay out there. We need to change our policy." Most of the
1994 news coverage of TransAfrica exclusively dealt with the political issues in Haiti.

Public Opinion
Table 9 1994 Public Opinion Polls-Haiti via source-Roper iPoll
Roper
Number
Studies/Datasets First Date of
iPoll:Sample of
of 1994

94 Poll

Questions

Public
Opinion
Polls
Haiti

343

76

1/15/941/18/1994
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The amount of public opinion that showed positive support for the US to intervene in
Haiti is much more significant than the amount of support given for Rwanda's
intervention force.
The public opinion regarding whether the United States should intervene in
Haiti is sporadic; the polls do not give us a definitive answer regarding the public
being the primary catalyst of intervention. However, in a query search from Roper
Polls, the word immigration was flagged 80 different times. In a poll by CBS
News/New York Times Poll: September National Survey, 63% percent of the sample
size believed that the United States should limit immigrants coming to the United
States.14
Perception of US Interest in Haiti
Methods/Patterns of Activism used by Domestic Actors:
1.
2.
3.
4.

News coverage
Partial Congressional Support
Interest Groups
Hunger Strike
a. Randal Robinson
5. Sit-in’s
a. April, 22, 1994, in front of the White House
6. business leaders Protest
7. Star Power- Paul Newman, Joanne Woodward, Jason Robards, Spike Lee,
Jack Lemmon, Gregory Peck, Julia Roberts, Danny Glover, Susan Sarandon,
Robert DeNiro, and Robin Williams.

Clinton Administration Reaction and Discussion on Haiti
The influence of the news media, public opinion, and interest groups helped
push the Clinton Administration to help create a United Nations resolution-United

14

CBS News/New York Times Poll: September National Survey [Roper #31091415]
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Nations Security Council Resolution 940. The resolution enabled the US to create
Operation Uphold Democracy reinstalled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office in
1994. The importance of Haiti's political struggle resonated with a lot more interest
groups, compounded with the increased media visibility, and the mention of Haiti on
public opinion polls gave the issues in Haiti more visibility.
The consistent political pressure from the CBC and TransAfrica gave
President Clinton the political capital that he needed to lobby the UN to sanction the
US government to lead a multilateral peacekeeping operation to return President
Jean Aristide to power. May 1994 marks a quick departure from the inaction of the
Clinton Administration. I hypothesize that the increase of coverage of the television
news stations, coupled with the advocacy actions of various interest groups, and the
fact that although the public opinion polls vary in showing American support, Haiti
being included in the polling questions is just as significant.
On September 15, 1994, President Clinton addressed the nation from the oval
office to tell Americans that the US would enter Haiti to remove the military dictators
and bring back democratically elected President Jean Aristide. President Clinton
said:
'We have tried everything,' Clinton asserted. 'We have exhausted diplomacy.
Now the United States must protect its interests. 'The message of the United
States to the Haitian dictators is clear: Your time is up. Leave now, or we will
force you from power.' 'President Aristide has told me that he will consider his
mission fulfilled not when he regains office, but when he leaves it to the next
democratically elected president of Haiti (Santos, 1994).
How did President Clinton get to this discussion on whether or not to intervene
in Haiti? Some of the answers can be found in the news media, interest groups, and
public opinion polls.
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There is clear evidence that the hard activism of the Congressional Black
Caucus and TransAfrica helped give President Clinton the political capital that he
needed to intervene in Haiti. Randall Robinson, the director of TransAfrica, went on a
hunger strike to bring awareness in early 1994 to Haiti's Clinton Administration's
ambiguous position. Mr. Robinson went on a hunger strike for 27 days (McAlevey,
1994). The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), another interest group, supported
Mr. Robinson’s hunger strike by appearing politically with Mr. Robinson on the
hunger strike's first day. The hunger strike started on April 12, 1994, resulting in Mr.
Robinson losing 13 pounds and hospitalization due to dehydration(McAlevey, 1994).
However, according to Clinton's aids, Robinson’s effort helped heightened political
awareness of Haiti. The former envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, said Robinson’s
actions put “pressure on the Administration”(De Witt, 1994). Most importantly,
President Clinton directly commented on Mr. Robinson’s actions when he said he
respected Mr. Robinson’s “conviction and courage and conscience " (De Witt, 1994).
Moreover, the Congressional Black Caucus supported Mr. Robinson’s actions
and faulted the U.S for not presenting a solid in early 1994 on restoring President
Jean Aristide to power in Haiti. House of Representatives member Major R. Owens
(Democrat from New York) stated that “ We are upset, we are indignant, and we are
declaring war on a racist policy”(De Witt, 1994). Rep. Owens, who is the head of
Haiti's task force, drafted a letter to the Clinton Administration urging the White
House to take Haiti as a “serious” matter (Merida, 1994). Moreover, news reports
from the Associated Press, including an article from March 24, 1994, characterized
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CBC comments on the Clinton Administration's reaction to Haiti as “ineffective”
(Gedda, 1994).
On October 15, 1994, when President Jean Aristide departed Haiti to resume
office, numerous essential members in the African-American presented to see
President Aristide leave the US. The Baltimore Sun’s Carl Cannon wrote:
The two presidents were standing in front of the West Wing before an
audience that included numerous African-American political luminaries.
Among them were the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin
L. Powell, who helped negotiate Father Aristide's peaceful return; the Rev.
Jesse L. Jackson, who plans to go to Haiti today; Rep. Kweisi Mfume, the
chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, which made a priority of Haiti;
and Randall Robinson, whose hunger strike over Haiti jolted the Clinton
administration.15
On November 2, 1994, President Clinton met with members of the AfricanAmerican moderated by Ed Gordan from Black Entertainment Television(BET) to
discuss domestic politics, and the Clinton Administration response to Haiti came up
during the forum. President Clinton, during the forum, said :
Every time I give a speech, I talk about the strength of our diversity; that one
of the best things about what we did in Haiti was that America is the only
country that could have gone to Haiti and produced a couple of hundred
Haitian-American soldiers that could be down there speaking Creole to the
people of Haiti as we prepared to wait for President Aristide to come back
(Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton,
1994).
Finding policymakers willing to talk on the record was the easy part; finding
one that could exclusively attest to being involved in Haiti's decision-making process
was harder.

15

https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1994-10-15-1994288024-story.html.
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Chapter Summary
The Clinton Administration's response to the Haitian military dictatorship
reflects the domestic population's concerns. The United States occupied Haiti in the
early 20th century; therefore, Haiti has had a dependent relationship with the US.
When President Clinton took office, the political situation in Haiti was already a 92
campaign issue.
In 1994, interest groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus and
TransAfrica began intensified political pressure on the Clinton Administration in
intervening in Haiti. The 1994 publicized hunger strike of then director of
TransAfrica-Randall Robinson forced the Clinton Administration's initial tragedy of
bringing peace to Haiti. The Clinton Administration wanted a diplomatic solution.
Therefore, the Clinton White House asked former President Jimmy Carter and
General Collin Powel to serve as negotiators in reaching a peaceful solution in Haiti.
Moreover, TransAfrica had focused most of its attention on trying to
convince the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti. Furthermore, the hunger
strike of Randall Robinson's strategy of embarrassing the Clinton White House to
intervene proved to be effective.
As noted, the news media played an indispensable role in giving
attention to the crises in Haiti. One of Haiti's news coverage's recurring themes was
that if Haiti is not stable, that will cause an immigration crisis that will negatively
impact the United States. The news media was already "activated" because Haiti
has been a political issue in the United States even before the military uprising
occurred.
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My argument deals with the idea that if there is a domestic will, that will
help give presidents more political capital in selling an intervention. Pollsters thought
it was essential to ask Americans over 300 questions regarding public opinion, and
Haiti is essential. Public Opinion polls focused the American population on Haiti
because when a question is asked, the pollster thinks it is warranted.
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Chapter 6 The Domestic Reality of Foreign Policy:
Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the importance of the domestic sources of
foreign policy. The Clinton Administration's responses to the crises in Rwanda, and
Haiti, demonstrated that Clinton’s foreign policy agenda was contingent on domestic
approval. The case studies selected showed the prominence of domestic variables
such as public opinion, the news media, and interest groups. In this chapter, I argue
that the evidence I presented gives credence to domestic actors in the United States.
The Clinton Administration response for both case studies was predicated on output
from my three domestic variables: news media, interest groups, and public opinion.

Towards a New Framework? Analyzing the “Domestic Reality”
My dissertation places liberalism as the main framework that allows for the
inclusion of the domestic variables discussed. Role theory, Democratic Peace
Theory (DPT), and Foreign Policy Analysis(FPA) highlight the critical issue that my
dissertation focuses on domestic/ internal sources: news media, public opinion, and
interest groups. The separation of powers/checks and balances and the constitution
gives the domestic population considerable agency in the foreign policy decisionmaking process.
165

Rwanda

Haiti

Clinton Administration response is
consistent with the domestic reality

Clinton Administration response is
consistent with the domestic reality

Public Opinion Polls yielded negative
reactions revolving American
Involvement

Increased News Media Coverage

News Media Coverage Centered on
the crisis as a “Civil War”
• The violence did result in a genocide but the
news media coverage was not consistent in
calling it a genocide.

Frequent Attention From Human
Rights Interest Groups

Frequent Attention from Ethnic
Interest Groups
• Visible Outrage-Hunger Strike by Randall
Robinson of Trans Africa

Interaction in Domestic Variables

Figure 5 Americans Perceptions

The case studies -Haiti and Rwanda demonstrate the power of the news
media, interest groups, and public opinion to influence the foreign policy decisionmaking process. It is hard to isolate each independent variable because when public
opinion, the news media, and interest groups are combined, they form a powerful
political actor. It is important to note that Congressional support for Rwanda and
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Haiti's US involvement was both mixed. In Haiti's case, the pressure was heightened
due to the Congressional Black Caucus's advocacy work, and TransAfrica complied
by the amount of coverage that Haiti's crises were receiving. Both CBC and
TransAfrica are interest groups that focus on issues concerning minority groups. As
mentioned earlier, most interest groups that use the media must stage protest events
to focus on the news media(Berkhout, 2013).
Implications:
1. The news media “presents” the story for consumption based on demand.
a. The news media presented confusing representations of the “crises” in
Rwanda.
b. The news media presented a consistent representation of the “crises”
in Haiti
2. Public opinion is an “estimation” of public attitudes on a particular public policy
issue.
3. Interest groups are interested in problems that are aligned with their interests
4. The news media can serve as the domestic vehicle to get awareness out on
“Crises,” However, for the news media to be engaged their needs to be a
willing audience. Other domestic variables can help express concerns about
crises
a. Interest Groups
b. Public Opinion
The American public had a prominent role in steering the Clinton Administration's
response to Rwanda and Haiti's violence. The answers are simple in that in the wake
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of the 1993 tragedy in Somalia, it reminded American's about the consequences of
another Vietnam War. In 1994, two crises galvanized the world, Rwanda and Haiti.
The United States experienced a loss of life in Somalia, which made humanitarian
interventions a political causality. The post- Somalia Clinton Administration
strengthened relayed more on domestic support in supported United Nations
peacekeeping operations. In 1994, there was domestic support for intervening in
Haiti over Rwanda because Haiti was more relevant to the United States. The issue
of Haitian refugees was a campaign issue. Therefore, the news media, interest
groups, and the public had a more considerable interest in intervening in Haiti versus
Rwanda. In defense of my conclusions:
The news media “presents” the story for consumption. The news media
creates a climate of urgency based on predicting the interests of the story.
o The fear of another Somalia and assessing American interest in the
story
 Rwanda is on the same continent as Somalia.
 Haiti is closer to the US and has more Haitians in the US.
Interest groups have their "interests."
• Interest groups will fight to advance their "interest," and they choose
issues that matter to their base.
Public opinion is "an opinion."
• Public opinion is a snapshot in one segment of society thinks about an
issue.
•

The Clinton White House, in a post-Somalia political reality, wanted domestic
allies in any military intervention that would result in troops on the on-ground. The
news media picks stories they want to show the American public and frame the story
accordingly. The violence in Rwanda was frequently inaccurately portrayed as a
"Civil War." All three significant networks covered the violence in Rwanda as a
continuation of the Civil War. In comparison, the news media portrayed the events in
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Haiti as a security concern. Interest groups such as TransAfrica and the
Congressional Black Caucus focused on pressuring the Clinton Administration to
intervene. Therefore, the news media kept the spotlight on Haiti. Also, the United
States has two news media levels: the local stage and the national stage. Depending
on the location of cities, the ones close to Haiti may receive more local coverage.
Therefore, Americans may regionally differ in their interests.
Moreover, public opinion was more consistent because the American public did
not want American troops on Rwanda's ground. The increased Haitian population in
the US, but more political coverage on the Clinton Administration. Public opinion
polls showed that Haiti was on Americans' minds, partially because it showed up
more on public opinion polls in 1994 versus Rwanda. Also, refugees are a more
significant concern in the surrounding countries such as Haiti and the United States.

HAITI AND RWANDA 1994 PRINT NEWS
COVERAGE OF SELECT INTEREST GROUPS
Congressional Black Caucus Haiti

Congressional Black Caucus Rwanda

TransAfrica Haiti

TransAfrica Rwanda

Human Rights Watch Haiti

Human Rights Watch Rwanda

100%

85%

28%
1%

0%
NY Times

10%

21%

75%

25%
3%

5%

14% 22%

WSP

32%
2%

0% 1% 5%
WSJ

Figure 6 1994 Rwanda and Haiti Media Coverage via source-ProQuest
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The news media is the first domestic catalyst needed because both the crises
in Rwanda and Haiti received news coverage. There was extensive coverage in
Haiti's case since 1993, and regarding Rwanda, when the president's airplane was
shot down, American media reported on it. The “CNN Effect” can increase
awareness so much that other political actors can get involved. The public then
discusses the coverage of the events, and from there, various interest groups can
heighten awareness of the news being covered. The public should have a
fundamental understanding base on the news to form a public opinion.
Why Not Rwanda?-President Clinton Speeches and actions
President Clinton’s Administration wanted a humanitarian peacekeeping
operation that would not put American troops in harms way. There is debate about
why President Clinton recommended the actions that he did in Rwanda. President
Clinton Administration was characterized by the New York Times in June, 10, 1994
to stop calling the killings in Rwanda a “genocide,” ( Jehl, 1994).
June, 1994 President Clinton Speech About Increasing Aid in Rwanda
Let me be clear about this. Any deployment of United States troops inside
Rwanda would be for the immediate and the sole purpose of humanitarian
relief, not for peacekeeping. The men and women of our armed forces have
responded to this tragedy with vigor and speed. They have already met the
goals we set out last week. The Entebbe air hub is operating around the clock.
The Goma airport is capable of operating 24 hours a day. Transportation
between airfields and the refugee camps is vastly improved. And as I noted,
we are expanding water supplies as quickly as we possibly can.
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Why Haiti?
President Clinton has made numerous speeches regarding the US position in
Haiti.
September, 1994 Address to Nation
Now the United States must protect our interests, to stop the brutal atrocities
that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our borders, and to
preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere, and to uphold
the reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments other make
to us.
I know that the United States cannot, indeed we should not be the world's
policeman, and I know this is a time, with the Cold War over, that so many
Americans are reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel
beyond our borders. But when brutality occurs close to our shores it affects
our national interest and we have a responsibility to act.
Thousands of Haitians have already fled toward the United States, risking
their lives to escape the reign of terror. As long as Cedras rules, Haitians will
continue to seek sanctuary in our nation. This year, in less than two months,
more than 21,000 Haitians were rescued at sea by our Coast Guard and
Navy. Today, more than 14,000 refugees are living at our naval base in
Guantanamo. The American people have already expended almost $200
million to support them, to maintain the economic embargo, and the prospect
of millions and millions more being spent every month for an indefinite period
of time loom ahead unless we act. Three hundred thousand more Haitians,
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five percent of their entire population, are in hiding in their own country. If we
don't act, they could be the next wave of refugees at our door. We will
continue to face the threat of a mass exodus of refugees and its constant
threat to stability in our region, and control of our borders.
In the post Cold War world we will assure the security and prosperity of the
United States with our military strength, our economic power, our constant
efforts to promote peace and growth. But when our national security interests
are threatened, we will use diplomacy when possible, and force when
necessary. (President Clinton)

Question of the Impact of Public Opinion

1994 PUBLIC OPINION POLLS
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Haiti
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25
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ts
13
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Figure 7 1994 Public Opinion Polls via iRoper
The results for public opinion was mixed in both cases. Regarding the two
cases- Rwanda and Haiti, there is no clear consensus from the public opinion polls
that implies people felt one way or the other because of some methodological issues
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beyond my control. The sampling issues with public opinion polls include the
diversity of people taking the poll and what region the people were in when they
answered the polling questions.
I think that the public opinion polls dates provide a clear message on what the
American public was concerned about in regards to foreign policy issues. I only
found in the Roper iPoll database that 25 questions were asked concerning Rwanda
in 1994 compared to the 343 questions asked about Haiti. CBS, and ABC news only
started asking questions concerning Rwanda later in the summer of 1994. The
questions do not reflect the true nature of the level of violence such as labeling it a
“genocide.” Moreover, the questions on Haiti increased after Randall Robinsons
preceded with his hunger strike.

Although the polls' ambiguous nature does not discredit them from my
argument, it is equally essential that “Haiti” questions were asked at a higher rate
than “Rwanda.” Therefore, just the numerous times that Haiti's questions were asked
can be viewed as a positive influence of including a public opinion as a domestic
source of the foreign policy decision-making process.
The initial most formidable challenge of this dissertation was to find a method
where I can prove that news media, public opinion, and interest groups played a role
in the Clinton Administration’s response to the violence in Haiti and Rwanda. It was
hard at first to be able to conclude that President Clinton considered non-traditional
political actors such as the news media, interest groups, and public opinion without a
“smoking gun.”
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My “smoking gun,” for this dissertation is anytime in 1994 that the print news
was recorded in any running record that President Clinton was concerned about the
public opinion, interest groups, and the news media
Foreign Policy with A Domestic Reality: The Clinton Doctrine Reassessment
This dissertation aimed to demonstrate that domestic support matters when
the president intervenes in foreign policy-related issues in American foreign policy.
The Clinton Doctrine champions the promotion of democracy and the expansion of
economic markets. Based on the research that I have conducted, the Clinton
Doctrine is constrained by the public, but the Clinton Administration listened to the
public's silence regarding Rwanda and the public's outrage in regards to Haiti. The
Clinton Doctrine's overall aim was indeed to promote democracy and economic
trade. Still, the caveat on the extent of how far the Clinton Doctrine was willing to go
was predicated on the public will, similarly to the Powell Doctrine.
The Clinton Administration appeared to have listened to the public in
intervening in Haiti, but not Rwanda. The Clinton Doctrine can evolve, such as when
President Clinton was expanding the inherited Somalia crises to the Clinton
Administration, making strategic choices based on the public pulse. The Clinton
Administration's response to Rwanda and Haiti reflects his changing foreign policy
that did not outright abandon humanitarian operations but strengthened the selection
criteria-PDD-25. As the first two-term president in a post-Cold War era, the Clinton
Administration laid the groundwork to ensure a somewhat public consensus in how
the Clinton Administration responded to international crises. Although the Clinton
Doctrine goes after rogue states, the extent and means may vary because Rwanda
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and Haiti fit the rouge states model, but with Haiti being closer to the US than
Rwanda, the public was more engaged in the crises in Haiti. The loud rhetoric on the
issue of intervention in Haiti from the Congressional Black Caucus(CBC) and
TransAfrica coupled with strong media coverage and public opinion polls met the
requirements of PDD-25. Therefore, President Clinton intervened in 1994 to remove
the military junta and restore President Jean Aristide.
Haiti and Rwanda's public perception of being a security threat( non-threat) to
the United States was also an issue. Americans did not fully understand the context
of why the violence in Rwanda merited a genocide, although the mainstream
American news coded the violence in Rwanda as a continuation of the 1992 Civil
War. Moreover, the government did not convene the American people that the Hutu
government was waging a one-sided war against the Tutsis.
The lack of public awareness elucidates why the Clinton Administration did
not recommend American military force in Rwanda. The news media covered
Rwanda substantively less than Haiti. Moreover, the CBC and TransAfrica, who
expressed outrage on Rwanda's violence, were more concerned with Haiti's
intervening. Furthermore, the mixed results from public opinion polls did not
strengthen the argument that the Clinton Administration should intervene. Based on
my research, I can conclude that domestic power and consensus are the Clinton
Doctrine's cornerstone.
Future Research
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There are numerous other areas that I can expand upon in future work in how
some of the domestic variables have evolved such as the rise of social media.
Moreover, this dissertation could have been enhanced if more elite interviews were
acquired but due to cost issues and availability, I only was able to conduct five.
The analysis of the domestic sources of foreign policy has been a fixture in
the study of foreign policy in a post-Cold War era. My research suggests that the
two cases that I examined, Rwanda and Haiti, indicate domestic debate in the United
States on whether the Clinton Administration should intervene in Rwanda and Haiti.
The first significant area could be diving deeper into how pluralism and constraints
on the government can explain foreign policy decisions. I can use my three
independent variables: news media, public opinion polls, and interest groups, to
explore other case studies.
My dissertation is a case study on how domestic politics can impact foreign
policy. Foreign policy support for US-led humanitarian decisions in peacekeeping
operations often reflects what the “domestic reality” is willing to support. Within my
dissertation, there are new themes that could be unearthed in future research. Queer
studies are sometimes not examined for foreign policy cases. Regarding Haiti, since
refugees were being discriminated against for HIV/AIDS status, this issue has the
attention of various other interest groups. This is because of the impact of LGBTQ+
groups such as ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) role in drawing attention
to Haiti's issues.
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Conclusion
This dissertation explores the hitherto unexamined Clinton Administration
dilemma of responding to two major crises in 1994-the genocide in Rwanda and the
political upheaval in Haiti. The Clinton Administration had to factor American public
on whether to support another humanitarian peacekeeping operation following the
disastrous 1993 peacekeeping operation in Somalia. From the archival and content
analysis, including interviews from top policymakers from the Clinton White House
and other policymakers in 1994, it appears that the Clinton Administration wanted
approval from the American public before committing the US to another
peacekeeping operation in the wake of the 18 Army Rangers killed in 1993, Somalia.
The Clinton Administration had more positive political capital in using force in
Haiti than in Rwanda. For Clinton, as a first-term president who wanted to be the first
Democrat president to win reelection since Harry Truman, President Clinton needed
domestic approval because the political stakes were too high. The Clinton
Administration needed public support to justify its intervention in Haiti and not
Rwanda. The Clinton Administration did not have the necessary domestic permission
to intervene in Rwanda. The news media coverage, interest groups, and public
opinion would be a compass for how the Clinton Administration would conduct
foreign affairs in a post-Somalia world. The lack of public awareness from the news
media, public opinion, and interest groups did not give the Clinton Administration the
political support to intervene in Rwanda. Still, the public awareness stemming from
intense news media coverage, vocal interest groups, and frequent mentioning of
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Haiti in public opinions was enough political support for the Clinton Administration to
intervene in Rwanda.

Finally, as a dissertation and contribution to the academic scholar, The
Domestic Reality of Foreign Policy: The 1994 Clinton Administration Response to the
Crises in Rwanda and Haiti not only underscores the importance that "domestic
sources" has on the foreign policy because other sources exist such as external,
psychological, decision environment, and among others. My dissertation focuses on
how domestic variables can have an impactful role in influencing foreign policy
decisions such as international crises. The Clinton Administration's ability due to
powers in the executive branch can quickly respond to international crises while
adapting ( if needed) to meet the public's concerns.

This dissertation looks at the complex nature of how the United States deals
with a crisis while considering domestic variables' role. In 1994, the Clinton
Administration changed immediately tightened its grip on supporting peace
operations. Moreover, this dissertation focuses on how the presidency can quickly
adapt to domestic concerns in figuring out how to handle international crises. The
Clinton Administration as the executive branch is more powerful because it can
quickly end a crisis, which a dragged-out debate on a treaty could not. Lastly, when
the president takes action to provide a hast solution to a crisis, it will direct how the
international community responds. As a first-term president, it appears that President
Clinton changed foreign policy directions in light of domestic pressure. The analysis
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of President Clinton's argument strengthens my use of Democratic Peace Theory,
Role theory, and foreign policy analysis because an international crisis can cause
political crises. With the 1994 and 1998 elections looming, the Clinton Administration
made difficult choices in strategically deciding the US's role in the 1994 crises in
Rwanda and Haiti.
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I am Camara “Cam Silver a PhD candidate at the University of South Florida
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Appendix C: Contextual Quotes
"When our founders boldly declared America's independence to the world and our
purposes to the Almighty, they knew that America, to endure, would have to change.
Not change for change's sake, but change to preserve America's ideals; life, liberty, the
pursuit of happiness. Though we march to the music of our time, our mission is
timeless. Each generation of Americans must define what it means to be an American."
-President Bill Clinton
"We cannot build our own future without helping others to build theirs"
-President Bill Clinton
"People around the world have always been more impressed by the power of our
example than by the example of our power."
-President Bill Clinton
"Our democracy must be not only the envy of the world but the engine of our own
renewal. There is nothing wrong with America that cannot be cured by what is right with
America."
-President Bill Clinton
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